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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates international organizations which are dealing with 
terrorist financing, tries to determine what their role is and what contributions 
they make to the issue. The research topic on struggle against terrorist financing 
will be analyzed step by step and will be followed by details of international 
organizations which have prioritized this research topic. Accordingly, this study 
tries to determine what terrorism is, how it is defined and classified. After that, the 
reasons for the need for terrorist funding are investigated from the aspects of how 
legal or illegal sources are flourished and how these funds have been manifested. 
It is worth mentioning about the early counter-terrorism history in order to 
determine how international organizations interact with/and are interested in the 
struggle against terrorist financing and who are the actors and which are the 
events that affect this process in the world politics. In that transition stage, 
priorities that lead to the terrorist financing’s technical adaptation will be 
assessed. It will also be investigated which of the international organizations have 
taken action by way of prioritizing the struggle against terrorism and terrorist 
financing, and what the roles/and the results of these struggles were. It is 
considered that some of the international organizations that are struggling against 
terrorist financing are considered as the authorities which have set international 
standards. Decisions and reports produced by the international organizations that 
are involved in the struggle against terrorist financing will be examined in detail 
and the details of what are the priorities of the international organization that have 
been struggling against terrorist financing will be examined. This study will 
abstract the history, the structures, the working groups, composition, and 
participation of Financial Action Task Force (FATF). There are 40 
recommendations and special recommendations set by the FATF to combat 
terrorist financing (CFT) and anti-money laundering (AML). This study will try to 
cover the CFT terminologies in the recommendations and will specify what those 
special recommendations on terrorist financing are and will investigate which 
xvi 
 
deficiencies and limitations they have experienced in the struggle against terrorist 
financing. This study analyzes two terrorist groups as a case, Islamic State of Iraq 
and Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda, to look financial war and strategies on these 
terrorist groups since 2001. How effective international organizations' campaign 
to limit terrorist finance has been a matter of controversy. This study suggested 
the way of solutions on this controversy. 
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ÖZET 
 
Bu çalışma, terörizmin finansmanı ile mücadele eden uluslar arası 
organizasyonların hangileri olduğu, rollerinin neler olduğu ve konuya hangi 
açılardan katkı yaptıklarını araştırmaktadır. Terörizmin finansmanı ile mücadele 
araştırma konusunun parçalara ayrılarak tanımlanması yapılmaya çalışılacak ve 
sonunda bu araştırma konusunu öncelikleri arasına koymuş uluslararası 
organizasyonlar incelenecektir. Bu sıralamaya göre ilk önce terörizmin ne olduğu, 
nasıl tanımlandığı ve sınıflandırıldığı tespit edilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bundan sonra 
terörizmin kaynak ihtiyacının nedenleri, hangi yasal veya yasal olmayan 
kaynaklardan beslendiği ve bahsedilen kaynakların nasıl büyüdüğü 
araştırılacaktır. Terörizmle mücadelenin geçmişine değinilirken terörizmin 
finansmanı ile mücadele aşamasına uluslararası alanda nasıl gelindiği, geçiş 
aşamasında bu sürece etki eden aktörlerin ve olayların neler olduğu belirlenmeye 
çalışılacaktır. Bu geçiş aşamasında terörizmin finansmanı ile mücadelenin teknik 
altyapısının hangi önceliklere göre kurulduğu değerlendirilecektir. Uluslararası 
organizasyonların hangilerinin terörizm ve terörizmin finansmanı ile mücadeleyi 
öncelikli kılarak hareket ettiği ve bu mücadele de rollerinin neler olduğu 
araştırılacaktır. Terörizmin finansmanı ile uluslararası alanda mücadele eden 
organizasyonların hangilerinin uluslararası standartları oluşturabilecek otorite 
olarak kabul edildiği değerlendirilecektir. Terörizmin finansmanı ile mücadele 
kapsamında uluslararası çalışmalar yürüten organizasyonların konuyla alakalı 
almış olduğu kararlar ve raporlar detaylı olarak incelenerek, hangi uluslararası 
organizasyonun hangi önceliklerle terörizmin finansmanı ile mücadele ettiği 
detaylarıyla incelenecektir. FATF tarafından terörizmin finansmanı ve kara para 
aklama ile mücadele için oluşturulmuş 40 tavsiye ve 9 özel tavsiye bulunmaktadır. 
Çalışma terörizmin finansmanı ile uluslararası mücadele terminolojisini 
kapsamaya çalışırken, terörizmin finansmanı ile mücadele amacıyla çıkarılan 9 
özel maddeyi detaylı inceleyerek eksik ya da kısıtlı yönlerini tespit etmeye 
çalışacaktır.  Çalışma Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti (ISID) ve Al-Qaeda terör 
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örgütleri ile finansal savaş ve stratejilerini 2001 yılından bugüne kadar analiz 
etmektedir. Terörizmin finansmanını kısıtlamaya yönelik uluslararası 
organizasyonların çabalarının etkili olup olmadığı bir ihtilaf konusu iken, çalışma 
bu ihtilafa çözüm yolları önermektedir.
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of terrorism has been a controversial concept that has not been 
a uniform definition for it over the years. Establishing this definition is the first 
and most important step for understanding terrorist financing. The common 
definition of terrorism is also important in the struggle against terrorist financing 
to identify the risks and to take preventive measures.  
Studies conducted in the framework of terrorism in Turkey have been 
limited to terrorist organizations at the national level in the field. Those national 
assessments are currently insufficient to define the supranational place of 
terrorism. Nugent (2003, p.475) notes supranationalism takes inter-state relations 
beyond cooperation into integration, and involves some loss of national 
sovereignty. Those inadequate definitions and examples are directly affecting the 
international struggle against terrorism. One state’s definition of terrorism can 
contradict with the other states’ definitions. One state’s terrorist could be defined 
as freedom fighter from the view point of another state. This acute discrepancy 
among the views of different states stems from the variety of definitions of 
terrorism. Germany Home Secretary Thomas de Maiziere declared that Germany 
and Turkey have different prospects on terrorism definition, and this contradiction 
has eventually harmed bilateral relations (Sputnik 2017). This discrepancy on the 
definition of terrorism has caused great damage to international relations, and it 
has unfortunately incapacitated the better and exact understanding of terrorism.  
Academic studies within the context of the international struggle against 
terrorism have been shaped by the role and efficiency of United Nations (UN). 
They have not included other international organizations which struggle against 
terrorism in an adequate manner. These limitations have inescapably affected and 
impacted in a negative fashion our prospects of fighting against terrorism at both 
national and international levels. Internationally accepted and shared definition of 
terrorism can help developing international approach to struggle against terrorist 
financing. International organizations provide many opportunities to develop the 
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necessary international approach to fighting against terrorism, but we do not know 
how it might work? And to which extent? In this sense, this study has tried to 
describe the ways that how international organizations could work and what their 
prospects would be against terrorism and terrorist financing.    
Conceptual debates on terrorism have only identified sociological side, but 
economic aspects of the issue have been neglected for many years. In our time, 
there is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism. Therefore, it has also 
led to the lack of clarification on definition of terrorist financing, despite the fact 
that this lacking in the definition of terrorism has prevented the concept of 
struggle against terrorist financing from achieving its goals for many years. 
Nonetheless, it has become one of the most important issues of the international 
agenda, in particular with the significant contributions of international 
organizations after 9/11.  
Jimmy Gurule (2009) noted that terrorism is a global threat and it is not 
possible to win fight against terrorism without common mind, sustainability, 
continuity and collaboration. This study has supported this idea and underlined the 
fact that terrorism can only be confronted by the way of establishing a structure 
over and beyond the borders so as to indicate that this scourge cannot be rooted 
out by just single state. It should first be accepted that terrorism and terrorist 
financing are global threats and solutions can only be found on a ground 
comprised of common mind, continuity, sustainability and collaboration.  
History of terrorism has showed that fighting terrorism with mere military 
and police measures is inadequate and ineffective; it is needed to have the causes 
and consequences investigated in a systematic and structural way. It is obvious 
that this substantial threat, which transcends borders, makes cooperation among 
states compulsory. Within the scope of international cooperation efforts, terrorist 
financing is one of the major issues in struggling against terrorism.  
On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists committed the largest and deadliest 
terrorist attack in the United States of America. The response from the 
international community, and in particular the US, was swift (ed. Ryder 2015, 
p.3).9/11 attacks triggered, a global war on terrorism and prompted a new burst of 
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rule-making and interaction on terrorist financing. FATF, the United Nations and 
the European Union enacted this policy change at a global level in order to 
struggle against terrorist financing. Then, IMF, the World Bank, Council of 
Europe, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the Wolfsberg Group of 
Banks and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision enacted CFT regime.  
This study has also searched about the possibilities for motivations of 
international organizations in struggle against terrorist financing? To what extent 
can their own reasons go in this fight? Moreover, terrorist financing is a global 
threat and this threat needs collaboration, persistence and global solutions. 
However, international organizations’ efforts on collaboration are limited or not? 
and to what extent international organizations’ efforts in struggle against terrorist 
financing? This study tried to find answers of these questions. 
Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane (1985) emphasize the importance of 
anarchy defined as the absence of government but argue that this constant feature 
of world politics permits a variety of patterns of interaction that could occur 
among states. Neo-institutional liberalism underestimates the importance of 
worries about survival as motivations for state behavior, which it sees as a 
necessary consequence of anarchy. 
Neo-institutional liberalism tries to find answers why the actors choose 
organizations to further their interests and which features of the organizations 
affect it. Keohane and Nye (2001) argue that interdependence, especially 
economic interdependence, is an important feature of world politics. Also, 
Keohane and Nye (2001) argue that states are dominant actors in international 
relations; it is not an effective instrument of policy. This mutual interdependence 
among states positively affects behavioral patterns and changes the way the states 
cooperate (Keohane & Nye 2001).  
Neo-institutional liberalism emphasizes that international relation is 
anarchic, states are self-interested and co-operation among nations are possible. 
Organizations may define rules, norms, practices and decision-making procedures 
that shape expectations and this can be overcome the uncertainty that undermines 
co-operation (Gutner 2016). Neo-institutional liberalism argues that organizations 
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enhance information about state behavior and increase efficiency. The neo-
institutional liberalism defines actors how to cooperate in the international 
anarchic environment; international organizations are key players that can solve 
problems such as terrorism, originated in the anarchy in world political system. 
This study tries to find answers on how the international organizations affect 
struggle against terrorist financing. Gurule (2009) noted that states should support 
from international organizations in struggle against terrorist financing. Moreover, 
he claimed that terrorism is a global threat and money is a liquid commodity, it is 
not possible without common mind, sustainability, continuity and collaboration. 
This study has searched for how those neo-institutional liberalism theories work 
under a global threat, like terrorism. 
This study has tried to answer three questions; first is it possible to combat 
terrorist financing with international organizations under neo-liberal 
institutionalism? Second which international organizations can combat terrorist 
financing, and through which mechanisms? Neo-institutional liberalism theory 
explains international organizations as may define rules, norms and standards, 
such as Counter Terrorist Financing (CFT) measures. This study has searched that 
CFT measures has worked on cases or not? 
Struggle against terrorist financing has become an internationally 
recognized issue with the adoption of the International Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorist Financing on 9 December 1999 in the UN General 
Assembly. Measures taken against terrorist financing to be applied by 
organizations such as Financial Action Task Force (FATF), United Nations, 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Council of Europe, 
European Union, G-20, Egmont Group, Wolfsberg Group and Basel Committee 
on Banking Regulations. They are following a trend of constantly increasing and 
expanding the range, scope, and field of application of these measures.  
This study has mentioned about international organizations which struggle 
against terrorist financing, after that it has assessed the context of FATF and 
FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. It has specifically 
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examined FATF, its decision-making processes, 40 Recommendations and 9 
Special Recommendations.  
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is one of those institutions that sets 
standards on the struggle against terrorist financing. It has 40+9 recommendations 
for money laundering, combating terrorist financing and proliferation. After the 
9/11 attacks, the appropriate recommendations that have been developed in the 
struggle against terrorist financing, which has not been examined before in 
academic studies related to terrorism.  
The fact that terrorist financing and FATF issue has already been very 
limited in academic studies and the FATF special recommendations for struggling 
against terrorist financing have not been included in the academic studies 
sufficiently. It is difficult to find resources on this issue and it is necessary to carry 
out the research for this study in other languages. 
The history of struggle against the terrorist financing by international 
organizations will be narrated based on their reports. FATF, one of these 
international organizations, and its nine special recommendations brings out the 
struggle against terrorist financing, will be examined in detail.  
These recommendations are: 
 
I. Ratification and Implementation of  UN Instruments 
II. Criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism and Associated  Money 
Laundering 
III. Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets 
IV. Reporting Suspicious Transactions Related to Terrorism 
V. International Co-operation 
VI. Alternative Remittance 
VII. Wire Transfers 
VIII. Non-profit Organizations 
IX. Cash Couriers 
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In this study, State Reviews CFT (Countering the Financing of Terrorism), 
FATF Annual Reports, High Level Principles and Procedures, Methodology of 
Terrorist Financing, FATF Terrorist Financing Strategy, Financing of Terrorist 
Organization Islamic State of Iraq, the Levant and Al-Qaeda Reports published 
by FATF will be cited for determining the possible shortcomings and limited 
aspects of 9 specific recommendations mentioned to CFT.  The actors and factors 
that impede development of these incomplete and limited aspects will be 
determined. 
International organizations efforts in fight against terrorism are main 
research topic for this study. It studies on 2 terrorist group cases, such as Al-
Qaeda and ISIL. Both cases found out some results on international organizations 
efforts in fight against terrorism and terrorist financing. These results showed that 
international organizations have limited affect in fight against terrorist financing. 
This study argues on limited affects of international organizations and makes 
future predictions on international organizations fight against terrorist financing. 
In the first section, it will be analyzed how to approach the theoretical 
framework. It will try to explain the crucial role that the international 
organizations play in supra-national issues of interest to the whole world in the 
struggle against terrorist financing by referring to neo-institutional liberalism 
theory thinkers. Where neorealists have been seen to focus on security measures, 
neo-institutional liberalism are believed to have placed greater emphasis upon 
environmental and economic issues, with specific emphasis on the latter (Lipson 
1984). Keohane and Nye (2001) argue that interdependence, especially economic 
interdependence, is an important feature of world politics. Also, Keohane and Nye 
(1971) argue that states are dominant actors in international relations; it is not an 
effective instrument of policy. This mutual interdependence among states 
positively affects behavioral patterns and changes the way the states cooperate 
(Keohane & Nye 2001). This study will also try to explain the cooperation in the 
struggle against terrorist financing and rational actors such as international 
organizations and states.  Attempt will also be made to explain how this study 
approaches the concern regarding the theoretical framework. Then a conceptual 
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definition of terrorism, the first and the most important step in the struggle against 
terrorism, will be conducted. Terrorism character, history of terrorism, causes of 
terrorism and classification will be completed. 
In second section of this study, the reasons for the need of funding terrorist 
groups that constitutes infrastructure of the concept of terrorist financing will be 
investigated. Legal and illegal sources of terrorist financing will be explained in 
detail.  
In third section, the scope of international co-operation studies will be 
investigated during the struggle against terrorist financing. It includes 
international organizations such as the International Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Council, the European Union, the G-20, the Egmont Group, the 
Wolfsberg Group and the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations. 
Organizations' studies, recommendations and reports on CFT will be assessed. 
In fourth section of this study, the structure of the FATF, the membership, 
and the working groups will be investigated to see what purpose of the FATF 
recommendations is. Special recommendations under the heading of FATF's 
combating terrorist financing (CFT) will be interpreted in detail by referring to 
criticisms regarding the lack of and the limitations of standards. This study tries 
furthermore to explain the FATF mutual evaluation process in order to understand 
name and shame model for non-compliant states for CFT. FATF still in process to 
improve its priority of CFT, so limitations of CFT strategy and special 
recommendations will be analyzed. In this context, FATF which has a decisive 
role in specifying the recommendations in the struggle against terrorist financing 
will be discussed in terms of weak and strong points within the scope of this 
study. The problems that may be experienced in the implementation of the 
standards in the international arena will be evaluated. The sanctioning power of 
the FATF to enforce the standards on member states and the rates of application 
of the states to the special standards will be handled in a comparative manner. 
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In fifth section of this study, study put summarize of international 
organizations efforts and remind their unique reasons in struggle against terrorist 
financing. The struggle against terrorist financing as earlier sections defined , is 
reliant on a number of mechanisms including the criminalization of terrorist 
financing, freezing or forfeiting the assets of terrorists, the use of financial 
intelligence and use of sanctions. Thus, the key question for this section has been 
what extent these measures will be able to limit the funding activities of terrorist 
financing. Moreover, study searched that what extent are CFT measures will have 
on these terrorist groups? Is this struggle against both terrorist organizations’ 
financing, international organizations efforts are proper or limited?   
In conclusion, a summary is made and results are put forward. There are 
citations of earlier sections to remind findings. This study put findings of 
evaluation section and emphasizes limited points of CFT regime. International 
organizations has essential role in struggling against terrorist financing. This study 
reminds of this role of international organizations and puts forth its own advices 
for them in struggle against terrorist financing.   Moreover, a future prospect on 
FATF Special Recommendations is defined and it proves itself up to the hilt that 
the situation of CFT is limited. Ultimately, this study tries to clarify an up to date 
perspective on CFT and struggle against terrorist financing strategies. 
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SECTION ONE 
 
THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Robert Keohane (1993) emphasized that students of international affairs 
need a better theory of organizations.  So he started a new discussion over 
organizations and their importance. Liberal scholars before made organizations 
the primary subject of their mostly descriptive and patently normative inquiries: 
organizations mattered to them (Onuf 2002, p.211). Realist and liberal thinkers 
start with states as rational agents, and not particularly on organizations.  
The best theory would tell us when organizations necessarily matter to 
states, and why necessary and possibly how? It would help us to understand the 
ways in which organizations possibly matter, by telling us how they come about, 
what the properties that they have, and how they can be used (Winch 1971). 
Economists have also experienced a renewed interest in organizations (Ed. 
Langlois 1986) (Rutherford 1994). Friedrich Hayek (1974) has a precise point of 
view to understand, which organizations matter to rational individuals. A giant 
among liberal economists, the polemicist of great power, Hayek was unwavering 
in his convictions and relentless espousing them over three decades (Onuf 2002, 
p.211). Hayek's story would seem to offer something to any scholar who assumes 
that agents make rational choices (Hayek 1974). Discussions of organizations in 
the field of international relations (IR) have far more to do with system properties 
and agent goals than with the cumulative effect of agents' choices on institutional 
conditions and the specific effects of organizations on agents' choices (Baldwin 
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1993) (Keohane 1993). Kenneth Waltz (1979) quoted in Institutions, Intentions 
and International Relations, insistence that the market is not an institution or an 
agent in any concrete or palpable sense, but instead a structural cause, is the 
reason (Onuf 2002, p.212). He did not accept Hayek’s economic organizations 
explanation and claim that the international system is structurally similar to a 
market. 
This study tries to find the best theory that can explain international 
organizations in world political system; it analyzes the organizations in 
international theories based on issues, such as anarchy, state interests, integration 
and cooperation. This study will finalize with the readings of international 
relations theories on international organizations.  
  Although no one denies that the international system is anarchical in some 
sense, there is a disagreement as to what this means, why it matters and how 
(Baldwin 1993, p.4). Arthur Stein (1982, p. 324) distinguishes between the 
independent decision making that characterizes anarchy and the joint decision 
making in international regimes and then suggests that it is the self-interests of 
autonomous states in a state of anarchy that leads them to create international 
regimes. Charles Lipson (1984, p.22) notes that the idea of anarchy is the Rosetta 
stone of international relations but suggests that its importance has been 
exaggerated by the neorealist at the expense of recognizing the importance of 
global interdependence. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane (1985) emphasize 
the importance of anarchy defined as the absence of government but argue that 
this constant feature of world politics permits a variety of patterns of interaction 
among states. Joseph M. Grieco (1988, p.497) contends that neo-institutional 
liberalism and neo-realism fundamentally diverge on the nature and consequences 
of anarchy. He asserts that the neo-institutional liberalism underestimates the 
importance of worries about survival as motivations for state behavior, which he 
sees as a necessary consequence of anarchy. 
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Helen Milner (1991, p.70, 81, 82) identifies the discovery of orderly 
features of world politics amidst its seeming chaos as perhaps the central 
achievement of neo-realism, but she agrees with Lipson (1984) that the idea of 
anarchy has been overemphasized while interdependence has been neglected. 
Duncan Snidal (1991) views Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations as examples of 
the realist conception of anarchy, while Grieco (1988) associates PD with neo-
institutional liberalism. In general, neo-realism sees anarchy as placing more 
severe constraints on state behavior than do neoliberals (Baldwin 1993, p.5). 
Uncertainty and fear defined the perspective for neorealist’s anarchic 
environment, but neo-liberal institutionalism has a different perspective that 
asserts international organizations can reduce state’s uncertainty and fear by 
encouraging cooperation between them. 
Neo-institutional liberalism and neo-realism agree that both national 
security and economic welfare are important, however, they differ in relative 
emphasis on these goals. Lipson (1984) argues that international cooperation is 
more likely in economic issue areas than in those concerning military security. 
Since neo-realism tends to study security issues and neo-institutional liberals tend 
to study political economy, their differing estimates of the ease of cooperation 
may be related to the issues they consider.  Grieco (1988) contends that anarchy 
requires states to be preoccupied with relative power, security, and survival. 
Powell (1991) constructs a model intended to bridge the gap between neo-
institutional liberalism emphasis on economic welfare and neorealist attention of 
security. In his model, states are assumed to be trying to maximize their economic 
welfare in a world where military force is a possibility (Baldwin 1993, p.7). For 
the most part, neorealism or neo-institutional liberalism treats state goals by 
assumption. As Keohane (1993) points out, neither approach is good at predicting 
interests. 
Furthermore, constructivist lawyers and political scientists have made a 
strong case that the roles that representatives of states assume, and even their 
conceptions of self-interest, depend significantly on the rules and practices of 
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international organizations (Wendt 1992). Hence, how actors' interests are 
constructed remains an open question. The instrumentalist optic has interests more 
sharply in focus than the normative optic. It is clearer what those interests are, and 
that the arguments being made are not circular. However, the fact that 
organizations can structure interests’ means that interests are not the 
instrumentalist's trump cards after all (Keohane 1999, p.376). 
In Morgenthau's view, the obvious measure of a nation's power is found in 
military strength. Such power is the main determinant for the place of state actors 
in the hierarchically-arranged international system the agenda of which is 
dominated by security concerns (Morgenthau 1949, p. 54). Realism defines that 
states are the main actors in world political system, but in modern world political 
system, this argument is inadequate. Non-state organizations, multinational 
companies are also actors that affect the world political system in line with state 
interests. However, we can say that these new actors cannot establish new 
paradigms and structures without states.  Keohane and Nye (1977) criticized 
realist school of thought in such a way that; states are not the only players in 
world political system. They are necessarily unitary actors as they are composed 
of competing bureaucracies, force itself may now be an ineffective instrument of 
policy; the traditional hierarchy of issues with military/security matters dominate 
economic and social ones is now replaced by an agenda in which a clear hierarchy 
of topics does not exist (Keohane & Nye 1977, p. 24,25). 
Neo-realism, unlike Realism, underlines that states continue to be the most 
talented actors, even if they are not the sole actors of international relations (Arı 
2013). At the same time, according to neo-institutional liberalism, states are 
rational actors. Neo-institutional liberalism, however, accept the presence of other 
actors from the state (Arı 2013). According to this theory, there are many actors in 
international relations, such as individuals, international organizations, pressure 
groups other than states. 
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Cooperation among nations has become the focus of a wide range of 
studies in the past decade, a subject of interest to political scientists, economists, 
and diplomats (Milner 1992, p.466). A notable feature of the recent literature on 
international cooperation is the acceptance of a common definition of the 
phenomenon (Keohane 1986). Following Robert Keohane (1986), some scholars 
have defined cooperation as occurring when actors adjust their behavior to the 
actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination (Lindblom 1965). This conception of cooperation consists of two 
important elements (Deutsch 1949). First, it assumes that each actor’s behavior is 
directed toward some goals. Second, the definition implies that cooperation 
provides the actors with gains or rewards (Milner 1992, p.468). Keohane (1986), 
Kenneth Oye’s (1986) Cooperation under Anarchy volume, Joseph Grieco 
(1990), and Peter Haas (1990) all employ the same definition. They should, 
therefore, be able to agree on what is cooperative behavior and what is not. Their 
disagreements are not about what constitutes cooperation; they are about what 
causes it (Milner 1992, p.468). 
Although neo-institutional liberalism and neo-realism agree that 
international cooperation is possible, they differ as to the ease and likelihood of its 
occurrence. According to Grieco (1993), neorealist’s view international 
cooperation is harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent 
on state power than do the neo-institutional liberalism. Both Keohane (1993) and 
Grieco (1993) agree that the future of the European Community will be a major 
test of their theories. If the trend toward European integration weakens or suffers 
reversals, the neorealists will claim vindication. 
David Mitrany is an integration theorist who believed that supra-national 
institutions should solve common problems, so he focused on the integration 
process on the functional way (Mitrany 1965). It called this functionalist way as 
ramification meaning co-operation in one sector would lead governments to 
extend the range of collaboration across other sectors. As states become more 
embedded in integration process, the cost of withdrawing from co-operative 
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ventures increases (Dunne 2001). Haas (1961), also another liberal thinker asserts 
the reasons whether states need integration or not. Hass emphasized that regional 
and international organizations are very important for states which don’t have 
enough capacity to reach their aims (Haas 1961). Most states treat regional or 
international organizations as having importance for them to reach their own 
goals. These ideas of Mitrany and Haas contributed to European Union integration 
which clearly ignores the traditional state-centric view that is used for realism. 
Liberal thinkers decline state autonomy for supra-national organization decision 
making; however realist thinkers focus on state autonomy as a consequence of 
their independence (Keohane & Nye 2001). 
One of the fundamental concepts of liberalism in international relations is 
integration. Integration in the world comes from strong international 
organizations. This process faced some problems and these problems were solved 
with liberal thinkers’ arguments like Mitrany’s ramifications (Mitrany 1965). This 
political and economic integration affected the whole system which stem from 
common needs and benefits in regional or international level. The system faced 
problems which state could not solve by themselves. When we look at the core 
features of neo-institutional liberalism, first of all, the analysis of peace and co-
operation emerges (Arı 2013). Neo-institutional liberalism analyzes international 
relations at the unit level. They are concerned with the systematic consequences of 
unit level problems. 
Democracy, the fundamental principle of liberalism, continues to be the 
most basic principle of neo-institutional liberalism (Arı 2013). Neo-institutional 
liberalism thought that cooperation between liberal democratic states is possible. 
There are, however, some factors that will favor mutual co-operation of the states 
(Arı 2013).  At the forefront of the reasons leading to the cooperation of the states 
are international organizations, international law, rational behavior of states. 
Michael Doyle also thought that liberal states could create peace between 
other liberal states (Russet et al. 1995). Moreover, integration contained political 
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or economic gains for the members, that liberalism in international relations 
emphasizes the position of this type of international organizations (Doyle 2004). 
Liberal states exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. 
It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states. And, as the 
number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this 
side of the grave or world conquest (Doyle 2005). 
Stein (1982, p.318) depicts the liberal view of self-interest as one in which 
actors with common interests try to maximize their absolute gains. Actors trying 
to maximize relative gains, it asserts, have no common interests. Lipson (1984, 
p.15, 18) suggests that relative gains considerations are likely to be more 
important in security matters than in economic affairs. Grieco (1988, p.487) 
contends that neoliberal institutionalism has been preoccupied with actual or 
potential absolute gains from international cooperation and has overlooked the 
importance of relative gains. He suggests that the fundamental goal of states in 
any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative 
capabilities. (Grieco 1988, p.498) So, it is evaluated that this theory will increase 
the depth of analysis of our study because this theory accepts that states are 
rational. Under this assumption, standards set by international organizations put 
pressure for further coopertion on member states.  
Robert Axelrod seeks to address this question: "Under what conditions 
will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?” (Axelrod 
1984, p.3, 4, 6) Similarly, Axelrod and Robert Keohane observe in world politics 
that "there is no common government to enforce rules, and by the standards of 
domestic society, international organizations are weak."(Axelrod & Keohane 
1985, p.226) 
Neo-institutional liberalism claims that, contrary to realism and by 
traditional liberal views, organizations can help states work together (Keohane 
1984, p.9). Thus, neo-institutional liberalism argues the prospects for international 
cooperation are better than realism allows (Keohane 1984, p.14, 16). 
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Neo-institutional liberalism begins with assertions of acceptance of several 
key realist propositions; however, they end with a rejection of realism and with 
claims of affirmation of the central tenets of the institutional liberalism tradition 
(Grieco 1988, p.493).  To develop this argument, neo-institutional liberalism, first 
observe that states in anarchy often face mixed interests and, in particular, 
situations which can be depicted by Prisoner's Dilemma (Axelrod 1984, p.7) 
(Keohane 1984, p.66, 67, 68, 69) (Axelrod & Keohane 1985, p. 231). 
Neo-institutional liberalism finds that one-way states manage verification 
and sanctioning problems is to restrict the number of partners in a cooperative 
arrangement (Keohane 1984, p. 77). However, neo-institutional liberalism places 
much greater emphasis on a second factor, international organizations. In 
particular, neo-institutional liberalism argues that organizations reduce 
verification costs, create iterations, and make it easier to punish cheaters (Grieco 
1988, p.495). As Keohane (1984) suggests, in general, regimes make it more 
sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being double-crossed 
(Keohane 1984, p.97). Similarly, Keohane and Axelrod assert that international 
regimes do not substitute for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize 
it. Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection and 
thereby make it more costly (Axelrod & Keohane 1985, p.250). Also, finding that 
coordination conventions are often an element of conditional cooperation in 
Prisoner's Dilemma, Charles Lipson suggests that in international relations, such 
conventions, which are typically grounded in ongoing reciprocal exchange, 
ranging from international law to regime rules (Lipson 1984, p.6).  
 Arthur Stein (1982) argues that just as societies create states to resolve 
collective action problems among individuals, so too regimes in the international 
arena are also created to deal with the collective sub-optimality that can emerge 
from individual state behavior (Stein 1982, p.123). Hegemonic power may be 
necessary to establish cooperation among countries, neoliberals argue, but it may 
endure after hegemony with the aid of organizations. As Keohane (1984) 
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concludes, when we think about cooperation after hegemony, we need to think 
about organizations (Keohane 1984, p.246).  
This study tries to find the best theory that can explain international 
organizations in world political system; it analyzes international organizations in 
international theories based on issues, such as anarchy, state interests, integration, 
and cooperation. The analysis should finally focus on readings of international 
theories on international organizations. 
The critical approach to organizations is emphasized by realist tradition in 
international relations. Realist approach tries to cover the dynamics of 
international politics. The researchers seek to find answers as to why the actors 
choose organizations to further their interests and which features of the 
organizations affect this choice. Neo-realist and neo-institutional liberalism 
research organizations find answers to these questions. Realist theories of 
international relations view the distribution of political and economic power as the 
principal determinant in approach. Keohane, Stein, Snidal quoted in “Reform at 
the United Nations: Reconciling Theory and Practice” that explanation of the 
hegemonic stability theory of the extensive institutionalization in the international 
system is that hegemonic power creates organizations to legitimize its power 
(Sönmez 2006, p.37). 
Kenneth Waltz’s only comment in the Theory of International Politics 
underlines that the institution has no regulatory role in the system because it 
simply reflects a state’s interests (Waltz 1979, p.164). Neo-realists believe that 
international organizations play little or no role in maintaining international 
security and peace because states’ interests dictate international organizations’ 
decision making. Mearsheimer approved the neo-realist statement that most 
powerful states in the system create and shape organizations so that they can 
maintain their share of world power (Mearsheimer 1994/95, p.13). In this view, 
organizations are essential areas for acting out the relationship (Evans & Wilson 
1992, p.330).  
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Although neo-institutional liberalism systematically studies the role of 
international organizations in world politics, since they believe that the conditions 
under which organizations matter are not present particularly in the security area 
during the Cold War (Barnett, 1997, p.528). However, both neo-realism and neo-
institutional liberalism have a consensus, that states are treated as rational 
actors operating in a world political system. Neo-institutional liberalism is broadly 
concerned with explaining how rational states under anarchy conditions can 
engage in cooperation and how organizations overcome barriers to cooperation by 
providing states mutual gain (Keohane 1984, p.9). 
“We students of international affairs need a better theory of organizations.” 
(Keohane 1993, p.293). So said Robert Keohane, who is a principal in discussions 
of organizations and their importance. Liberal scholars of an earlier time made 
organizations the primary subject of their largely descriptive and patently 
normative inquiries: organizations mattered to them (Onuf 2002, p.211). A new 
generation of scholars, realist and liberal, start with states as rational agents, and 
not organizations. They ask whether organizations matter, not to themselves as 
scholars, but to states making choices consistent with their goals (Onuf 2002, 
p.211). 
Neo-institutional liberalism and neo-realism theories agree that both 
national security and economic welfare are important, but they differ in relative 
emphasis on these goals. Lipson (1984) argues that international cooperation is 
more likely in areas of economic issue than in those concerning military security. 
Since neorealist tend to study security issues and neoliberals tend to study 
political economy, their differing estimates of the ease of cooperation may be 
related to the issues they study. 
Neo-institutional liberalism is the best international relation theory that 
describes the international organizations to combat terrorist financing. This study 
can clearly explain the limitations and weaknesses of organizations on the 
struggle against terrorist financing. Neo-institutional liberalism underlines that 
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international relations is anarchic, states are rational and cooperation is possible 
between states.  
This study believes that terrorism is originated in this anarchic 
environment and struggle against terrorism and terrorist financing needs 
cooperation between states. Thus, neo-institutional liberalism emphasizes that 
organizations can overcome these anarchic problems with setting rules and 
procedures. FATF and special recommendations on terrorist financing is the other 
title that this study will focus using neo-institutional liberalism to exactly define 
FATF and its recommendations.  
 
1.1.1 Methodology 
 
 Struggle against terrorism is a supra-national concept, and cannot be 
ended without following the trail of money. However, this study divides issues 
and starts to define terrorism and it will take stock of articles, books and academic 
studies on terrorism. It will try to reach a common definition of terrorism. 
 This study will look at the key players in combating terrorist financing, 
which have not found enough relevance in academic studies and will analyze how 
relevant international cooperation is in this respect. The scope, deficiencies, and 
state of existing co-operation activities will be assessed in light of the reports 
published by international organizations and the relevant articles written on the 
subject. 
It will explain which international organizations are considered to be the 
key players in the struggle against terrorist financing, which have not been 
sufficiently included in academic studies. There are not enough academic 
resources on terrorist financing and related international organizations. Hence, 
this study benefits from primary sources, such as organizations reports, articles, 
publications and web sites.  
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Under FATF and special recommendations sections of this study, FATF 
publications, reports and personal communication with Alexandra Wijmenga-
Daniel who is the Communications Management Advisor at Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) will be utilized. For analyzing FATF and special 
recommendations on terrorist financing, this study will aim to benefit from critical 
articles and institutional reports on effectiveness of terrorist financing. 
 
1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.2.1 Terrorism Concept and Definition 
 
In general, violence has not a political goal, another way; it covers the 
whole of the damaging assaults up to the enemy. Violence is both an aim and a 
prerequisite for terrorism. Terrorism is also politically motivated violence (Bese 
2002, p. 23).  When assessed in the framework, terrorism is both the fear created 
by violence and act of violence that creates the case (Zafer 1999, p. 9). 
On the other hand, terrorism means organized and systematic use of terror 
to reach political purposes. Terror is sometimes used instead of terrorism, but also 
it refers to terrorism (Baseren 2002, p.183). Today terror and terrorism have now 
disappeared in spoken language, and both concepts have the same meaning and 
have been started to replace each other (Zafer 1999, p.11). 
Terrorism, secretly entered the daily spoken language and to be an 
indispensable notion of the spoken language at the end of the 19th century 
(Hoffman 1998, p.13). The ambiguity of terrorism notion is always a problem. 
Terrorism and terrorist are defined to oppose someone or something, but it is clear 
that terrorist and terrorism definitions may change and a terrorist will not be a 
terrorist forever. For example, during the occupation of France, those who were 
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called terrorists by German occupying army suddenly became the heroes of 
liberation, the resistance fighters. The victory could determine the results. 
Historical events tend to demonstrate that terrorism has never ceased; it 
sails on the crest of ambiguity and appears in various forms (Sorel 1999). The 
aphorism of terrorism persists: "one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter."The president of Spanish Government J.M. Aznar who assimilates 
Ben Laden to ETA and declares that he does not make any differences 
between terrorists (Aznar 2002). Furthermore he added that making 
differences was to start losing the fight (Le Monde, 17 January 2002). It is the 
right of states to fight against terrorism, but it should be specified that the 
ambiguity in the definition of terrorism still continues to this day. 
Terrorism has different definitions; subjective definitions are easier than 
objective ones, because the objective definition is very difficult, perhaps even 
impossible. While the simpler part may be more national and state-based, the 
difficult definition is especially of international scope. In a simpler sense, states 
can more easily determine whether violence within themselves, is terrorist or not. 
However, the definition of international violence in the context of terrorism 
cannot be expressed clearly. As a matter of fact, no definition of terrorism has 
been made so far as to agree with the international community (Ayhan 2015). The 
fact that 109 different definitions of terrorism have been made between 1936 and 
1981 is the most obvious indication of the difference in the international 
understanding of terrorism (Jongman & Schmid 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
Table 1.1 Frequency of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism 
 
Frequency of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism 
Element Frequency(%) 
1 Violence,force 83.5 
2 Political 65 
3 Fear, terror emphasized 51 
4 Threat 47 
5 (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions 41.5 
6 Victim-target differentation 37.5 
7 Purposive, planned, systematic tactic 32 
8 Method of combat, strategy,tactic 30.5 
9 Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanatarian 
constraints  
30 
10 Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28 
11 Publicity aspect 21.5 
12 Arbitrariness:impersonal, random character, indiscrimination 21 
13 Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims  17.5 
14 Intimidation 17 
15 Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5 
16 Group, movement, organization as perpetrator 14 
17 Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others 13.5 
18 Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurence of 
violence 
9 
19 Clandestine, covert nature 9 
20  Repetitiveness: serial or campaign character of violence 7 
21 Criminal 6 
22 Demands made on third parties 4 
“Source: Frequency of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism” (Jongman 
& Schmid 2005, p.5,6). 
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According to these variables, we can shape a general terrorism definition 
which includes words such as violence, force, political, fear, threat, psychological 
effects, and anticipated reactions. Furthermore, more definitions include victim-
target differentiation, purposive, planned, systematic tactic, a method of combat, 
strategy, tactic, extra-normality, coercion, and extortion, induction of compliance, 
publicity aspect, and indiscrimination. 
 
1.2.2 Characteristics of Terrorism 
 
Terrorism stems from the idea of overthrowing the existing order (through 
violent and illegal means). This inspiration motivates the terrorist group's belief, 
and in this way, unrelated terrorist groups try to reach the same desire. 
Terrorism use violence that consists of hijacking, suicide bombings. They 
try to exhibit injuries or deaths for all to see. Terrorism defines their war which 
they believe that it has reasons, so they thought that they are of soldiers fighting 
(Carr 2002). 
The reasons for terrorism can be complex and often deep-rooted; however, 
they are all derived from political, social, cultural and economic conditions and 
grievances, perceived or real (Moore 2003). Many societies face worse 
conditions; terrorism chooses violence to solve these complex issues. They turn 
grievances to violence, and it comes from ethnic, cultural, political, religious and 
social issues. Terrorist live in the future, and ideal world is their prophecy 
(Hoffman 1998). Their future defines an ideal world which includes lots of rights 
that many cannot ignore and this future is unachievable for their enemies. 
Terrorism targets people psychology. They try to gain attention and with 
this attention reach sympathy. They try to gain acceptance; they try to be a leader 
to demonstrate their ideas on political, social, ethnic and religious movements. 
They target to get psychological results and these require sudden, unexpected, 
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random and spectacular attacks. They create uncertainty and occurrence 
unexpected reactions. 
Terrorism occurs from within, their own war with others, and also with 
their own enemies. Under these circumstances, ending terrorism is not reachable 
for states. There are lots of reasons which feed terrorism. Poverty, social injustice, 
ethnic and cultural conflict and political inequality, exploited by religious and 
ethnic intolerance and radicalism, egged on by maniacal leaders showing no signs 
of abating in the future. Similarly, the fundamental characteristics and principles 
of terrorism will not change (Moore 2003).   
 
1.2.3 History of Terrorism 
 
The root word “terror” (from the Latin “terrere”-“to frighten”) entered 
Western European languages’ lexicons through French in the 14th century and was 
first used in English in 1528 (Schmid 1997). “Terrorism gained its political 
connotations from its use during the French Revolution. The French legislature 
led by Maximilien Robespierre, concerned about the aristocratic threat to the 
revolutionary government, ordered the public execution of 17,000 people 
(“regime de la terreur”) to educate the citizenry of the necessity of virtue (ed. 
Krieken 2002). Robespierre supporters who turned against him, having supported 
the use of terror in the first instance, accused him of using terrorism in an attempt 
to identify the illegitimate use of terror (Schmid 1997). Terrorism, initially 
associated with state-perpetrated violence, shifted to describing non-state actors 
following its application to the French and Russian anarchists of the 1880s and 
1890s ( Conrad  2004). 
The formation and source of terrorism in the 19th century have emerged 
mostly from the complaints of the masses of workers in the Western countries that 
continue industrialization and urbanization in this period. As a result, terrorist acts 
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were labeled by the workers' movements in this period (Laqueur&Alexander 
1987). 
According to Laqueur (1977, p.175), the wave of urban terrorism, which 
started in the late 1960s after World War II, has emerged in different forms in 
various countries. It emphasizes that this difference is divided into three main 
branches: the first is separatist terrorism as in Ireland, Spain and Canada, the 
second is urban and rural guerrillas in Latin American countries, and the third 
wave is urban terror which starting with new socialist flows emerging in North 
America, Western Europe and Japan (Laqueur 1977, p.175). 
Although in the 20th century, independence movements, in general, came 
to the forefront of separatist terrorist events, these developments became more 
prevalent, and the Cold War era terror was the decisive political discourse. The 
distinctive feature of the Cold War Terrorism is that terrorism is frequently used 
by states in this period. Here, it is the intensified support of the terrorist 
organizations that are fighting against the sides that declare the enemy as a result 
of the states not taking part in the mutual battles of the states located in the eastern 
and western blocks rather than the terrorist ones themselves (ed. Bal 2006, p.9). 
Cronin states that countries were going to change the method because of the 
losses they have made in the hot war, and the 1970s and 1980s call the peak of 
state terror (Cronin 2002, p.30). 
Terrorism was developed with World War II technologies, and Terrorist 
hijackings of civil aviation aircraft were a feared and relatively common 
occurrence.( Evans 1969) The United Nations’ response to a series of terrorist 
attacks on diplomats and civilians in the 1970’s was similarly reactionary (Pilgrim 
1990). The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages 
Convention) followed in 1979, although it did not result in fewer hostage-taking 
incidents (ed. Bassiouni 2001). Terrorist attack frequency increased after 1989. 
The first examples of the attempt to use the more efficient and mass 
destruction of weapons began in 1990's. As in the Oklahoma bombing, the 
proportion of explosives used began to be expressed in tons (Ovet 2005, p. 
194,195). On March 20, 1995, a Japanese cult called Aum Shirinko Kyo placed 
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containers of sarin poison gas on five trains of the Tokyo underground network 
that converged in the Kasumigaseki station, where many government offices are 
situated, the attack resulted in 12 dead and 5500 injured and of course a great deal 
of chaos (Laqueur 2002, p.89). In 1990’s terrorist acts show us that terrorists’ 
motives differed widely in the past- and they will differ even more so in the 
future. However, there are discernible patterns that can be broadly applied 
(Laqueur 2002, p.154). 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had a significant outcome that 
would surface in the following decade. In order to contain Soviet invasion, the 
United States, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia collaborated to organize the 
Afghan resistance which consisted of radical Islamist volunteers arriving from 
different parts of the Middle East (Ozbudak 2015, p.68). The United States had 
supplied militants in Afghanistan with arms while Saudi Arabia participated in 
providing manpower and funds to be used by the resistance. Pakistan provided a 
logistical corridor for the militants arriving from the Gulf, Maghreb and Palestine. 
Flow of foreign fighters into Afghanistan continued for 10 years where they were 
subject to religious and military trainings in camps (Anti Soviet Mujahideen 
2015).  
After almost a decade, Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan 
upon heavy losses. Jihadist groups accomplished their objectives with regards to 
defeating the USSR. However, after Soviet withdrawal, these groups were split 
into two different parts. First group returned to their homes in order to serve for 
local radical Islamist movements. Second group chose to stay in Afghanistan in 
order to help train younger Jihadists that would later on join radical Islamic armed 
resistance movements in Chechnya, Bosnia, Algeria and Kashmir (Migaux 2007). 
Osama Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi, was among the fighters who joined the 
Jihad in Afghanistan. Chipman and Howell quoted in "How Successful In 
Terrorism" that one of the goals of the attacks by Al Qaida, including those of 
9/11, was the generation of a rift between Muslims and the West and the 
mobilization of Islamic extremists in the Middle East and elsewhere (Lutz, J. M., 
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& Lutz, B. J. 2008, p.17). It is also quite possible that he hoped to provoke an 
excessively violent reaction from the United States with this attack (Kydd and 
Walter, 2006, pp. 50, 71). 
9/11 attacks occurred along a new cross-national area and ethnic lines 
(Rostow 2001).The aircrafts were used to destroy the World Trade Center towers 
in Newyork and part of the Pentagon building in Washington D.C. This huge 
attack highlighted deficiencies in the struggle against terrorism on law 
enforcement and coordination needs for criminal and intelligence, the absence of a 
comprehensive definition of terrorism ( Bâli 2001). 
Al-Qaeda set out its major goal as the establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate, developments in Syria after 2011 indicated that the group appears to 
have opted to create a local emirate in Syria that would establish political and 
territorial control over a limited amount of territory within Syria with the support 
of other opposition groups fighting against the regime forces in Syria(Mapping 
Militant Organizations 2017).  Jabhat al-Nusra (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) emerged 
in Syria during 2011 as a branch of Al-Qaeda that was formed out of the group’s 
branch in Iraq called “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” (Jones 2013, p.55). The group received 
ideological, logistical and manpower aid from the Al-Qaeda in Iraq during its 
formation phase (Chulov 2013).  During that time, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which would 
later become Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, was led by Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, who is now the leader of JN’s main rival in Syria, the Islamic State (IS) 
(Negus 2006).  
JN’s main aim during the Syrian Civil War was to defeat Bashar al-Assad 
regime together with other opposition forces in order to establish an Islamic state 
projected in Al-Qaeda’s charter. A significant event during JN’s emergence was 
its split from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which would later evolve into the Islamic State. 
During 2013, Baghdadi released a statement where he declared merger of Al-
Qaeda in Iraq (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq – ISI) with JN (Szybala 
2013).  Meanwhile, JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani held back the declaration 
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regarding announcement of JN’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda (Szybala 2013).  After 
Baghdadi’s declaration regarding the merger of the AQI and JN in Syria, JN 
leader Julani made a statement where he declared that there is no possibility of 
such a merger between JN and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. In addition, Julani stated that he 
held back his declaration of affiliation of JN to Al-Qaeda due to the efforts to 
understand a Sharia policy that is appropriate for al-Sham (Syria) reality (Szybala 
2013).  
Although Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared in June 2013 that 
both JN and ISI were to operate separately in Syria under the umbrella of Al-
Qaeda, JN and ISI eventually split in February 2014 (Atassi 2013). Since 2014, 
clashes occurred between JN and the IS led by Baghdadi. Frequency of clashes 
between two Jihadist groups from same descent tend to increase as more groups 
pledge alliance to IS (Senior Al-Qaeda figure killed by ISIS24 February 2014, 
p.8) Meanwhile, United States listed both the IS and JN as foreign terrorist 
organizations in 2004 and 2014 respectively(Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
2017). 
ISIS is the major threat for today’s that there were lots of attacks in 
different side of the world by ISIS. These attacks made ISIS to a global terrorism 
threat for Western countries. It is distinctly declared by ISIS that was a war, called 
Jihad. ISIS is a Jihadist Militant Organization. They believe that they will place 
Allah’s rule on earth in the form of Caliph, associated Islam. However, it is clear 
that there is no way to condoned murder and slaughter of innocent people under 
the guise of Jihad (It Is Not Jihad: Al-Qaida and ISIS Spread Turmoil 2017). 
International organizations against terrorist financing, try to fight terrorism 
and terrorist financing. In this way, international organizations have been in a war 
today in extremist Islamic extremists, such as ISIL, Levant, Al-Qaeda and more. 
They try to look into terrorist groups to cut their funds. Thus, terrorist financing is 
a major issue on struggle against terrorism. G20 Leaders at the summit in 
Hamburg on 7-8 July 2017 expressed their determination to fight terrorist 
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financing that includes increasing transparency and beneficial ownership of legal 
persons and legal arrangements (G20 Leaders Strengthen Their Efforts To Tackle 
Terrorist Financing Together 2017).  These issues show us that terrorism’s history 
covers extremist groups and especially since 9/11 attacks, international 
organizations have been caught in a struggle against terrorism and terrorist 
financing. 
 
1.2.4 Components of Terrorism  
 
1.2.4.1 Ideology 
 
An ideology is the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives – however ill-
defined or tenuous - by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and 
aims (Rosenbaum 1975). According to Heywood (2007, p. 15), ideology is a more 
or less coherent set of ideas that form the basis for organized political action 
directed at conserving, modifying, or removing the existing system of power. 
Therefore, all ideologies; (a) provide a description of the existing plan, usually in 
the form of a "worldview," (b) develop a model for the desired future, a good 
society view, and (c) how to do political development. 
Terrorism has an ideology that wants to spread with violent acts. This is 
the starting point of view for terrorist groups. All of the acts from terrorist groups 
have an ideological background. Terrorist groups try to engage people on their 
ideology. If there is a difference in ideology in their terrorist groups, it needs 
secession from the group. For instance, the Basque group ETA categorize itself 
communist and separatist. Political partner of ETA, Herri Batasuna categorized 
himself both Marxist and separatist (Clark 1984). This has caused splits in ETA 
(Pollack & Hunter 1988). The Palestinian group Hamas also categorizes itself 
religious and separatist. They believe in a Islamic Palestinian state. They faced 
30 
 
secession because of these ideological differences in Palestinians other groups 
(Cubert 1992). 
Ideology plays an important role for terrorist groups and its targets. They 
believe that their targets are the main obstructer to reach their ideology. There are 
three categorizations of ideologies: Radical Leftist Ideology, Racism, and 
Religious beliefs ideology (Dilmac 2004, p.360).  
Ethnic differences are fully learned from others. There are obvious 
physical differences between humans, but only a few of them are inherited to later 
generations. Racism is a prejudice based on socially important physical 
differences. A racist is the one who believes that some individuals are superior or 
inferior to others as a result of these race differences (Giddens 2000, p.224, 226).  
Scholarly and government definitions also has errors when they focus 
exclusively on the political nature of ethnic terrorism (Tucker 1997, p.52).They 
ignore the focus of ethnic terrorists on the creation of a strong ethnic 
identity(Byman 1998, p.152). In fact, ethnic terrorist acts are generally intended to 
affect political and social balance within the terrorists’ own ethnic community; 
although influencing state’s political decisions is the terrorists’ nominal goal, it is 
usually a secondary concern (Byman 1998, p.153).Ethnic conflict also defies very 
notion of innocent bystanders and not just in the minds of the terrorists (Moxon-
Browne 1981, p.42). The vast majority of ethnic conflicts, particularly those that 
do not involve a strong state, occur essentially between militias of the involved 
groups (Byman 1998, p.153). 
There are lots of examples in the world political history that ethnic 
problems turn to be terrorism. The experiences the Kurds in Turkey, the Basques 
in Spain, Jewish radicals under the British Mandate in Palestine, Tamils in Sri 
Lanka, and other ethnic struggles(Byman 1998, p.151). These are some examples 
of the phenomenon of ethnic terrorism. There are lots of differences in groups’ 
objectives, their histories, level of support and the responses of the states. 
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The radical leftist ideology is basically a movement against capitalism, 
feudalism, comprador bureaucrat capitalism, inequality, exploitation, 
marginalization and failure of the state to provide good governance (Left Wing 
Terrorist Groups: Maoist, Marxist, Communist, and Socialist 2017). Radical 
leftist ideology believes that no political system is correct unless instill the state is 
ruled by proletariats or working class (Left Wing Terrorist Groups: Maoist, 
Marxist, Communist, and Socialist 2017). In fact, the Maoists have been 
criticizing the second largest successful democratic country, India, as a 
‘bourgeoisie democracy’ (Left Wing Terrorist Groups: Maoist, Marxist, 
Communist, and Socialist 2017). They argue that the existing democratic system 
or any political system in a country, except in Russia, China and some West 
European countries, a ‘new democracy’ should be replaced by armed revolution 
followed by socialism and a single party communist state(Left Wing Terrorist 
Groups: Maoist, Marxist, Communist, and Socialist 2017). 
Marxism is the doctrine of the philosophical, economic and socio-political 
views of Marx and Engels in the 1840s. A Marxist-Leninist terrorism definition is 
a terrorist act carried out by organizations that aim to destroy the existing order on 
the ground of the armed folk war and to establish a classless and exploitative 
order in the direction of Marxist-Leninist principles. In such actions, the aim is 
not to divide the country, but to change the existing order (Yayla 1990, p.1). 
Leftist organizations draw on Marxist and various neo-Marxist theories to 
justify their revolutionary strategy. A few groups are anarchist or anarchist-
syndicalism or environmentally oriented leftist groups that espouse the destruction 
of global capitalism (Robison, Crenshaw, Jenkins 2006). These groups are united 
by their anti-capitalist orientation and insistence on the need for a social 
revolution that frees the exploited (i.e., workers/peasants, other oppressed peoples, 
animals and the environment) from the capitalist system to become participants in 
a communal/collectivist or socialist-communist economic system (Robison, 
Crenshaw, Jenkins 2006).  Seventeen percent of all transnational ITERATE 
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attacks between 1968 and 2002 were conducted by Leftist groups (Robison, 
Crenshaw, Jenkins 2006, p.2014) 
When terrorism tried to reach its targets concerning religious beliefs, it led 
to the emergence of terrorist groups with religious ideology. It is saddening to 
practice terrorism based on a person's religious beliefs, even though almost every 
religion is believed, people's happiness and peace are sought, killing, fighting and 
conflicts among people are unheard of. However, unfortunately, the fact that all 
religions are considered to be the greatest sins in the name of religious values can 
be taken to destroy the human life, reveals the fact that the terrorist groups must 
be studied extensively regarding social, economic, political and psychological 
reasons. 
The connection between religion and terrorism is not new. More than two 
thousand years ago the first acts what we know describe as terrorism were 
perpetrated by religious fanatics (Hoffman 2006, p.131). Religion-based terrorism 
is fundamentally a source of religious fundamentalism. According to Heywood 
(2007, p. 351-363), fundamentalism is derived from the root of the fundament, 
which means "basic" in Latin, and was first used in American Protestant debates 
in the early 20th century. In its current use, fundamentalism is associated with the 
great religions of the world, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism and 
Buddhism, and is seen as a kind of religious, cultural movement or proletarian 
rather than explaining the meaning of the book of the sacred texts. Particularly 
those who act in the name of religion are inspired by their belief that they are 
divine, and this leads to all other views. For all these reasons, religious 
fundamentalists accept basic religious texts as a fundamental ideology, assuming 
they are a comprehensive social reconstruction program. In this framework, 
secular ideologies are rejected because they are not based on religious principles 
and are deprived of the moral essence (Heywood 2007, p.19). 
Hoffmann (2006, p.136) says that violence is a sacred activity based 
primarily on, and above all, a holy act against any divine desire or order and 
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argues that it is relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of violence 
perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations. 
 
1.2.4.2 Organization  
 
Terrorist groups are organized in a hierarchical order by the leader. There 
is a division of responsibilities within the terrorist group. 
Terrorist groups should act with secrecy. Besides they should divide the 
illegal and legal side for their organization. The legal side feeds the illegal side 
with human source. Terrorist groups carry out their legal activities in the axis of 
cultural centers, publishing houses, associations and foundations. The aims of 
terrorist groups operating in the legal field are: 
 
• To organize within the women, workers, civil servants, youth, and 
detainees, 
• To spread their ideology through panels, seminars, conferences, 
open sessions and radio and television programs 
• Provide logistical support (Alkan 2002, p.32, 33). 
 
Organizing in an illegal structure is an indispensable element for a terrorist 
organization to achieve success. The illegal organization is the most important and 
complicated element that allows terrorist activities to be carried out. The basic 
characteristic is that it is carried out with maximum confidentiality (Dilmac 2004, 
p.360). Besides, illegal side of the terrorist group is the main acting group who 
play the important role to do a terrorist act. These terrorist acts also play a crucial 
role for terrorist groups in reaching and separating their ideology. 
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1.2.4.3 Violence 
 
According to Güzel (2002, p. 148,149,150), terrorism is a particular form of 
violence or conduct, at least three core elements and terrorist violence has the 
following distinctive features: 
 
• Due to the effects of terrorist violence, there is an 
uncertainty. No one can be sure that the next victim will not 
be himself. 
 
• The effects it creates on individuals and society are 
arbitrary and unpredictable. 
• Terrorism implicitly refuses to recognize all the rules and 
practices of war. They do not recognize any human 
limitations and obligations.  
 
   Violence is the main element for terrorism and the most important factor 
to define whether the act constitutes terrorism or not. Terrorist groups use 
violence in unpredictable ways, thus, terrorism believes that they can induce fear 
in society. Terrorism tries to convert this fear into weariness with violence. 
 Some of the scholars believe that violence depends on the nature of 
human; social conditions direct people to the violence (Unsal 2010, p.29). 
Violence is defined as making a person, force or pressure, doing something other 
than what is requested, forcing, attacking, brute force, bodily or psychological 
suffering (Moses 2010, p.23). Yves Michaud quoted in Expanded Violence 
Typology that we can claim that there is violence in the context of mutual relations 
where there is violence in moral integrity, symbolic and cultural values, whatever 
the rate is (Unsal 2010, p.30). 
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Violence is both vehicle and prerequisite for terrorism. Non-violent action 
cannot be called as a terrorist act. In general, violence covers all the damaging 
assaults, from carrying political ends to destruction. E.V. Walters claims that 
terrorism has 3 sections: the threat of violence, emotional and social reactions 
(Mazari 2006, p.215) 
Violence can be applied not only through armed harm, but also with 
words, actions and behaviors (Gücenmez 2014, p.18). Pressure on society with 
this situation called psychological violence and it is tried to reach the desired aim 
(Bozkurt 2013, p.20).  
 
1.2.5 Classified Terrorism 
 
There are different forms of terrorism and terrorist groups all over the 
world, and there are also non traditional forms of terrorism, for example hyper-
terrorism, cyber terrorism, scandalous states and economic terrorism. 
Today, classification of terrorism is done in different ways. Like 
Administrative Approach, purpose approach, structure approach, Methods 
approach, and other forms (Intriligator 2010). 
 
1.2.5.1 Terrorism in Terms of Administrative Approach 
 
1.2.5.1.1 Political Approach 
 
The definition of terrorism by political parties and governments within the 
country, within and outside the country, constitutes a political approach to groups. 
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Terrorist definitions are made by this political view. In general, they can declare 
organizations that are unsuitable for their political philosophy as a terrorist 
organization. As a result of this political situation, political parties or governments 
in the country and terrorist evaluations in other countries can do the same. 
The definition of terrorism, which is shaped according to the political 
views of current governments around the world, is hampering international 
fighting on that. For years, the international struggle against terrorism, which 
should proceed over universal values, has not been sufficiently developed due to 
the political definitions of terrorism of the current state administrations. This 
partnership has not been achieved in the classification of terrorism in this area, 
and countries are defining their friends and terrorists within the framework of the 
definition of political terrorism as determined by current governments and parties. 
The truth is that the lack of common definition of terrorism does not end the 
devastating effects of terrorism. 
 
1.2.5.1.2 Diplomatic Approach 
 
It refers to the diplomatic relations that have developed on the attitudes of 
governments towards terrorism in the course of conducting international relations. 
In these diplomatic relations, the true attitudes of states may not always be clear. 
Sometimes, states cannot tolerate organizations that they do not support their 
interests. This field can be explained with many examples in the world. Since 
there is no common definition of terrorism, the definition of terrorism, which 
varies according to the states, sometimes causes disagreements in diplomacy. The 
most up to date example of this is the crisis in Syria. The states in close proximity 
to the region have different views for the groups in the region. In this case, in 
order to stop the increasing violence in the region, a common cross-border deal 
work is deadlocked because there is no definition of common terrorism. While 
some of the groups in the region are a group that should be supported by them as 
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they move towards the interests of the United States, the same group is a terrorist 
group that must be fought for the Russian Federation. 
The different interests of states in the field of diplomacy and the lack of a 
common definition of terror can clog peace talks. Unable to stop the increasing 
violence for these and similar reasons is a loss for world peace and diplomacy. In 
these cases, there is a need for international organizations to ensure that common 
lines for terrorism are identified. Diplomacy, which takes into account the 
sensitivities of countries in the peace talks that preceded the international 
organizations that rank above the countries, will be effective in stopping the 
increasing violence. 
 
1.2.5.1.3 Bureaucratic Approach 
 
It is an approach involving the perspectives and activities of the units that 
have undertaken various tasks in the administration of the states. The approach of 
these management units is much more mechanical, and their main activity is 
technical following terror, detecting and capturing criminals, and eliminating the 
damages. Again, in the scope of the fight against terrorism, they focus on security, 
economic and sociological areas. 
The bureaucracy sets the agenda in the direction of the demands of the 
governments in the field of fight against terrorism. The texts accepted by 
countries for combating terrorism under the initiative of international 
organizations are the main texts that determine the legal and universal 
infrastructure of the bureaucracy's struggle against terrorism. These texts can also 
intervene through the representatives sent to international organizations in the 
process of formation and can be intervened in the interest of the state in the 
process of formation of the joint text. The latest treaty, which is recognized by the 
states as common, sets the main road map of the bureaucracy in the field of 
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combating terrorism since it takes the form of legal legislation following the 
parliamentary vote. 
 
1.2.5.1.4 Legal Approach 
 
It contains the definition of terrorism within the framework of national 
legislation and perspectives. It refers to the perspective of terrorism, which is 
formed within the framework of national legal regulations and international legal 
regulations (Yücebas 2010, p.239). The international scene has yet to find a 
universal definition of terrorism that all can adhere to. There are legal definitions 
in light of the political sensitivities of each state and are also published the list of 
terrorist groups, some states covered by these definitions (Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations 2017). 
At this point, international organizations are attempting to introduce a 
definition of terrorism that has no common definition of the states with certain 
borders. The supranational structure of terrorism does not allow the legal regimes 
mentioned to remain only nationwide. The necessity of international legal 
regulations is also a necessity in combating terrorism. The organs to develop 
international law in this struggle are also international organizations. In the fight 
against terrorism, common legal texts which are made by observing the 
sensitivities of the countries are very important. These common texts are the texts 
that countries will refer to in their domestic law and which they will accept 
directly. The fight against terrorism, which is required by the structure of 
terrorism, is a subject that should be pursued on a supra-national structure. In 
combating terrorism, the universal legal infrastructure is the strongest instrument 
in the hands of the states. 
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1.2.5.2 Terrorism by Purposes 
 
1.2.5.2.1 Nationalist and Separatist Terrorism 
 
An ethnic group can be described as a group of people who have a 
subjective belief in their physical characteristics or similarities in traditions, or 
that they have common roots between them due to colonization and migration 
(Sirin, Valentino& Villalobos 2017, p.427). Horowitz (1985, p.64) further 
improves this to make ethnic groups' intercompany communication more like an 
extended version of family relations. Smith (2002a, p.57-58) define the ethnic 
group is a collective private name, common ancestor; history; religion, tradition, 
language, or organizations, based on more than one cultural diversity; As a 
community of people identified with a piece of land and with a sense of solidarity. 
The concepts of ethnicity, nation, and nationalism are based on very 
ancient histories. The fact that these subjects are part of the security concept is not 
so old as it is in academic studies. No one should think that ethnicity and ethnic 
communities refer to violence. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the 
concept of ethnicity which has been forgotten for many years while examining the 
causes of terrorism. ETA, IRA, and PKK terrorist groups are ethnicity based 
organizations. Persons aiming to produce solutions for these organizations should 
first investigate their reasons. For this reason, a researcher who has not put the 
concepts of ethnicity and nationalism at the center of his analysis can never be 
successful in analyzing such organizations. 
There are terrorist activities that an ethnic group makes with nationalist 
and separatist considerations because they cannot live comfortably in their 
countries. It should be noted that this classification of ethnic apartheid terrorism is 
differentiated by researchers. Wilkinson (2006, p. 4) has used ethnic nationalist 
terrorism in his work, Hoffman (2006) used inter-ethnic and nationalist terrorism 
40 
 
words as substitutes for each other, Byman (1998) referred to as ethnic terrorism, 
as nationalist and separatist terrorism. Despite differences in putting the name of 
terrorism mentioned, researchers agree that terrorism involves activating ethnic 
identities and that ethnic groups have to re-arrange or leave relations with the 
state. 
 
1.2.5.2.2 Ideological Terrorism 
 
The aims of terrorist groups; depend on the countries in which they operate 
and the centers they are directed from. Within the framework of known 
approaches, terrorism targets a system using violence to destroying it and 
establishes a new management in line with their own ideology. 
Terrorist groups argue that their aim is a more happy and just life style for 
their defenders and they want to eliminate the methods and directors that they 
view as causing injustice and oppression, depending on ideology. 
It is a terrorist movement aimed at the realization of political philosophy or 
an ideological order. It is also called political or political terrorism. Political 
terrorism does not involve personal and financial reasons, and activities must 
involve violence or threat of violence. In this definition, not only those who suffer 
from terrorist activity but also the wider community beyond it must be affected. 
Red brigades in Italy, Hezbollah in the north and Al-Qaeda ideological 
terrorist groups are examples to be given. It suggests a new world for ideology-
based terrorist groups’ members. It includes the suggestion that they use violence 
to reach their ideal outcome of a new order. Its members have high motivation. 
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1.2.5.2.3 Natural and Environmental Terrorism 
 
Environmental terrorism, include the utilization of natural forces as 
weapons for hostile purposes (Westing 1984). Environmental terrorists 
manipulate and destroy in the political or ideological partisanship. Environmental 
terrorism includes both the targeting of the environment itself, such as deliberate 
contamination of water or agricultural resources and the use of the environment as 
a conduit for destruction, such as releasing chemical or biological weapons into 
the atmosphere (Hedman 1990). The end of the Cold War and the changing face 
of terrorism have contributed to this improvement. Domestic law has not covered 
this threat yet. Applicable legal doctrines do not operate effectively with existing 
anti-terrorism strategies and fail to express adequately. Existing legal doctrines of 
terrorism are not adequate for the unique environmental terrorism (Schafer 1988). 
A new criminal law of ecocide will provide more appropriate systems for 
confronting this emerging threat.   
 
1.2.5.3 Terrorism by Methods 
 
1.2.5.3.1 Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Terrorism 
 
An explosion of a nuclear weapon or device, a radioactive substance, a 
chemical weapon or substance, caused by terrorist groups, causing massive 
massacres and destruction, is an activity carried out using disease-causing or 
lethal pathogens that can be defined as biological weapons. Since the 1970’s, it 
has become possible for terrorists to seize parts of a nuclear bomb and do it in a 
university laboratory. 
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On November 23, 1995, a Chechen guerrilla leader, Shamyl Basayev, 
informed a Russian television network that four cases of radioactive cesium had 
been hidden around Moscow. The network later discovered a thirty-two-kilogram 
case of the material, emitting over 300 times the amount of normal background 
radioactivity, in Moscow's Ismailovo Park (Schofield 1998). Nowadays, the 
consequences of an attack that terrorist groups can make a nuclear incident can be 
quite large. It may be useful to give an example from the nuclear explosions 
experienced in order to become aware of the danger.  
In 1986, when the nuclear plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine, was out of control, 
radioactive substances were dispersed in high amounts in the atmosphere. This 
situation led to the poisoning of animals, plants and all living beings in Belarus, 
which is the neighbor of Ukraine. After this date, Belarus has become a 
radioactive wasteland. Only one percent of its land is arable land. In total, 30,000 
acres of rich agricultural land are prohibited for use in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus. At least 70,000 square kilometers of live plant area has been affected by 
radioactive materials. Experts state that healthy crops will not grow in this region 
before 600 years (Thomas 1995).  
Chemical and biological weapons are other threats to the future of the 
world.  Unconventional terrorist attacks can also be carried out by spreading 
chemical substances, polluting food and water resources, or spreading radiological 
effects through the use of explosives .These attacks can be limited or unlimited, 
and in unlimited unconventional terrorist attacks, terrorist groups are primarily 
engaged in nuclear or biological weapons rather than chemical weapons. 
The use of such weapons or materials by terrorists has caused many 
disasters. In 1995, a blast was done on the Tokyo metro by Aum Shinrikyo Sect, 
which used the chemical Sarin gas, and resulted in twelve people died and more 
than five thousands of people were affected (Berkenstadt et al. 2003). In 2001’s, 
five deaths of the biological substance depend on anthrax used in the US.  In Iraq, 
hundreds of people have been ill or wounded after the terrorist bombing of 
chlorine gas. 
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American intelligence sources ensure that Al-Qaeda's experience with 
chemical, biological and dirty bombs, but they are disappointed because of the 
technical problems they have experienced and the limitations of damage they have 
caused (Finjing 2006). There are countless terrorist groups with enough 
motivation to get chemical, nuclear or biological weapons.  NEST stated that after 
9/11 attacks, 70 potential nuclear attacks had been detected (Allison 2004). 
Nuclear, biological and chemical threat assessments should be made on the 
question of when it will be done before it can be done (Keller 2002). 
 
1.2.5.3.2 Technological Terrorism 
 
Technological terrorism is confronted with names such as modern 
terrorism, computer terrorism, and cyber terrorism. This type of terrorism includes 
activities carried out using media such as communication, broadcasting, 
transportation systems, computer and the internet (Uyar 2008). Technology and 
knowledge shared over a network are called cyber terrorists by malicious users 
who use malicious intent in destructive activities for their political purposes 
outside of their personal aims, and these activities are also creating cyber 
terrorism. 
Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda do make significant use of the Internet, but 
as a tool for intra-group communications, fund-raising and public relations (Lewis 
2002). Cyber terrorists may also steal the information on credit cards or valuable 
data to get financial support for their own operations.   
In terms of terrorism, the internet is an efficient field of action. Terrorist 
groups can be used to attack national security and the military secrets of 
governments. A lot of information/data about the citizens of the state can also be 
used by these attacks and third parties to the detriment of the citizens (Lewis 
2002). Cyber terrorism is the dynamic kind of terrorism. In order to protect 
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against this terrorism, the state tries to keep up to date with technology and 
continuous upgrade of skills. 
There are lots of ways that cyber terrorist uses to reach personalized or 
national data. Mail addresses are targets that cyber terrorists can reach without 
needing too much investment. Mail addresses are areas where all information is 
available for large companies, states, and people today. This information can 
easily be accessed from the data collection area. Cyber terrorists who have access 
to personal data systems using the Web browsers that they use can access many 
personal files. The software is a system that opens the doors to phones and 
computers from other easy ways. Chat sites and chat programs are the easiest 
ways to get personal access to the doors for cyber terrorists. These gates are 
accessed directly from cyber terrorists via trojans, malicious scripts, viruses, and 
worms, which are coded for the purpose of the attack. These cyber codes can 
easily be used to steal files in data center storage. They can multiply the gates that 
develop upon stealing this information. In wireless communications, User Access 
Points, DNS and Routing Vulnerabilities are the other main ways for cyber 
terrorists to steal the data from their owners. 
 
1.2.5.3.3 Independent Terror 
 
It is a personal terrorist activity that is made up of a group, state and non-
religious affiliation, usually marginal, mental illness and addiction. This includes 
activities such as racist attacks on strangers and slanderous attacks by students on 
their teachers and friends. Today, especially in societies, it is possible to see 
separatist attacks on migrants. There are regulations to correct this situation, 
however, racists groups are carrying out these attacks against people who are 
faced with ostracization. 
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Terrorism has changed dramatically in recent years. Attacks by groups 
with defined chains of command have become rarer, as the prevalence of terrorist 
networks, autonomous cells, and, in rare cases, individuals, has grown (Burke 
2017). This evolution has prompted a search for a new vocabulary, as it should. 
The label that seems to have been decided on is “lone wolves” (Burke 2017). 
 
“In April 1925, the New York Times reported on a man who 
“assumed the title of ‘Lone Wolf’”, who terrorized women in a Boston 
apartment building. But it would be many decades before the term came to 
be associated with terrorism. In the 1960s and 1970s, waves of rightwing 
and leftwing terrorism struck the US and western Europe It was often hard 
to tell who was responsible: hierarchical groups, diffuse networks or 
individuals effectively operating alone. Still, the majority of actors 
belonged to organizations modeled on existing military or revolutionary 
groups. Lone actors were seen as eccentric oddities, not as the primary 
threat. ” (Burke 2017, p.42)  
 
It is the short history of independent terror of lone wolf terrorists. In 
today’s, there is an increase on this independent terrorism. Islamist groups, right-
wing white supremacists, abortion foes, and separatists of various stripes have all 
used this tactic with varying degrees of success (Byman 2017). 
We’re seeing attacks like the one outside Parliament in London where 
carnage is manufactured from the innocuous (Aly 2017). This is not the 
spectacular, cinematic terrorism of 9/11 or even the coordinated mass-casualty 
terrorism of the Bataclan in Paris (Aly 2017). It’s not the stuff of blueprints and 
cells. It’s crude, apparently spontaneous, and individual. Its power owes nothing 
to weapons, funding and networks, and everything to its lightness, its agility, its 
imponderous (Aly 2017). 
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1.2.5.4 Structural Terrorism 
 
1.2.5.4.1 Terrorism against the State 
 
1.2.5.4.1.1 State Terrorism against Other Elements of State 
 
State terrorism is the act of violence that a state imposes against its own 
citizens within its borders (Mickolus 1977, p.211). States have the legal and 
military power to restrict the freedom of their own citizens or third parties, to 
considerably oppress them and to disgrace them. States are talking about state 
terrorism when it is used not to preserve public order but to suppress citizens 
(Zafer 1999, p.57). 
Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse Tung, Vladimir Lenin, and 
Maximilien Robespierre were those who in the past practiced state terrorism 
(Mullins 1997, p.37). The 20th century was the period when state terrorism 
became widespread with the rise of totalitarian regimes. Many states with 
different political views, especially Germany and the Soviet Union, have been 
terrorizing their own citizens. After the Cold War, states with totalitarian or 
military regimes such as Iraq, Syria, Burundi Raunde, Indonesia, Zaire, and 
Yugoslavia have implemented terrorism against their own citizens (Wilkinson 
2003, p.107, 108). State terrorism has always spread and become more violent 
than terrorist acts carried out by individuals or groups (Thackrah 1987, p.31). 
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1.2.5.4.1.2 State-Supported Terrorism 
 
Due to the national interests of states, terrorism in other countries may be 
supported by states, in physical, moral, logistical, political and diplomatic ways, 
contrary to the spirit of international law and relations. This occurs when a state 
subsidies terrorist groups to engage in acts against another state or indoctrinate 
them openly in order to support them either materially or politically, or to 
terrorize a certain segment of their own people within their state borders.  
It is also possible to categorize the support that states have made to 
terrorist groups. Accordingly, the first form is ideological support. Terrorist 
groups are used to spread ideologies by states. The second form is financial 
support. Terrorist groups need financial support from the state to carry out their 
activities, their education and for many other reasons. The third way is military 
support. States provide support for terrorist groups, such as arms, ammunition, 
military training, and courses. The fourth or top level form is operational support. 
The state provides operational support for the realization of specific attacks. Iran's 
support for Hezbollah terrorist organization is a good example for all the 
mentioned forms.  
Some states are supporting terrorism and are known as countries that 
support terrorism by the international system and countries such as Syria, Libya 
and Iran are partly or completely excluded by the international system in the 
context of the 20th century terrorist acts and the role which they play. 
 
1.2.5.4.1.3 State Tolerance Terrorism 
 
Although the state does not actively support terrorist groups in its territory, 
it does not interfere with the terrorist groups that continue its activities in the 
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country or does not endeavor to take them out of the country and does not take 
any action to suppress the activities of this terrorist organization. In this case, 
where the state does not support the terrorist organization in any way, the terrorist 
organization meets self-supporting needs or has foreign sponsors or supporters 
(Erickson 1989, p.26). The terrorist organization carries out a non-written 
agreement with the host state, primarily in other countries, not in the country in 
which they operate. An example of this is the existence of the separatist ETA 
terrorist organization in France that struggles for the independence of the Basque 
region (Erickson 1989, p.26). 
It is possible to cite more examples under this heading because many states 
can tolerate terrorist groups that will not cause harm to their own interests or 
weaken another state in an environment where general standards on struggle 
against terrorism cannot be met. This is a very old state strategy. States use these 
terrorist groups that develop in their own lands from time to time as a power in 
their own hands. Until state sees terrorist groups as a threat, terrorist groups act as 
trump cards for states. 
 
1.2.5.4.1.4 State Sponsored Terrorism 
 
 The sponsorship of the state by terrorism is the control or direction of 
terrorist acts. In this case, the state uses terrorism as a direct means of struggle and 
provides terrorist acts through the use of unofficial state agents, mercenaries or 
armed gangs, which are organized, equipped or controlled for terrorist acts 
(Cassese & Topal 2005, p.59). The fact that states sponsor terrorism is due to the 
fact that terrorism is an alternative low-cost struggle according to normal warfare 
(Jenkins 2003, p.25). 
It is a terrorist activity that the state has organized outside its own 
organizations and officials, using volunteer persons against ideologies or other 
49 
 
interests, voluntary civilian organizations, and even other countries as sponsors 
(Ganor 1997). 
Especially during the cold war, both superpowers sought to expand their 
spheres of influence by financing the armed groups. The support given by the 
United States to the opponents of the revolution in the mid-American era and the 
Union of the former Soviet Socialist Republics to Marxist groups in the south-
American era is examples of this title. 
After World War II nearly half of all rebel groups received support from 
foreign states (Cunningham et al. 2013, p.527). Pakistan, for instance, started to 
sponsor Mullah Omar’s Taliban in the mid-1990 in order to affect the Pashtun 
outright victory in Afghanistan’s civil war (Christia 2012). 
The research finds that 93 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 
and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of state sponsored terror, 
involving extrajudicial killing, torture, and imprisonment without trial (Institute 
for Economics and Peace 2016, p.3). 
 
1.2.5.4.1.5 State Inadequacy 
 
States do not want terrorist groups and their elements to be within the 
borders of the country. However, if they do not have enough police, military 
power or technological facilities, the fight against terrorism may be insufficient 
(Erickson 1989, p.26). 
This inability does not remove the states' responsibility for combating 
terrorism (Reisman 1999, p.44). In such a case, the state has international 
responsibility to ask for help from another state. In 1977, Somalia, in Mogadishu, 
asked for help from West Germany (Erickson 1989, p.26). Although this does not 
give a very positive picture to the state’s authority, fighting against terrorism is a 
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tribute to fulfill the responsibility of states. Sometimes states that cannot solve 
terrorism by their own means can request help from international organizations 
such as United Nations. 
 
1.2.5.4.2 Terrorism in Terms of Where It Is Made 
 
1.2.5.4.2.1 Local Terrorism  
 
It is a terrorist activity that has no external connection, its causes, its 
source and its consequences come from within the country, and can usually be 
done against a famous politician, businessman, private or official institution. The 
type of terrorism mentioned is a rare type of terrorism today. Nowadays, a 
terrorist organization that does not receive its source from a different state or state 
seems to disappear. Local terrorism limits its boundaries and aims to the state. 
The resources it needs, and it aims to achieve are all within the borders of the 
state. 
 
1.2.5.4.2.2 International Terrorism 
 
International terrorism is a terrorist activity involving the territories or 
citizens of more than one state, including a threat that goes beyond the national 
border, against the national system and beyond the national borders. The content 
of its activities results in international consequences. It is within the scope of this 
type of terrorism that the actions taken in more than one states take place and that 
an attack on organizations where members of more than one states are members. 
In cases where they are co-operated by terrorist groups originating from more than 
51 
 
one state, they are also treated against international law and are called 
international terrorism. 
 
1.2.5.4.2.3 Transnational Terrorism 
 
It is the type of terrorism that occurs when actions are taken in multiple 
states that are not under the control of any state without the support of any state. 
The structure of terrorism is a partnership that is largely in need of support. There 
is no chance that a terrorist organization that is not supported by any state or 
group can exist for a long time. Terrorist groups, which now carry out actions in 
more than one state, mostly transnational terrorism support other states. In an 
environment in which all states cannot bring common definition and standards on 
the struggle against terrorism, one state’s terrorist organization can become a 
freedom fighter for the other state. Therefore, terrorist group may be supported by 
other states. Hence, it is not possible to see today enough trans-national terrorism 
types that do not receive support while supranational actions are being carried out. 
 
1.2.5.4.2.4 Other Terrorism 
 
Terrorism is a living and breathing structure. Every day it develops its 
actions and goals in according to the changing world. Trying to use the 
advantages and disadvantages of the globalizing world to make its actions more 
effective, to try to reach more geography to use mass media as much as possible 
to talk more about the propaganda. 
In today's changing world, different names are being sought for changing 
terrorism, such as media terrorism, economic terrorism, and ecological terrorism. 
However, terrorism in this context should include an ideology, an organized 
structure, and violence with a certain political element and a plan. 
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SECTION TWO 
 
TERRORIST FINANCING 
 
2.1 FUNDING NEEDS FOR TERRORISM  
 
The first step in the understanding of modern terrorist groups is to define 
the needs for funds to continue. It is important to understand that the costs are not 
limited to terrorist attacks, and terrorist groups have different needs. These funds 
are used to promote a militant ideology, pay operatives and their families, arrange 
for travel, train new members, forge documents, pay bribes, acquire weapons, and 
stage attacks. To make propaganda is an important step for terrorist groups to 
achieve the goals benefiting from legal organizations, such as media outlets and 
charities.  
The funds requirement varies according to the types of terrorist groups. 
There are two types, those in the first group are traditionally diversified and have 
a supra-national hierarchy while the other one is composed of smaller and 
independent groups. According to these variations, the funds need are determined. 
Certainly, terrorist groups cannot survive without financial resources. It is also 
necessary to know the history of terrorist financing in order to better understand 
the concept of resource needs. 
Terrorist groups have been provided with funds from different sources. In 
the 19th century, terrorist acts did not need large funds because they had lower 
costs. In this period, terrorist organizations' funds have been provided with 
sympathizers and wealthy states. For example, in 1858 the Irish Revolutionary 
Brotherhood was founded with $400 sent by sympathizers living in the United 
States of America (Laqueur 2002). 
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Table 2.1 1880-1975 Funding Sources of Terrorist Groups 
 
Terrorist Budgets 
Year Terrorist Group Country Income( in 1976 
dollars) 
Source 
1880 Noradyana Volya Russia Insignificant Donations from well-
wishers 
1880 Irish dynamiters Ireland 50000 Irish sympathizers in US 
1896 Anarchists France, Italy Insignificant Donations 
1906 Social 
Revolutionists and 
other groups 
Russia 5-10 Million Robberies, some voluntary 
donations 
1932 IMRO Bulgaria 2-3 Million Extortion, Bulgaria, Italy 
1933 Ustasha Yugoslavia 1-2 Million Italy, Hungary 
1947 IZL-Stern Gang Palestine 1-2 Million Donations from well-
wishers, robbery 
1970 Tupamaros Uruguay 5-10 Million Abductions, robbery 
1970 ALN Brazil 5-10 Million Abductions, bank robbery 
1974 ERP-Monerost Argentina 50-100 Million Abductions, robbery 
1975 Fatah Middle East 150-200 Million Mainly donations from 
Arab oil-producing 
countries 
1975 PFLP-PDFLP Saiqa Middle East 20-30 Million Donations from 
Libya,Iraq, and Syria 
1975 IRA, provisionals 
and regulars 
Ireland,Ulster 1-3 Million Donations and robberies, 
protection rackets and 
income from legitimate 
business 
1975 UDA,UDF Ulster ? Same 
“Source: 1880-1975 Funding Sources of Terrorist groups” (Laqueur 2002, p.90) 
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During the cold war period in which the bipolar system reigned, the two 
countries, which were unable to fight directly against each other, were supported 
by terrorist groups and competed with each other through them. According to 
James Adams, who put forward his first major work on terrorism financing, 
terrorism has changed between 1960 and 1980, but this change has not been 
reflected in the defense policies of the West (Adams 1986).  However, after the 
cold war, state support for terrorist groups has decreased. This decline has 
prompted terrorist groups to seek alternative funds (eds. Cakmak &Altunok 
2008).  The decline in state intervention in the market during the 1990s, when free 
market economy conditions began to dominate the market, was an opportunity for 
terrorist groups. The rise of hurdles has opened the way for the globalization of 
terrorism. In this way terrorist groups have created a great market by 
communicating with each other. The size of this market had reached 1.5 trillion 
dollars by the time of the 9/11 attacks (Napoleoni 2004). 
The 9/11 attacks against the United States have been perpetrated by the 
abduction of 4 planes by 19 people, simultaneously crashing into Pentagon and  
the World Trade Center Twin Towers. The impact of these events in the short run 
has been felt worldwide. The struggle against terrorism is divided into two 
periods: before 9/11 and after 9/11. The state support given to the terrorist groups 
has been further reduced thanks to the struggle against the terrorist financing that 
made the real progress after the 9/11 attacks. After this date, struggle against 
terrorist financing has become one of the most important topics. 
Blocking the funds to terrorist groups will reduce the operational capacity 
of them. Measures to prevent terrorist financing increases the risk and costs of 
terrorist groups for the next action. Sensitivity to terrorist financing shifts terrorist 
organization to activities that are more visible and detectable. 
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2.1.1 Broad Organizational Costs 
 
Terrorist groups need a supporting infrastructure, trained membership and 
ideology development to carry out their attacks and to find funds. These 
infrastructure costs relate to charitable organizations and mass media outlets. 
The Terror organization needs to make compromises or be complicit with 
charities and business for continuity in its attacks. Terrorist groups make their 
way through the charities operating in the states in which they are trying to settle 
in. Terrorist groups receive financial support for their attacks from these legally 
functioning charities. 
For example, the employees of a TV channel in the UK were members of a 
terrorist organization. This channel can be viewed in the Middle East and Europe. 
It was found that the channel has been collecting donations on behalf of the 
terrorist organization deemed affiliated with its bank account. At the same time, 
the channel had been broadcasting videos that encourage children to become 
suicide bombers. The legal authorities in UK removed the said TV channel and 
broadcasting was forbidden in France, Netherlands, Spain, Brazil and China, 
thanks to co-operation against terrorist financing (FATF 2008). 
In all these cases, the significant infrastructure is crucial for the terrorist 
groups, whose aim is international restructuring. For example, Al-Qaeda has spent 
nearly $30 million a year on broad organizational costs, as reported by the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks of the United States (Roth, Greenburg 
& Wille 2004). 
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2.1.2 Direct Operational Costs  
 
2.1.2.1 Direct Costs 
 
An effective attack requires a critical preparation process. This requires a 
long and costly preparation phase, such as the right choice of where to take action, 
the identification and supply of weapons to be used for action. 9/11 attacks are the 
best example for understanding the direct costs of terrorist groups. According to 
the US Commission reports, Al-Qaeda has spent $ 30 million annually for training 
and preparation of militants, support for senior Taliban and Taliban officials and 
individual assistance to relevant terrorist groups before the 9/11 attacks (The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2011). 
Another example is that the direct costs of East African embassy bombings 
were set at $ 50,000 by the United Nations. The steps of the attacks are as follows: 
 
1. Al-Qaeda opened a fake business in Nairobi in 1993. 
2. High-ranking Al-Qaeda members have travelled several times to 
Nairobi. 
3. East African Al-Qaeda members have been trained in areas such 
as bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, assassination, intelligence gathering. 
4. Rented a house in Nairobi for bomb education. 
5. Another house has been used for preparatory work in 
Darussalam. 
6. Satellite telephones were provided to communicate between 
Osama Bin Laden and East African terrorists. 
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7. Bribes given to local public officials to avoid trouble during their 
work. 
8. Provided high-tech video cameras and electronic devices 
9. Pick-up truck to be used for embassy bombing. 
10. Provided TNT explosives to be used for embassy bombing 
(Prober 2005). 
 
Expenditures made until the end of the terrorist attacks are called direct 
costs. According to the statistical data, terrorist acts most commonly used in 
terrorist attacks are bombing with vehicle (38%), shooting with firearms (24%), 
suicide bombing (10%) and hostage taking (5%) (Lotan 2006, p.10). 
 
Table 2.2 The Direct Attack Costs Of A Terrorist Conspiracy 
 
Attack Date Estimated Costs 
London Transport System 7 July 2005 GBP 8 000 
Madrid Train Bombings 11 March 2004 USD 10 000 
Istanbul Truck Bomb Attacks 15&20 November 
2003 
USD 40 000 
Jakarta JW Marriot Hotel 
Bombing 
5 August 2003 USD 30 000 
Bali Bombings 12 October 2002 USD 50 000 
USS Cole Attack 12 October 2000 USD 10 000 
East Africa Embassy Bombings 7 August 1998 USD 50 000 
“Source: The Direct Attack Costs of a Terrorist Conspiracy” (FATF 2008, p.7) 
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Those spendings mentioned in the table of direct attack costs may also be 
misleading because the need for financing of terrorist groups is not limited only to 
the ultimate direct attack costs. The direct costs for these attacks are often smaller 
than other costs. It is unrealistic to comment on the costs of a terrorist 
organization simply looking at direct attack costs (Aykın & Sözmen 2008). 
 
2.1.2.2 Salaries and Member Compensation 
 
The most important elements of terrorist attacks are not weapons and 
explosives. The people who will carry out the possible attack are members of the 
terrorist organization and the regular payments made to them are a salary expense. 
Members of the organization live in mountainous areas and cell-house 
environments in cities. The lifestyle of members is costly, and they will not be 
able to meet with their own means. For this reason, it is necessary to make regular 
payments to the members of the organization. 
For example, members of the IRA organization were paid 30-40 pounds 
per week. This salary varies according to the task of the organization. A senior 
IRA official in the Dublin area has been quoted saying that around 6,000 pounds 
were paid to keep morale high between 1994 and 1996. The salary payments play 
a major role in keeping the links between the organization members and the 
organization tight (Horgan & Taylor 1999). 
Terrorist groups may also provide financial support to the families of 
deceased operatives. Terrorist groups find funds for salaries of their members and 
the families of jailed or deceased members. These funds ensure that relations 
between the organization and its members continue for a long time (FATF 2015). 
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2.1.2.3 Education, Travel, Accommodation Expenses 
 
According to Phil Williams, the cost of special training for a terrorist 
organization that wants to perform effective attacks is quite high. Long-term 
training is needed for the development of terrorist organization members who 
conduct terrorist acts. The best example is the flight training of terrorists linked to 
the Al-Qaeda that carried out the attacks of 9/11 attacks (Williams 2005). 
All terrorist groups need spaces to provide weapons training, bomb 
training, clandestine communication and ideology training for sympathizers. They 
need reliable areas and training opportunities for all these training activities. 
Virtual training programs can be made on a much wider sympathizer group on the 
internet. 
Psychological and military training should be given to terrorist groups to 
acquire suitable talents for their members, but psychological and military 
education entails infrastructure cost (FATF 2015). 
Terrorist groups need to constantly relocate their members and top 
managers to avoid arrest and detection of their location. The cost of relocation is 
increasing because of the use of forged passports and other difficulties in these 
relocations. Travel expenses for all terrorist groups today is a major item. 
It would be fallacious to think that terrorist attacks are merely composed of 
direct costs. The accommodation, dressing and other needs of those who will 
carry out these attacks will incur considerable costs. It has to have enough 
members and sympathizers in order to maintain continuity in its attacks. Some 
part of these groups may need to be found in the city while the other part 
continues the armed struggle in the mountain. In organizations with large 
memberships, costs such as housing and dressing in the countryside as well as the 
cost of living for the members of the city are added. The Hezbollah, a terrorist 
organization, has supported all expenses incurred by its members in the armed 
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wing, such as house rent, health care expenses, subsistence expenses and similar 
expenses (Yurtseven 2006, p.146). 
 
2.1.2.4 Other Terrorist Organization Aid 
 
Terrorist groups which have reached a large organization scale may 
sometimes be involved in establishing smaller subcontracting terrorist groups or 
supporting organizations with the same ideology. These supports are also 
necessary expenses. Terrorist groups can establish an organization by hiding that 
this is an extension of their organization, aiming to use in acts to gain legality. 
The terrorist group is also funded by its other funds and members (Akın 2009). 
 
2.1.2.5 Propaganda Expenses 
 
It is important for terrorist organizations to use all means of propaganda to 
achieve their goals. It is important to carry out media campaigns to carry out the 
propaganda, to engage in political influence, to continuously increase the potential 
of the members, or to carry out social projects to create sympathy in the public. 
They benefit from the media which is a huge cost, too. It should be noted that the 
annual satellite usage fee for a terrorist group which wants to use a channel to 
carry out its propaganda work is around $3 million. Expenses made for the 
technical infrastructure that the television channel needs to be operated are also 
expenditure items (Aykın & Sözmen 2008). 
Terrorist organizations are involved in the propaganda to recruit members 
and increase funds. Diversification of the channels of the propaganda is an 
advantage for them. While other media are costly investments, on the contrary, 
internet access and social media means are less expensive and are able to reach 
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much more people. The development of technology has enabled low-cost and 
efficient channels to spread propaganda of terrorist groups. Today, terrorist groups 
are investing especially in social media and trying to take advantage of the 
opportunity to reach massive mass with lower cost. For instance, ISIL’s “Dabiq” 
and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” online magazines 
(FATF 2015). 
 
2.2 RAISING TERRORIST FUNDS 
 
Terrorism commits new crimes without regard to laws, values, principles 
and human life to meet their needs (Lilley 2006). The quest for terrorist groups to 
create funds varies. Analyzing the ways that terrorist groups use to provide funds 
determines the roadmap of the struggle against terrorist financing. 
It is possible to categorize the financial resources of terrorist groups under 
three main headings: 
• Raising Funds From  Legitimate Sources 
• Raising Funds From Criminal Proceeds 
• Raising Funds From Foreign States (Aykın & Sözmen 2008) 
Differences in ideology for terrorist groups affect funds choice. Terrorist 
groups use methods of providing funds that their geography allows and that they 
consider appropriate within their own timeframe. These crimes provide funds 
through many activities such as Human Trafficking, Drug, Arm, Cigarette, 
Migrant and Commodity Smuggling, Robbery, Theft, Extortion, Kidnapping, 
Ransom, Counterfeiting, Credit Card Fraud and Terrorist Groups’ Publication 
Revenue. 
The acceleration of globalization has transformed the world into a small 
village. The physical borders between states lose importance, the acceleration of 
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the movements of people, goods and money, the developments in the information 
sector and the opportunities offered by the internet make new ways for easy 
access. Terrorism develops its structures using this developing and globalizing 
system. The missing points in these developing areas are important for terrorist 
groups trying to establish their funds by committing a crime. 
Terrorism exceeds the borders of the states, which makes the problem 
global. Canadian-financed terrorism can lead to mass casualties in Sri Lanka. 
French-born terrorists in Spain and financially supported terrorists from the 
United States have caused disruption in Britain, and Afghan-German origin 
terrorists from Saudi Arabia are planners and practitioners of 9/11 attacks (Demir 
2006). In the work to identify networks that financed terrorist activities after the 
9/11 attacks; Charities, Non-governmental Organizations, Legitimate Business, 
Self Funding have been mentioned (Burke 2004).  In order to ensure the positive 
consequences of the measures to be taken to the global dimension of terrorism, it 
is crucial that the financial resources of terrorism are appropriately and accurately 
identified. 
Terrorist groups need money to sustain their assets and terrorist activities, 
and these funds are obtained from the support of foreign states, raising funds from 
legitimate sources and criminal proceeds. On the other hand, they worry about 
hiding their purpose and the source and destination of their funds. For these 
reasons, they use different methods to curb money and prevent money 
recognition.  
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Table 2.3 US Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use Of Alternative 
Financing Mechanisms 
 
Alternative Financing Mechanisms Earnings Moving Storing 
Trade in commodities 
Illicit drugs X   
Weapons X   
Cigarettes X   
Diamonds X X X 
Gold  X X 
Systems 
Charities X X  
Informal banking  X  
Currency 
Bulk cash  X X 
“Source: US Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative 
Financing Mechanisms” (Financing 2003, p.10) 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf>.   [12 March 2017]. 
 
2.2.1 Raising Funds from Legitimate Sources 
 
Terrorist groups gain support and funds from and through legitimate 
sources, such as charities, non-profit organizations, legitimate business, and self-
funding by terrorists and their compounds from employment, savings and social 
welfare payments. This is called black-washing where legal funds are used for 
terrorism or radicalization (FATF 2008). 
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Obtaining legal income is one of the most important features that 
distinguish terrorist groups from organized crime groups. It is often used because 
it is difficult to track the income provided by legitimate sources for terrorist 
organizations (Aykın & Sözmen 2008, p.34). 
 
2.2.1.1 Charities, Non-profit and Non-governmental Organizations  
 
Some non-profit organizations are used to terrorist financing (FATF 2014). 
Terrorist organizations earn income through the religious, ethnic or geographical 
ties of people through organizations under the name of charity. It is alleged that an 
American-owned foundation funded $ 13 million in 2000 and transmitted it to the 
terrorist organization (GAO 2003, p.14). 
There are reasons why terrorist groups want to use charities or non-profit 
organizations as a tool. These organizations are based on public trust, have a 
collective amount of donation and aid of a considerable amount. Collected 
donations are usually cash. Some charities or non-profit organizations are 
international and engage in international financial transactions. Also, charities and 
non-profit organizations are much more flexible than companies. Regulations on 
charities or non-profit organizations, such as keeping records, reporting and 
auditing are more relaxed. Based on these reasons, terrorist organizations often 
use these tools in providing funds to terrorist groups. Charities or non-profit 
organizations have been recognized by the FATF as an important area of funding 
for terrorism (FATF 2008, p.11). 
The use of non-profit organizations or charities as a tool for financing 
terrorism is in 3 forms (Aykın & Sözmen 2008): 
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1-Transferring some of the funds to terrorist organizations through 
fraudulent acts: They donate part of the money to terrorist organizations by 
making misrepresentations on their expense items, that they donate by 
offering different reasons to donors. 
2-Use of these organizations as masks: Non-profit organizations 
and charities are being used as a means to remove the financial link 
between terrorist organizations and financiers. Charities and non-profit 
organizations used to collect funds from sympathizers who want to support 
ideological views of terrorist groups are being transferred or spent through 
foundations and associations to protect the collected funds from the 
inspection and detection of legal authorities (Lilley 2006, p.140). 
3-Exploitation of non-profit organizations and charities: The gains 
from donors that they have collected are totally controlled by terrorist 
groups. It is important to supervise the organizations that are used as a tool 
in terrorist financing without harming other useful organizations (Lilley 
2006, p.139). 
 
2.2.1.2 Legitimate Business  
 
A natural outcome of financial support is capital accumulation in the hands 
of a terrorist group and some of this capital is opened as a legitimate business by 
using clean sheet people as a front. Otherwise, the link between the legitimate 
business and terrorist group can be easily determined. Legitimate businesses that 
have direct links with terrorist groups or are established and operated by 
sympathizers are an important resource for terrorist financing (Shelley 2008). The 
companies established through terrorist organization make money by importing 
and exporting goods which are indicated by a terrorist group but in compliance 
with legal framework. Transfers made between two legitimate trading companies 
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through the establishment of companies for imports or exports are carried out in 
line with the wishes of the terrorist organization. 
IRA, like other terrorist groups, has benefited from legitimate businesses. 
IRA focuses on areas such as markets, cafes, pubs or accommodation facilities 
with a high number of transactions.  IRA collects a sum of $ 10 million a year 
from these commercial activities (Chrisafis 2005). 
Dispersion of funds between legitimate businesses is a common way used 
in terrorist financing. For instance, the personal bank account of a restaurant 
manager regularly received checks from another company, but his accounts did 
not show any normal financial activity such as food, travel, etc. The bank account 
of other company showed significant cash withdrawals. The restaurant manager 
account was held by the bank because of a suspicious transaction. FIU analysis 
that restaurant manager and other company’s owner linked to Salafist movements 
and case was referred to the prosecutors for investigation (FATF 2008). 
 
2.2.1.3 Self Funding 
 
One of the principal sources of income of terrorist groups is the money 
that they collect from members or sympathizers in the name of contributions. The 
terrorist group determines the amount of money that the member or sympathizer 
can donate, according to the economic situation of that person. Sympathizers 
donate significant amounts of donations and aid to organizations. The PKK and 
Hezbollah are terrorist groups that collect large amounts of money in these ways. 
Funding for religious-oriented terrorist organizations is much easier. The 
individual benefits collected by religious organizations reach great numbers. The 
Al-Qaeda terrorist organization also collects large amounts of money under the 
name of donations and zakat through Islamic charities in many parts of the world 
(Waszak 2004, p.696). 
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2.2.2 Raising Funds from Criminal Proceeds 
 
Interest in the illegal activities of the terrorist groups that brought in large 
amount of funds to the organized crime organizations in the post-cold war period 
increased. The reasons that direct the terrorist groups towards illegal sources is 
mainly the decrease of state support after expansion of struggle against terrorism 
depends on attacks of 9/11 and the high turnover of the criminal market (Aykın & 
Sözmen 2008, p.20).  
In the past, when terrorist groups were being helped by states that 
supported terrorism, this support, after 9/11 became a less reliable source of 
funding for terrorist financing. Small cell constructions of terrorist organizations 
have also restricted access to these resources. Terrorist groups have chosen to find 
alternate sources for the reduction of foreign support (FATF 2008, p.15). 
Organized crime organizations and terrorist groups have entered into 
cooperation as a reflection of the concentration of terrorist groups in illegal 
income-generating activities. Terrorist groups provide logistical support while 
organized crime organizations meet weapons and other hardware needs. 
Organized crime organizations also serve terrorist groups, such as 
organizing counterfeit passports, credit cards, and fraudulent activities in the field 
of social services, in order to ensure that members of the terrorist groups are able 
to go abroad and live comfortably in the country (Carter 1994). 
 
2.2.2.1 Drug Trafficking 
 
Drug trade is a very profitable area that terrorist groups use to raise funds. 
It has been found in many countries that terrorists are increasingly involved in 
illegal trade in drugs, which is the easiest way to make money and more profitable 
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than others (GAO 2003, p.11). There are two arguments on how raising fund 
system has turned state sponsorship to drug trafficking. According to a report 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of Library Congress, the decline of 
state sponsorship of terrorism in the 1990’s due to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has played a critical role in terrorist groups’ turning to drug trafficking 
(Hudson et al. 2002, p. 2).  It has been suggested that tendency to increase in this 
source is influenced by the effect of the international initiatives against the 
terrorist supporters, especially after the 9/11 incidents as terrorist groups 
increasingly participated drug trafficking in recent years (KOM 2011, p.2, 53). 
A control system has been envisaged by the United Nations for the trading 
of drugs and psychotropic substances. Regarding this, the United Nations has 
three conventions. With these conventions, the use of hundreds of psychoactive 
substances is restricted to health and scientific purposes only. Despite these 
limitations, the fact that five percent of the world's population is using any form of 
the drug has made these substances, which are restricted in production, 
distribution, and use, a significant criminal market for illegal organizations (CE 
2005, p. 29).  In 2005, the estimated value of international illicit drug trade was 
valued at US $ 322 billion (UN 2007, p.170). 
According to the US State Department reports, at least one of the world's 
25 largest terrorist groups has ties with global drug trade (UNODC 2005). Some 
of these terrorist groups  are the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(FARC), Colombian United Defense Groups (AUC), National Liberation Army 
(ELN), Gleaming Road, Palestinian Islam Jihad, Al Qaeda, Uzbekistan Islamic 
Movement, Hezbollah, PKK, Freedom (ETA) includes Tamil El-Amin Freedom 
Tigers and Abu Sayyaf (Thachuk 2008, p.17). 
Terrorist groups emerging in states which have failed to make sufficient 
efforts to deal with corruption and criminal offenses are actively involved in drug 
trafficking. The only reason terrorists are into drug trade is not only financial 
resources; some terrorist groups are believed to have supplied addictive drugs to 
weaken the communities and their rivals (Beers & Taylor 2002). 
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Terrorist groups do not like to be referred to as drug traders as this can 
harm their propaganda; however they increase great funds from the drug trade. 
Some states that support terrorist groups accept the negative image of the drug 
trade and states abstain from supporting terrorist groups (Yücebas 2010). 
 
2.2.2.2 Arms Smuggling 
 
The link between arms smuggling and terrorism has been proven many 
times. All around the world, terrorist organizations smuggle arms. It is known that 
ETA, IRA, and PKK terrorist organizations have provided resources by entering 
into arms smuggling business (Gheordunescu 1999). 
The smuggling of arms and ammunition particularly increases during 
periods of intense terrorist incidents (Uyar 2008). Smuggling of arms means two 
dimensions in terms of terrorist groups. Terrorist Groups can get their needs, 
besides earning money through weapons smuggling. They can also increase 
cooperation by selling arms to each other (eds. Cakmak & Altunok 2008). 
There is a direct relationship between arms smuggling and terrorism. On 
the one hand, terrorist groups provide their needs of weapons, and on the contrary, 
they raise the fund. There is demand-driven supply in arms smuggling. The hiding 
and storage of a weapon is not as easy as a drug. Control mechanisms in arms 
smuggling work effectively. For these reasons, weapons smuggling cannot take 
the first place in raising funds for terrorist organizations (Sevim 2000). 
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2.2.2.3 Robbery, Theft, and Extortion 
 
Terrorist groups, especially in the establishment phase, receive funds for a 
crime such as theft, robbery, and extortion. For instance, during the establishment 
phase of ISIL terrorist group in Iraq and Syria, they gathered funds by carrying 
out acts of robbery, extortion, and theft. For all terrorist groups, bank branches, 
foreign exchange offices and jewelry stores are a goal for resource provision 
(Gökbunar R. & Gökbunar, A. 2010). 
Bank robberies have also been identified as a viable option for terrorist 
groups to access large sums of money.  Bank robbery is a source of funds for the 
terrorist groups. Recently, a Dutch person who returned from Syria was arrested 
in possession of firearms. The investigation showed that he was preparing an 
armed robbery, and he was suspected of planning to use the proceeds of the crime 
to finance terrorism (Europol 2015, p.10). 
Some terrorist groups have committed extortion crime by taking the goods 
of the persons by use of force. Another aspect of robbery, theft and extortion 
crimes committed by terrorist groups in order to provide funding is the 
propaganda (Yıldırım 2012). They try to spread the name of the terrorist group 
with these reports easily found in the visual and written press. 
According to the researchers, $1 million were collected by a terrorist group 
before 2001 from Canada, Britain, Switzerland and Australia in a month (Cronin 
et al. 2004).  According to another research, there is a particular economy, which 
has been formed for extortion. Canada has over 100,000 CAD, and UK has over 
100,000 GBP in extortion economy. When similar figures are considered in 
France and Norway, the prospect for terrorist organizations could be better 
understood (Becker 2006).  
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2.2.2.4 Kidnapping and Ransom 
 
Ransom and kidnappings are often a crime committed by terrorist groups. 
When it succeeds, it provides income through intimidation or threat. For 
paramilitary groups and terrorist groups, kidnapping and ransom is a major source 
of income (MASAK 2007, p.57). 
Ransom is defined as the money someone must pay for himself or for 
someone else on his behalf to get rid of any incarnation or slaughter. Ransom in 
terms of terrorist groups is to get money from businessmen, well-known 
bureaucrats, statesmen and so on. It can be defined as a request for money by 
kidnapping individuals (Aykın & Sözmen 2008, p.34). 
Many terrorist organizations in the world have committed kidnappings and 
ransom crimes. For instance, ETA, when compared with other terrorist groups, 
made the biggest revenue from ransom. Catalan businessman Jesus Serra 
Santamans was kidnapped in April 1980 and released for $ 1.5 million. 
Industrialist Adolfo V. Martin was abducted and released on February 24, 1990, 
in change with $ 2.8 million ransom (Alkan 2004). 
One of the most frequently used methods of terrorist groups is forced 
taxation, which is also called interlinking. Terrorist groups receive tribute through 
intimidation. Depositors are mostly people and goods. They give money to the 
terrorist organization to protect their security. Especially in the border regions, 
they are paying taxes under the name of the protection money to the smugglers. 
Sometimes they also give receipt for the tribute received (Yayla 2008, p.434). 
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2.2.2.5 Migrant Smuggling 
 
In the Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, human trafficking is defined as the illegal entry of persons who 
are not nationals of an individual country and those who do not reside in the 
country (UN 2000-1). 
For terrorist groups, smuggling of migrants and human has two benefits. 
The first one is raising funds; the other is getting human resources for themselves. 
Terrorist groups increase cooperation with each other also in smuggling of 
migrants. 
According to the International Organization for Migration, there are 
around 130 million migrants in the world, of whom 20 to 30 million are illegal 
immigrants. 4 million of these illegal immigrants are in constant motion. 
Smuggling of migrants provides substantial funds. The cost of smuggling of 
migrants is determined by the state of origin, the income of the migrant, the risk 
taken on the journey, the level of professionalism of the service provider, and the 
destination country (CE 2005, p.39). 
Terrorist groups provide commissions under the name of tax in the face of 
security guarantees by observing crossings from the border. According to the 
asylum policy of European states, they make asylum, forfeit their financial aid 
from their refugees who can get right to residence. 
 
2.2.2.6 Cigarette and Commodity Smuggling 
 
Smuggling is a type of crime based on socio-economic differences 
between states. This kind of crime, which is made by taking advantage of the 
difference between the states where the smuggling is made, provides significant 
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funds (Yayla 2008). The most preferred smuggling item is cigarette. This is 
mainly due to the high level of private consumption tax applied, ease to maintain 
and easy convertibility into money. In 2000, The UK Organize Crime Task Force 
reported that loss of revenue from fuel smuggling and counterfeit tobacco 
products between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland reached 568 
million dollars. It is estimated that the IRA's money acquisition capacity for 
fraudulent goods and property smuggling is between $ 7.7 and $ 12.3 million 
(Thachuk 2008). 
For instance, The Real IRA has flooded Ireland with contraband cigarettes, 
and imported counterfeit versions of popular brands and cigarette smuggling have 
emerged as a top funding source for the organization. The combined IRA groups 
have reaped an estimated USD 100 million in proceeds from cigarette smuggling 
over a five-year period (FATF 2012, p.32). There are lots of examples in terrorist 
groups which raise funds from cigarette and commodity smuggling. Although the 
smuggling of cigarettes and goods is a type of crime that is ignored by the states, 
there is a high direct supply of resources among terrorist finances. Terrorist 
groups get easier, and high gain of funds from cigarette and goods smuggling are 
attractive for IRA, PKK, Hezbollah and many terrorist groups(Gücenmez 2014). 
According to the European Commission Anti-Corruption Office, cigarette 
smuggling is very common in Europe, and it is used in many Eastern European 
states as illegal cash. Terrorist groups are looking for the possibility of generating 
income by putting all kinds of goods into the state as fugitives when necessary. 
For example, some terrorist groups have earned income by illegally entering and 
selling merchandise produced in Europe and trans-shipping to a free zone in South 
America to a third country, and finally, these incomes have been used for 
financing terrorist activities (Lilley 2006). 
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2.2.2.7 Counterfeiting and Credit Card Fraud 
 
Another way to get money is to make fake credit card and legal papers. 
Today, high-quality printing devices, tools, and equipment are accessible by 
everyone. Fraud for terrorist organizations is not limited to money alone. Fake 
passports, identity cards or documents are sources of income as well (Oztürk 
2000). For this reason, terrorist groups have specialized in counterfeiting. 
According to OECD data, fake and counterfeit goods account for about 7% 
of the world trade. One of the reasons for this, is the fact that forgery crime has 
fewer penalties than other crime types (Erdinc 2006). Tangible counterfeit 
products volume in international trade could be up to 200 billion US dollars, 
which is larger than GDPs of about 150 economies around the world in 2005. 
Nevertheless, domestically produced and consumed counterfeit products and 
counterfeit digital products that are distributed via the internet are not included; if 
the volume of these is added it is estimated that total volume of counterfeit goods 
could well be several hundred billion dollars more (OECD 2007). 
Terrorist groups are also able to generate income by using fraudulent 
activities. Terrorist groups, especially those who obtain credit card information by 
fraudulent means, rob these accounts. The credit card and special information is 
used by the terrorist organizations are used for raising funds according to  FATF’s 
Terrorist Financing Working Group, to carry out their work as stated in the 
terrorism financing report (Aykın & Sözmen 2008). 
 
2.2.3 The Role of Safe Havens, Failed States, and State Sponsors in Raising 
Funds 
 
States without effective judicial system, tolerant to or direct supporter of 
terrorism create an unsafe environment for many to live. Safe havens, failed states 
75 
 
and state sponsors today are an important resource for terrorist groups, such as 
Somalia, Iraq and the Pakistan-Afghan border. States with poor judicial control, 
terrorism tolerance, and sponsors of terrorist groups are crucial for the terrorist to 
move and use finance, moreover to enhance their role in raising funds (FATF 
2008). 
Terrorism has been used by powerful states for many years as a foreign 
policy tool to facilitate the functioning of politics and to neutralize its opponents. 
Some states that are unable to find a way out for themselves in the face of 
practical politics of strong states and unable to obtain their rights in the 
international arena; see terrorism as a chance to overcome obstacles (Alkan 2004). 
Terrorist groups are provided with financial support, either implicitly or 
explicitly, besides support such as, granting asylum to members of international 
organizations who want to use terrorism as a tool for international politics, 
allowing the use of the state's territory as a base. Covert financial assistance 
provided to terrorist groups can be done by methods such as money and in-kind 
assistance to associations and foundations close to the terrorist organization 
(Aykın & Sözmen 2008). 
States can use terrorism as a foreign policy instrument. Some states use 
terrorist groups frequently to influence other states for their interests. Many 
examples of this have been seen during the Cold War. The former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Bloc states have helped terrorist groups. After the end of the Cold 
War era, the states have not fully extricated themselves, despite a gradual decline 
in their support for terrorism. The support given by the state to terrorism for use in 
its foreign policy can be at the level in terms of, simple aid or the point of 
sponsorship (Baseren 2006, p.15). 
States that support terrorist groups grant rights to organizations such as 
shelter, asylum, and publication in their countries. They are doing logistics, 
weapons and ammunition aid. Although measures to finance terrorism after the 
9/11 attacks have narrowed the possibility of sponsoring terrorist groups by the 
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states, they can still receive foreign state aid of terrorist groups operating at local 
and international levels in different parts of the world. There are reasons why 
states choose sponsor terrorist groups. First of all, they want to ensure that the 
relevant state can be directed in the desired manner without disturbing the 
relations. It does not contain the risks that the direct appeal of the “gentleman” 
may be revealed and that intelligence organizations of terrorist groups can be used 
as side-arms and serve in an operational sense (Aykın & Sözmen 2008). 
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SECTION THREE 
 
INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING 
 
Terrorism is the greatest threat to peace, security and human rights in the 
national and international arena. By taking advantage of developing and changing 
economic, social and technological conditions, the impact of terrorism is 
increasing  gradually everyday. Besides national efforts, international cooperation 
is very crucial to counter terrorist groups that are looking for greater interaction 
with society and developing relationships with organized crime organizations.  
Acute discrepancy among the views of different states stems from the 
variety of definitions of terrorism. At 1937 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism (League of Nations 1937), it is the first international 
attempt to achieve a definition of terrorism (Bantekas 2003) The regulation of 
terrorism in international law progressed with the acts of terrorism (Bantekas & 
Nash 2009, p.195). The ongoing work since 1960 has gained momentum as 
terrorism has gained a global threat dimension. Discussions on causes of terrorism 
and measures to be taken, diplomatic contacts and international legal 
arrangements have been done. 
All relevant international organizations, especially the United Nations, are 
working to ensure that all countries are united in a joint action platform against 
the threat of terrorism. It has evolved with the change of world politics and with 
the related new studies. The problem of definition of the concept of terrorism has 
also affected the efforts to find solutions. 
Despite the fact that terrorism has accelerated, there is no common mind 
by the way of achieving solutions of this global threat. The new problem has been 
that the definition of terrorism varies among countries. This differentiation has 
made it difficult to fight terrorist groups and has created a legal gap for them to 
78 
 
continue their assaults. The ongoing terrorist activities since 1960 have shown that 
the problem is not just an issue of one state, but of more than one state. 
 The world politics lacks authoritative governmental organizations and is 
characterized by uncertainty. Within this settings, international regimes need 
mutually beneficial agreements between states for resolving common problems, 
such as terrorism, because it is clear that structural condition of anarchy does not 
mean a total war of all against all (Keohane 1982). The anarchy needs cooperation 
on shared problems. Cooperation has increased on a question that concerns more 
than one state. The notion of cooperation has evolved with changing world 
politics in time. The struggle against terrorism needs international order and 
international cooperation through an interpretation of international regime 
formation that relies heavily on the rational choice analysis in the utilitarian social 
contract tradition (Keohane 1982). Regimes are more like contracts when actors 
with long-term objectives who seek to structure their relationships in stable and 
mutually beneficial ways (Lowry 1976, p.276). The fight against terrorism needs a 
contract that covers all these common needs and benefits, for regimes, because 
until the notion of terrorism is defined in the directives of state’s or international 
organization’s interest, the international struggle is inadequate. It needs 
cooperation between state’s and international organization’s interests. For this 
reason, cooperation has come to the forefront, which can carry out international 
struggle, which also cares about both interests of the state and international 
organizations. International organizations have developed their work in this 
regard. 
Until today, 12 universal agreements have been drafted to prohibit specific 
acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking, and bombing in order to protect societies 
and several steps have been taken in fighting terrorism by ensuring that the 
contracts are signed by the states. Many of the crimes which were committed have 
been recognised as criminal acts before the preparation of these contracts and 
protocols in the internal laws of the states. Nevertheless, the main feature of these 
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contracts is that they should foresee the crimes as international crimes of terrorism 
and mention the necessity of full international cooperation on these crimes. 
The needs of money to finance the activities of terrorist groups gives them 
global nature and threaten the integrity of states, the peace and security of the 
people, and thus generate a substantial amount of income through legal action or 
illegal activities. The struggle against terrorist financing is considered as one of 
the priority issues of international organizations, and the necessary work has been 
initiated in this field. It is worth considering that terrorism and terrorist activities 
can be prevented by cutting off their financial resources and bringing their assets 
to a final stage in the struggle against them (Aykın & Sözmen 2008). 
The internationalization of the supply of terrorist financing has brought 
about the beginning of the struggle with terrorism financing on the international 
platform (Utük 2009, p.43). According to Aykın (2010, p.144); "Struggle against 
terrorist financing; Removal or reduction of fund collection and supply facilities 
of terrorist groups to the lowest level, determination of funds to be used for 
terrorist groups or acts of terrorism and confiscation on funds. It involves 
preventing terrorist groups from clearing their criminal proceeds from illegal ways 
and identifying, monitoring or preventing terrorist groups or terrorists' ways of 
sending funds." The struggle against terrorist financing is considered to be one of 
the priority issues of international organizations, such as Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Council of Europe, European Union, G-20, Egmont Group, Wolfsberg 
Group and Basel Committee on Banking Regulations. The necessary work has 
been initiated in this field for discovering hidden terrorist activities and 
interrupting them by cutting off financial resources. Thus it would be possible to 
bring their assets to an end in a decisive battle against terrorism. 
Decisions have been taken by the United Nations to combat terrorist 
financing (CFT) to protect the international peace. Decision 49/60 dated at 
09.12.1994 stated that, all terrorist acts were crimes and with the decision of 
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51/210 dated at 17.12.1996, it was decided to take measures and introduce legal 
arrangements to prevent terrorist financing. 
The International Convention on the Prevention of Terrorist Financing was 
prepared and presented to the signatories of the members by the UN in 1999, 
emphasizing that all forms and manifestations of terrorist acts have increased 
worldwide and that the increase in the number of terrorist acts is proportional to 
the financial resources of the terrorists. 
The 9/11 attacks were a turning point that directly accelerated the fight 
against terrorism. This watershed has shown to the whole world, that it is not 
possible to reach a solution with terrorism and that both  military and police 
measures need to be used in the combat. The United States has also chosen to 
combat terrorist financing (CFT) as one of its anti-terrorism methods. On 24 
September 2001, President George W. Bush (2001) announced the major thrust of 
war on terrorism.  Executive Order 13224 on Terrorist Financing was to be 
pursued with equal vigor and publicity as the initiatives, which at that time had 
not yet been publicly commented (Heng & Mcdonagh 2008). To emphasize the 
importance, the president insisted on unveiling the initiative in the Rose Garden 
1himself, rather than delegating it to an Under-Secretary (George WB 2001).  
The US changed its own terrorism strategy and established a new 
proactive, preventative strategy for waging financial war (Shetterly 2005). 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which was established to 
prevent the use of the financial system by criminals and to combat money 
laundering, which issued 40 Recommendations on this framework at international 
level. 9/11 attacks activated, a global war on terrorism and prompted a new burst 
of rule-making and interaction on terrorist financing. It published 8 Special 
Recommendations in 2001 on the struggle against terrorist financing by 
expanding the scope of the studies it conducts in this context. Then it added one 
                                                          
1 White House Rose Garden is used frequently to greet distinguished visitors and for special 
ceremonies and public statements, the contemplative setting is often a very personal and private 
place for the US President. 
81 
 
more recommendation and reached a total of 9 special recommendations on 
combat terrorist financing (CFT). 
In addition to the UN and FATF, international organizations such as the 
European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB) and the Council of Europe (EC), G-20, the Egmont Group, the Wolfsberg 
Group and the Basel Committee are also taking steps to combat terrorism and 
terrorist financing, for punishment and impositions of the penalties in accordance 
with international provisions. 
 
3.1 THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
The United Nations is an important part of the struggle against money 
laundering and counter-terrorism campaign, as it enjoys the membership of all 
recognized state entities. It prepares international agreements and conventions 
binding regarding parties on money laundering and terrorist financing (Schott 
2006). It establishes the legal ground necessary for the development of 
cooperation between states in the context of the detection and prevention of such 
crimes. 
The United Nations has played a major role in counter-terrorist financing 
since the 1960s. After the massacres at Lod Airport in Israel and at the Olympic 
Games in Munich; the Resolution 3034 was decided at General Assembly 
(Sederberg 1989). It established an ad-hoc Committee on terrorism for submitting 
recommendations on international terrorism (Koh 2006). 
After 1963, decisions were made by the United Nations Secretary-General 
on terrorist financing. The first decision associated with terrorist financing is 
"Covenants on Crimes and Certain Other Actions on Airplanes" (Kiser 2005, p. 
123). The actions specified in similar UN contracts and protocols have been 
accepted as the premise of terrorist financing. These are: 
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• Actions are Taken in the Convention on the Elimination of Illegal 
Seizure of Airplanes (16 December 1970, Lahey) 
• Actions are Taken in the Convention on the Elimination of Illegal 
Acts against Civilian Security (23 September 1971, Montreal) 
• Actions are Taken in the Contract for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
Including Diplomatic Agents (14 December 1973, New York) 
• Actions are Taken in the International Treaty against Hostage-
Taking (17 December 1979, New York) 
• Actions are taken in the Physical Protection Contract of the 
Nuclear Material (March 3, 1980, Vienna) 
• Protocol on the Prevention of Illegal Acts of Violence in Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, Actions Taken In Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of illegal against 
Civil Aviation Security (24 February 1988, Montreal) 
• Actions are Taken on the Contract to Prevent illegal Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (10 March 1988, Rome) 
• The Actions are Taken in the Protocol on the Prevention of illegal 
Actions against the Security of the Fixed Platforms Installed on the 
Continental Site (10 March 1998, Rome) 
• Actions are Taken on the Contract to Prevent Terrorist Bombings 
(15 December 1997, New York) (Aykın & Sözmen 2008, p.77). 
 
The financing of terrorism was not considered as a major issue in the fight 
against terrorism until the mid-1990s. In 1996, United Nations General Assembly 
prepared a resolution and mentioned on both legitimate and illegitimate financial 
resources of terrorist organizations. It mentioned that terrorist groups involved in 
organized crime and the abuse of charitable organizations. It was the first time 
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when it was mentioned about terrorist financing and needs for measures to prevent 
the terrorist funds’ international movements. 
 
“(f)  To take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate 
domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist 
organizations, whether such financing is direct or indirect through 
organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, social or 
cultural goals or which are also engaged in unlawful activities such 
as illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing and racketeering, including 
the exploitation of persons for purposes of funding terrorist 
activities, and in particular to consider, where appropriate, adopting 
regulatory measures to prevent and counteract movements of funds 
suspected to be intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in 
any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements and to 
intensify the exchange of information concerning international 
movements of such funds,”(UN  1996) 
“5. Reiterates its call upon States to refrain from financing, 
encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting 
terrorist activities ;”( UN 1996). 
 
In 1998, the Resolution 53/108 of the General Assembly formed an ad-hoc 
committee to prepare a draft convention for the suppression of terrorist financing. 
The need for a contract to be prepared by the UN to deal specifically with 
terrorism, in particular on the possibility of terrorist financing, on the inability and 
ineffectiveness of fighting terrorism financing, has been achieved and the 
International Convention on the Prevention of Terrorist Financing has been 
prepared by the UN. 
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 “11. Decides also that the Ad Hoc Committee established by 
General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 shall 
continue to elaborate a international convention for the suppression 
of acts of nuclear terrorism with a view to completing the 
instrument, shall elaborate a draft international convention for the 
suppression of terrorist financing to supplement related existing 
international instruments, and subsequently shall address means of 
further developing a comprehensive legal framework of 
conventions dealing with international terrorism, including 
considering, on a priority basis, the elaboration of a comprehensive 
convention on international terrorism;”(UN 1999, p.2) 
 
The contract was drawn up in support of the initiative initiated by France 
in the G-8 countries (Clifton 2000). In May 1998, the Foreign Ministers of the G-
8 countries considered combating terrorism funding as a priority issue (G-8 1998, 
paragraph 28). 
In the last quarter of 1998, France initiated the negotiations of the 
Convention and proposed a text to the UN. The text of convention evaluated by ad 
hoc committee and adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1999. The 
convention defines the financing of terrorism as: 
 
“…directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, providing or 
collecting funds with the intention that they should be used or in 
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to 
carry out: 
(c) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as 
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex 219; or 
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(d) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to 
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such 
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act.”(UN 1999, p.3) 
 
The Convention has three main obligations for countries. The first of these 
requires that countries should regulate the financing of terrorism offenses in 
domestic law. The second is the development of international cooperation and the 
enhancement of mutual judicial assistance.  
The third is related to the issue of evidence on the financing of terrorist 
activities and the establishment of fundamental obligations for the determination 
of the role of financial organizations (Aykın & Sözmen 2008).  
There are other suggestions for the state in the struggle against terrorist 
financing. The convention advises establishing regulations prohibiting the 
opening of accounts for unidentified holders or beneficiaries. For legal entities, to 
require financial organizations to verify the legal existence and the structure of the 
customer by obtaining either from a public register or from the customer. It 
advises by making clear the role of financial organizations to report all unusual 
large transactions immediately to the relevant authorities. Financial organizations 
are also to maintain all transaction records for at least five years (Utük 2009). The 
Convention defines only a general framework for the measure to be taken with the 
objective of struggling against terrorist financing.   
In 1999, the Resolution 1267 of Security Council demanded that Taliban 
should give up providing a safe haven for terrorist and turn over Osama Bin 
Laden (Utük 2009, p.35). In accordance with UNSC Resolution 1267 dated 
15.10.1999 on combating terrorist financing, measures such as freezing of Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda assets, travel ban and arms embargo are required. According to this 
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Resolution, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee was established. The 
committee has a duty on monitoring the measures taken by member states against 
the Taliban and Osama bin Laden (United Nations Security Council 1999). 
In 2000, the Resolution 1333 of Security Council, with emphasis on drug 
trafficking as one of the significant financial resources of the Taliban and 
demanded to stop illegal drug trafficking. Furthermore, it stated that the 
Committee established under the Resolution 1267 has the task of forming 
blacklists of individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, 
and the Taliban. According to the blacklist, the Resolution advised to member 
states to freeze the funds, assets and economic resources of blacklisted individuals 
and entities (United Nations Security Council 2000). 
In 2001, the Resolution 1363 of Security Council, established a monitoring 
mechanism to work on arms embargoes, fight against terrorism and related 
legislation and arms sales, terrorist financing, money laundering, financial 
transactions and drug trafficking in order to monitor the implementation of 
Decisions 1267 and 1333 of the countries; and to form customs, border security 
and security services under the coordination of the Monitoring Group. It is stated 
that the Monitoring Group will report to the Committee and the Sanitation 
Implementation Support Group will report on the Monitoring Group that will 
work in the field of fight against terrorism. According to this Resolution, Security 
Council improved the struggle against terrorist financing and defined a 
relationship between drug and arms trafficking and terrorist financing. Security 
Council ascribes that terrorist groups are raising funds from these illegal activities 
and focus should be on financial transactions which relate to terrorist financing 
(United Nations Security Council 2001). 
In 2001, the Resolution 1373 of Security Council does not mention any 
terrorist groups or individual’s name, so it can be regarded as a global context for 
fighting terrorism that should be accepted by all member states.  The Resolution 
mainly focuses on the financing of terrorism and advice to all member states to 
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prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism. On the subject of financing of 
terrorism, the resolution can be regarded  same as International Convention for 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, deliberate provision or collection of 
funds to use in terrorist acts which should be criminalized by all member states 
(United Nations Security Council 2001). Besides, according to the Resolution, all 
member states should: 
 
“freeze, without delay, funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist 
acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; 
of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such 
persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the 
direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or 
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by such persons and associated persons and entities.”(United 
Nations Security Council 2001, p.2) 
 
The resolution mentions the international cooperation on counter-
terrorism. All member states are called upon to cooperate against terrorism by 
means of bilateral and multilateral agreements and become parts of the 
international conventions and protocols related to terrorism. Moreover, it 
mentions the need for actions against threats at a national, regional and 
international level due to money laundering, transnational organized crimes, and 
terrorism.  
In 2001, the Resolution 1377 of Security Council stressed out the full 
implementation of Resolution 1373 and importance of cooperation on 
international terrorism (United Nations Security Council 2001). In 2003, the 
Resolution 1455 of Security Council tried to improve the measures of the 
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Resolution 1267 considering the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Taliban Sanctions 
Committee can review the blacklist (United Nations Security Council 2003). 
In 2003, the Resolution 1456 of Security Council calls upon member states 
to take steps to prevent and suppress the support the terrorism and adopt the 
Resolutions 1373 and 1455. Besides, the Resolution persists that the member 
states to become a part of all international conventions and protocols on terrorism, 
especially to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. It draws attention to cooperate for struggle against 
terrorism and imposed sanctions on Al-Qaeda.  It proposes to take measures to 
prevent Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s access to the financial resources (United Nations 
Security Council 2003). 
In 2004, the Resolution 1526 of Security Council states that member states 
should continue to implement the measures of Resolution 1333 against the 
individuals and entities blacklisted by the Committee established under 
Resolution 1267 (Utük 2009, p.92). Furthermore, the Resolution focuses on abuse 
of non-profit organizations and alternative remittance systems which were used 
for flow of funds of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It proposes to the member states to 
take measures against the movement of funds and economic resources to 
individuals and entities related to Taliban and Al-Qaeda (United Nations Security 
Council 2004). 
In 2004, the Resolution 1566 of Security Council mentioned the 
international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. Therefore, The 
Resolution established a working group for submitting recommendations to the 
Security Council. These recommendations include the measures on individual or 
entities associated with terrorism. The measures include not only bringing them to 
justice but also freezing their economic resources to cut their access to all types of 
arms and to prevent their free movement. Unlike the Resolution 1267, the 
working groups not only focuses on Taliban and Al-Qaeda but also other terrorist 
organizations. The struggle against terrorist financing has developed as the 
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working group monitors the measures executed by member states (United Nations 
Security Council 2004). 
In 2005, the Resolution 1617 of Security Council stresses out again the 
Resolution 1267 regarding sanctions on the individuals and entities related with 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Moreover, the language in which Resolution was used has 
evolved from day to day in the fight against terrorist financing (United Nations 
Security Council 2005). The Resolution determined the measures for struggle 
against Taliban and Al-Qaeda financial resources: 
 
“-participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or 
perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the 
name of, on behalf of, or in support of; 
-supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; 
-recruiting for; or 
-otherwise supporting acts or activities of; Al-Qaida, Osama bin 
Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or 
derivative thereof.” (United Nations Security Council 2005, p.3) 
 
The Resolution also requests the Member States to report the actions that 
are taken to (or “intending to”) impose the sanctions on the individuals and 
entities, which are included on the list. Finally, the Resolution refers to another 
international body, FATF and urges Member States to implement FATF’s Forty 
Recommendations on Money Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing (Utük 2009, p.94). It is the first time that it refers to the FATF 
in United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions.  
In 2006, the Resolutions 1730 and 1735 of Security Council emphasize the 
importance of cooperation and exchange of information between member states, 
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Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee established under Resolution 
1267. Moreover, the Resolution 1735 updates the version of the list of individuals 
and entities related with Taliban and Al-Qaeda for freezing asset and border 
control (United Nations Security Council 2006). 
In 2008, the Resolution 1817 of Security Council focused on the relation 
between terrorism and organized crimes especially in Afghanistan. It calls upon 
the member states not only to take measures on illicit drug trafficking but also to 
improve the cooperation in regional and international level (United Nations 
Security Council 2008).  
In 2008, the Resolution 1817 of Security Council proposed the member 
states to implement the provisions of the Resolution 1373 fully. It requests the 
Committee to monitor the member states for full implementation of the sanctions 
on individual and entities associated with Taliban and Al-Qaeda and forms reports 
on improvements on implementation to Security Council. 
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism is the first international document associated with the financing of 
terrorism, before the 9/11 attacks upon the United States. The Convention urges 
the member states to criminalize the financing of terrorism, freeze and confiscate 
the funds associated with terrorism. Moreover, the Convention focuses on the 
cooperation and exchange information between states struggling against the 
financing of terrorism.   
The struggle against the financing of terrorism has begun before 9/11 
attacks, but it was taken acceleration after the events of 9/11. The US pressed the 
Security Council to combat the financing of terrorism and urged the member 
states to freeze funds and financial resources of the individuals and entities 
associated with Al-Qaeda and Taliban. This blacklist has been regularly updated 
and was monitored in the process by special committees.   
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3.2 THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
 
Although the missions of the World Bank and the IMF differ from one 
another, the methods of combating money laundering and terrorist financing in 
general, are similar. This area is conducive for joint studies. The main objective of 
the World Bank is to fight poverty on the globe. To this end, the World Bank has 
been working to ensure that the development capacities of the states are increased 
by providing financial and technical assistance. Otherwise, the main objective of 
the IMF is to maintain fiscal stability in the macroeconomic framework. In this 
context, the IMF has been working to increase international monetary 
cooperation, facilitate balanced development of international trade, increase 
foreign exchange stability, and help establish the multilateral payment system 
(Schott 2006, p. X-2). 
In April 2001, the World Bank and the IMF's Executive Directors pointed 
out that terrorist financing was a serious threat to the development of countries 
and the financial stability of their economy, and they began to work within this 
scope. After 9/11 attacks, the Councils extended their scope to include terrorist 
financing. Besides, the Boards adopted 40 Recommendations on money 
laundering and terrorist financing in July and August 2002, and to approve 9 
Special Recommendations for the prevention of terrorist financing exclusively as 
essential international standards (World Bank 2002). The Boards determined that  
the fight against laundering and terrorist financing as an area of operational work, 
and in November 2002 they put into practice a 12-months pilot program which 
uses a comprehensive assessment methodology internationally. Within the scope 
of the pilot program, The IMF and the World Bank have been doing country 
assessments and have decided to continue their work in this area after March 
2004, when they received the pilot program results. It also stated that during these 
studies, cooperation with regional organizations like FSRB and FATF should be 
continued (IMF n.d.). 
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Within the scope of the studies carried out by the World Bank and the 
IMF; Initiatives have been made to develop international dialogue. Also, in this 
context, it is made in the context of international struggle against money 
laundering and terrorist financing with the development of the evaluation 
methodology. The methodology consisted of 120 criteria covering each of the 
FATF Forty and Special Recommendations, including implementation of criminal 
law enforcement (FATF 2004). It covered the legal and institutional AML/CFT 
framework for a country, including the establishment of financial intelligence 
units (FIUs). The methodology also covered relevant United Nations (UN) 
Security Council Resolutions and international conventions and other measures of 
international standard setters. It provided an in depth assessment of the preventive 
measures for financial organizations (Schott 2006, p. X-5). The methodology will 
be used by the international organizations in their evaluations of AML/CFT 
controls carried out as part of their overall assessments of a country’s compliance 
with international financial standards in the FSAP and OFC processes. They will 
result in an ROSC for AML/CFT, which will be reported to the Executive Boards 
of the Bank and the Fund. The methodology will also be used by the FATF and 
FSRBs in their mutual evaluations. FATF and the FSRBs will prepare an ROSC 
as part of their mutual evaluations, which will be recognized by the Bank and the 
Fund and working towards improving the institutional capacity through the 
intensification of educational activities (Schott 2006, p. X-6). 
In 2002, the World Bank and the IMF worked together with the FATF, 
FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRB), the Egmont Group, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, International Association of Securities Commissioners 
(IOSCO) and International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) on single 
comprehensive anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing 
assessment methodology. This method was revised in 2004, and 200 criteria were 
determined to assess countries’ efforts to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing (Schott 2006, p. X-6). 
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In 2011, the Executive Board of IMF discussed the evolution of the IMF’s 
AML/CFT programs and established guidance as for the way of improving in this 
topic. In 2012, the guidance on the AML/CFT in surveillance and financial 
stability assessments (FSA) was issued. It mentions that the money laundering 
(ML), terrorist financing (FT) threaten stability, the balance of payments stability, 
the effective operation of the international monetary system. In 2014, The Board 
of IMF reviewed the AML/CFT strategy. Firstly, it approved the revised FATF 
AML/CFT standard and assessment methodology. It also approved the continuity 
of AML/CFT issues (IMF 2016, p.2). 
In 2009, IMF established a donor-supported trust fund. Until 2014, the 
Topical Trust Funds (TTF) which received contributions from France, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom, more than $25 million dollars for improving the AML/CFT 
capacity (IMF 2016, p.3). 
Furthermore, the World Bank and IMF dialogue series increases the 
awareness of states to combat terrorist financing. Within the scope of the studies 
carried out by the World Bank and the IMF, the organizations try to build 
institutional capacity in order to provide technical assistance for states and to 
conduct studies associated with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing 
(Schott 2006). 
 
3.3 THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 
The Council of Europe was established in 1949 to protect human rights, 
the rule of law and democracy. It identifies the prevention of the financing of 
terrorism as one of the most important aspects of the struggle against terrorism 
(Utük 2009). Thus, in 2005 the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism was 
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signed in Warsaw among 29 member states (out of 47) of the Council of Europe, 
but only 7 of them ratified it (Council of Europe 2005). 
The Council of Europe determined to update its 1990 Convention on 
Money Laundering to redefine the financing of terrorism and to draw attention on 
resources of terrorism, not only money laundering from criminal activities, but 
also through legitimate ones.  The text also underlines the fact that quick access to 
financial information or information on assets held by terrorist groups, is a major 
step to reach success to prevent financing of terrorism. The convention proposes a 
mechanism to ensure the proper implementation by parties (Council of Europe 
2005). 
 The Council of Europe Convention defines financing of terrorism in 
Article 1; it has amended the International Convention on the Prevention of the 
Financing of Terrorism of the United Nations. It has been stated that the 
provisions of the Convention (International Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorist Financing) should be taken into account in this context (Council of 
Europe 2005, p.2). 
 
“Article 2 – Application of the Convention to the financing of 
terrorism 
•    Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to enable it to apply the provisions contained in 
Chapters III, IV and V of this Convention to the financing of 
terrorism. 
•    In particular, each Party shall ensure that it is able to search, 
trace, identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property, of a illegal or 
illicit origin, used or allocated to be used by any means, in whole or 
in part, for the financing of terrorism, or the proceeds of this 
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offence, and to provide co-operation to this end to the widest 
possible extent.” (Council of Europe 2005, p.2) 
 
In Article 2 of the Council of Europe Convention; It is stated that the 
parties need to search, trace, identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property 
belonging to or used for the purpose of financing of terrorism or for the purpose 
of which they are legally or illegally sourced, or that they should obtain 
international cooperation in this regard (Aykın & Sözmen 2008, p.85). 
 
“Article 4 – Investigative and provisional measures 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to enable it to identify, trace, freeze or seize rapidly 
property which is liable to confiscation pursuant to Article 3, in 
order in particular to facilitate the enforcement of a later 
confiscation.” (Council of Europe 2005, p.3) 
 
In Articles 3 and 4 of the Council of Europe Convention; It is stated that 
each state which is a party must take proper and other precautions necessary for 
the realization of the proceeds of crime or the confiscation of the goods equivalent 
to this income and the property of the proceeds. In this context, it is stipulated that 
it is a necessity to take proper and other precautions that may be necessary for the 
detection, arrest, freezing and seizure of property subject to confiscation (Aykın & 
Sözmen 2008, p.85). 
 
“Article 5 – Freezing, seizure, and confiscation  
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Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to ensure that the measures to freeze, seize and 
confiscate also encompass:  
•      the property into which the proceeds have been transformed or 
converted; 
•     property acquired from legitimate sources if proceeds have 
been intermingled, in whole or in part, with such property, up to the 
assessed value of the intermingled proceeds; 
•    income or other benefits derived from proceeds, from the 
property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or 
converted or from the property with which proceeds of crime have 
been intermingled, up to the assessed value of the intermingled 
proceeds, in the same manner, and to the same extent as proceeds.” 
(Council of Europe 2005, p.3) 
 
In the money laundering convention, only the proceeds from illegal 
activities were taken into consideration, while in the renewed convention, Article 
5 of the Council of Europe Convention was established, bearing in account the 
existence of illegal revenues in the financing of terrorism as well as income 
derived from legal remedies. Income derived from proceeds of freezing, seizure 
and confiscation measures, if the incomes are mixed with wholly or partly legally 
derived assets, illegal incomes mixed with legal income and the income derived 
from the crime, the assets for which the incomes have been changed or converted, 
income or other benefits must be included (Aykın & Sözmen 2008, p.86). 
Article 7 of the Convention contains the authorization of the courts to take 
measures for the freeze, seize and confiscate property mentioned earlier. It was 
stated that the exceptional circumstances that would prevent the courts from 
taking these measures should be avoided. 
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“Section 2 – Financial intelligence unit (FIU) and prevention 
Article 12 – Financial intelligence unit (FIU) 
•    Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish an FIU as defined in this Convention. 
•    Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to ensure that its FIU has access, directly or 
indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law 
enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its 
functions, including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports.” 
(Council of Europe 2005, p.6) 
 
Under the provisions of Articles 2 and 12 of the Convention, each member 
state should establish financial intelligence units to carry out measures to prevent 
international financing of terrorism. Also, the financial intelligence units (FIU) 
recommended being established should be legally defined to implement and 
follow these measures. It is stated in the Council of Europe Convention that the 
importance of international cooperation among FIUs is also emphasized and it is 
also stated that each country should be authorized to take suspension or 
suspension decision of the operation carried out at the request of another FIU 
(Aykın & Sözmen 2008, p.86). The Convention states that countries should 
benefit from the FATF Special Recommendations when regulating the struggle 
against the financing of terrorism (Council of Europe 2005). 
In conclusion, the Council of Europe Convention on Financing of 
Terrorism mentions search, trace, identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property 
belonging to or used for the purpose of financing of terrorism or income derived 
from the crime of terrorist financing, and in this respect shall enforce extensive 
international cooperation (Ustün 2008). 
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3.4 THE EUROPEAN UNION     
 
The states which are members of the European Union have worked in 
relation to drugs, immigration, asylum, police and judicial matters, in particular, 
terrorism, in similar way to the Council of Europe decision of 2 December 1975. 
TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extreme, and Violence International) co-
operation was created by participating in the observer countries of the member 
countries of the European Union. The Working Group was established on May 31, 
1977. It was tasked with conducting a routine analysis of known and probable 
terrorist groups and developing a secure and rapid network to gather information 
about them. Moreover, the Group prepares the joint working groups on the subject 
of financing of terrorist groups and provides information flow and exchange in 
other matters (ed. Güzel 2002). 
The European Union has some special groups and committees which work 
on the financing of terrorism and assist the Council and the Commission. The first 
of them is an Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(EGMLTF) frequently meets to share views and help the Commission define 
policy and draft new legislation. The EGMLTF assist the Commission in the 
preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives, moreover to provide 
expertise to the Commission when preparing to implement measures. The second 
of them is a Committee on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing may also convene to give its opinion on enforcement measures put 
forward by the Commission.  
The European Union draws attention to combat money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism to prevent the market from being misused. EU rules in this 
area largely based on international standards adopted by the Financial Action 
Task Force’s (FATF), Special Recommendations and the Commission 
Communication on the Prevention of and Fight against Terrorist Financing of 
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October 2004 (Commission of European Communities 2004). They are tailored to 
the EU’s needs and complemented by national rules.  
The Commission’s Communication on the Prevention of and Fight against 
Terrorist Financing mentions the horizontal measures, the transparency, exchange 
of information and traceability of financial transactions as critical areas in the 
struggle against terrorist financing (Commission of the European Communities 
2004). 
In Exchange and Analysis of Information part, the Communication 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004) has proposed the importance of 
exchange of information among competent authorities and the private sector. The 
Communication draws attentions to exchange information in investigations of 
terrorist financing, and sharing of intelligence with criminal prosecutors would 
enhance the prospects of successful prosecutions (Commission of the European 
Communities 2004, p.5). The Communication believes that the programs, 
FIU.NET and SUSTRANS which are used for the exchange of information on 
terrorist financing between member states, are indispensable in struggle against 
terrorist financing. (Commission of the European Communities 2004) The 
financial sector does have information for suspicious transactions or financial 
patterns of suspects so that financial organizations could give access to encrypted 
data (Commission of the European Communities 2004, p.5). 
In Traceability of Financial Transactions part, the Communication states 
that it should be well formed and cooperation mechanism among the national 
actors dealing with identification, tracing, freezing, and confiscation of assets 
associated with terrorist financing. Establishing adequate links between funding 
activities and the pursuit of terrorism/terrorist attacks would allow financial data 
to be turned into intelligence which can be turned into evidence (Commission of 
the European Communities 2004, p.6). 
In Transparency part, the Communication states that improving 
transparency of legal persons is a key element in countering an infiltration by 
100 
 
terrorist organizations and their sympathizers. Moreover, transparency is a core 
issue in a charitable or non-profit sector which are among the most preferred ways 
of terrorist financing. The European Commission also try with Europol, its 
automatic intelligence gathering and analysis tools to apply to the charitable 
sector (Commission of the European Communities 2004, p.7,8). 
The Council Decision (Commission of the European Communities 2005) 
underlines the backgrounds of the final draft of the Directive 2005/60 on the 
Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. The fight against the financing of 
terrorism is one of the key aspects of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy, and this 
Decision shows us the way of European Union to struggle against the financing of 
terrorism.  
On 14 December 2004, EU Counter Terrorist Financing Strategy was 
formed. The key elements of the Strategy can be summarized as follows (Council 
of European Union 2004): 
•    The strategy states to improve transparency and traceability would be 
important in developing investigations. Thus, member states should 
develop financial investigative skills to follow money trails backward to 
the person providing finance and forwards to terrorist cells (Council of 
European Union 2004, p.6). 
•    The individual who carries cash and other equivalent instruments 
across borders is another method of moving funds for terrorist financings, 
such as small banking transfers. Technology for detecting this 
phenomenon should be developed and deployed. Thus, analysis of trends 
and techniques in terrorist financing should be followed by parties with 
reports from Europol (Council of European Union 2004, p.5). 
•    There are differences between money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism, and therefore in the methodologies to be successful in correctly 
identifying relevant suspicious transactions. For terrorists, the acquisition 
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of funds is not an end in itself but a means of committing a terrorist attack 
(Council of European Union 2004, p.4). Thus, the actors who are in a 
struggle in terrorist financing should distinguish the differences of 
methodologies of these crimes which have developed together. 
•    The Strategy underlines the cooperation with international actors with 
full implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and 
other relevant international conventions and Security Council Resolutions. 
Moreover, cooperation with FATF and it FATF-style Regional Bodies 
should be developed (Council of European Union 2004). 
 
“Between December 2003 and February 2005, the committee of 
experts held seven meetings and discussed a draft new convention 
on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime and the financing of terrorism. The agreement reached at the 
December 2004 meeting was submitted to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe on 27 January 2005 for 
consultation (Opinion No 254/2005). At its final meeting in 
February 2005, the committee of experts discussed parliamentary 
amendments and drew up a final draft, which was examined by the 
CDPC on 7 March 2005. At its 925th meeting on 3 May 2005, the 
Committee of Ministers formally adopted the Convention, paving 
the way for the formal endorsement of the text at the third summit 
of the Heads of State or Government held under the aegis of the 
Council of Europe in Warsaw on 16 and 17 May 2005.” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005, p.2) 
 
Council Directive 1991/308/EEC of the European Parliament on the 
Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Money Laundering has been 
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repealed by the Directive 2005/60 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. This 
directive sets out the necessary arrangements for EU member states in their 
legislation under the framework of fighting money laundering and financing of 
terrorism. According to the agreement, all member states are required to make 
their internal legislation compatible with the Directive by 15 December 2007. The 
Directive defines terrorist financing as; 
 
“The provision or collection of funds, by any means, directly or 
indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to 
carry out any of the offences within the meaning of Articles 1 to 4 
of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism.” (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2005, p.20) 
 
The Directive focuses on the CDD procedures and to enhance CDD 
measures should be applied in member countries which have high-risk of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. It mentions the importance of FIUs to follow 
the AML/CFT. Also, it draws attention to report suspicious transactions. Money 
laundering and terrorist financing are international problems, and the effort to 
combat them should be global (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2005, p.18). 
According to the Directive, credit and financial organizations, auditors, 
external accountants, tax advisors, real estate agents, casinos and notaries and 
other independent legal professionals when they act on behalf of their clients or 
assist them in any financial or real estate transaction and finally other natural or 
legal persons trading in goods, only to the extent that payments are made in cash 
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in an amount of 15.000 EURO or more, are obliged parties. (European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union 2005, p.16). 
The other important document in EU’s struggle against the terrorist 
financing is the Regulation (EC) 1889/2005, focuses on the movement of money. 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2005) According to the 
Regulation, any natural person entering or leaving the Community and carrying 
cash of a value of 10.000 EURO or more should make a declaration including full 
name, nationality, the owner, the amount of cash and transport route comprising 
where he is leaving or entering the Community. 
In 2005, the European Commission underlined the importance of 
cooperation and exchange of information between competent authorities in 
horizontal structures. The cooperation between Finance, Justice, Interior and 
Foreign Ministries, financial intelligence unit, law enforcement authorities, 
intelligence agency and public prosecutor offices in policy formation and 
operational issues (Commission of the European Communities 2005, p.3). 
Concerning non-profit sector, it suggests that the member states should monitor 
the non-profit sectors and ensure reporting regularly, in order to protect non-profit 
sectors from terrorist financing (Commission of the European Communities 2005, 
p.12). 
In 2016, the European Commission stress out in Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use Of The Financial System for The Purposes 
of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing that an action plan presented by the 
Commission(European Commission 2016-I) at 2 February 2016 for strengthening 
the fight against terrorist financing that focuses on two main strands of action: 
tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving 
funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist 
organizations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds(European Commission 
2016-II). 
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The European Union’s struggle against the terrorist financing covers a 
extended range of issues and focus on suspicious transactions, customer due 
diligence mechanisms, exchange of information on both national and international 
level, the physical movement of currency, the prevention of the use of non-profit 
sector for the purpose of terrorist financing, financial sector for purpose of 
terrorist financing. 
 
3.5 THE EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS 
 
On June 9, 1995, the Egmont Group was formed in Brussels with 24 
countries and eight international organizations. The organization takes its name 
from the place, where the meeting is held, the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in 
Brussels. Its main goal is to help countries to develop systems of counter 
intelligence at the national level and to remove the obstacles in front of 
international information exchange related to money laundering (Aykın 2007, 
p.7).  In this context, in addition to providing financial assistance to the financial 
intelligence units, training, experience and knowledge to the staff, international 
exchange of information is developed, and a systematic structure is provided. 
Information exchanges between Egmont Group member countries are 
made through financial intelligence units (FIUs) of countries. The financial 
intelligence unit is described by Egmont as: 
 
"It is the central national unit responsible for collecting, analyzing 
and referencing to relevant authorities reports of financial 
information required by national legislation and regulations in 
order to combat incurred income and potential terrorist financing or 
money laundering and terrorism financing." (Egmont Group 2004, 
p.3) 
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The Egmont Group ensures a platform on combating terrorist financing 
and money laundering (TF/ML) for exchange of the information of expertise and 
financial intelligence. The FIU has an important position to cooperate and support 
national and international level struggle against terrorist financing and share 
secure financial information domestically and internationally in compliance with 
global standards on CFT/AML. It is the operational tool for international 
CFT/AML system. Thus, its sharing of financial intelligence has become an 
indispensable part of international efforts to struggle against TF/ML. Financial 
Intelligence Units provide and exchange information in compliance with 
international standards on CFT/AML and law enforcement (Schott 2006). The 
Egmont Group works as an international intelligence forum and mobilizes its 
member FIUs. 
 
“The support provided by the Egmont Group includes: 
• Expanding and systematizing the exchange of financial 
intelligence information 
• Improving expertise and capabilities of personnel of such 
organizations 
• Fostering better communication among financial intelligence 
units through the application of technology.” (Egmont Group 2004, 
p.3) 
 
In 1997 the Egmont Secure Web was established. Through this Web, 
financial intelligence units communicate with each other, on the basis of 
confidentiality and protection of privacy, exchange information in a secure way. 
Furthermore, the Web also provides updated information about the new trends and 
techniques in money laundering and terrorist financing (Aykın & Sözmen 2008, 
p.122). 
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The Egmont Group is an informal body without a secretariat or a 
permanent location. The Egmont Group meets in a plenary session once a year 
and in working group sessions three times a year. Within the Egmont Group, the 
FIU heads make all the policy decisions, including membership. The group 
established the Egmont Committee to help coordinate with the Working Groups, 
and the FIU heads in between the annual plenary sessions (Schott 2006, p. III-20, 
III-21). 
 
“There are five working groups and an Egmont Committee. The 
working groups and their functions are listed below:  
• The Legal Working Group (LWG) reviews the candidacy of 
potential members and handles all legal aspects and matters 
of principle within Egmont, including cooperation between 
FIUs.  
• The Outreach Working Group (OWG) works to create a 
global network of FIUs by identifying candidates for 
membership and working with those countries to ensure that 
they meet international standards.  
• The Training Working Group (TWG) identifies training 
needs and opportunities for FIU personnel and conducts 
training seminars for Egmont members as well as for non-
Egmont jurisdictions.  
• The Operational Working Group (OPWG) seeks to bring 
FIUs together on typologies development and long-term 
strategic analytical projects.  
• The IT Working Group (ITWG) provides advice and 
technical assistance to new and existing FIUs to develop, 
enhance, or redesign their IT systems, and examines new 
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software applications that might facilitate analytical work.” 
(Egmont Group 2004, p.3,4) 
 
In conclusion, the Egmont Group works for simplifying the exchange of 
secure information between its member FIUs, stakeholders, and international 
organizations. It strengthens the cooperation in the struggle against terrorist 
financing. It is a crucial attempt to provide solutions to international and domestic 
problem of the terrorist financing.  
 
3.6 THE WOLFSBERG GROUP OF BANKS 
 
The Wolfsberg Group is an association of 12 global banks, representing 
primarily international private banking concerns. The group, which was named 
after the Château Wolfsberg in north-eastern Switzerland where the group was 
formed, has established four sets of principles for private banking (Schott 2006, p. 
IV-4). 
In January 2002, the Wolfsberg Group published “the Statement on the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.” (Wolfsberg Group 2002) It 
underlines the role of financial organizations in the fight against the financing of 
terrorism that may assist states and their agencies, to strengthen struggle against 
terrorist groups from accessing their financial funds. Moreover, the Wolfsberg 
group is conscious of the fact that, adherence to existing “Know Your Customer” 
procedures is a key player to struggle against the terrorism. The identification of 
customers by financial organizations can facilitate the struggling against the 
financing of terrorism (Wolfsberg Group 2002).  
The Wolfsberg Group is committed to applying enhanced and appropriate 
due diligence in relation to those of their customers engaged in sectors and 
activities which have been identified by competent authorities as being widely 
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used for the financing of terrorism, such as underground banking businesses or 
alternative remittance systems (Wolfsberg Group 2002, p.2). Moreover, the 
Wolfsberg Group advice to restrict their business with remittance businesses, 
change offices, exchange houses, casas de cambious and money transfer agents 
which are associated with crime or financing of terrorism.  
Wolfsberg Group recognizes that while the motive for such transactions 
may be unclear, monitoring and then identifying and reporting unusual or 
suspicious transactions may assist government agencies by linking seemingly 
unrelated activity to the financing of terrorism (Wolfsberg Group 2002, p.3). 
Wolfsberg Group mentions the need of chase on unusual or suspicious 
transactions. Similar to Egmont Group, there is a common belief that if the 
authorities may follow the unusual or suspicious transactions, they may decrease 
the risk of financing of terrorism.  
Wolfsberg Group indicates that cooperation and assisting law enforcement 
and government agencies, is indispensable, furthermore financial organizations 
are able to make: 
 
• “The provision of official lists of suspected terrorists and 
terrorist organizations on a globally coordinated basis by 
the relevant competent authority in each jurisdiction. 
• The inclusion of appropriate details and information in 
official lists to assist financial organizations in efficient and 
timely searches of their customer bases. This information 
should ideally include in the case of individuals: date of 
birth: passport or identity card number; in the case of 
corporations; place of incorporation or establishment; 
details of principals; to the extent possible, reason for 
inclusion on the list; and geographic information, such as 
the location, date and time of the transaction.  
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• Providing prompt feedback to financial organizations on 
reports made following circulation of such official lists.  
• The provision of meaningful information in relation to 
patterns, techniques, and mechanisms used in the financing 
of terrorism to assist with monitoring procedures. 
• The provision of meaningful information about corporate 
and other types of vehicles used for terrorist financing. 
• The development by government and clearing agencies of 
uniform global formats for funds transfers that require 
information which may assist efforts to prevent and detect 
the financing of terrorism.  
Ensuring that national legislation : 
• Permits financial organizations to maintain information 
derived from official lists within their databases and to 
share such information within their groups 
• Affords financial organizations protection from civil 
liability for relying on such lists. 
• Permits financial organizations to report unusual or 
suspicious transactions that may relate to terrorism to the 
relevant authorities without breaching any duty of customer 
confidentiality or privacy legislation. 
• Permits the prompt exchange of information between 
governmental agencies of different nation states.” 
(Wolfsberg Group 2002, p.3,4) 
 
The Wolfsberg Group stands behind the FATF Special Recommendations 
on Terrorist Financing as a measure for the struggle against terrorist financing. 
The Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
proves that the financial organizations interest in the issue and put forward 
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reasons to be a part of the fight against the financing of terrorism which needs 
significant cooperation on efforts.  
 
3.7 THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established by 
the group of ten countries central bank governors. Actually, there are 13 member 
countries. However, it called the Group of Ten: Canada, Germany, Luxemburg, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, United States, Spain, 
United Kingdom and Switzerland. Countries are represented by their central 
banks or by the relevant authority with formal responsibility for supervision of 
banking where that authority is not the central bank. The committee has no 
supervisory power or force of law; it tries to determine the broad supervisory 
standards and statements of best practices on bank supervisory issues. These 
standards were adopted by each state which will take all necessary steps to 
implement measures in the national law enforcement system. The main purpose of 
the committee to develop international standards for banking supervision and 
enhancing international cooperation on the issue, to create an international forum. 
Its mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and practices of banks 
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. 
 
“The core of the work undertaken by the Basel Committee focuses 
on the following activities: 
•    Exchanging information on developments in the banking sector 
and financial markets to help identify current or emerging risks for 
the global financial system, 
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•    Sharing supervisory issues, approaches, and techniques to 
promote common understanding and to improve cross-border 
cooperation, 
•    Establishing and promoting global standards for the regulation 
and supervision of banks, as well as guidelines and sound practices, 
•    Addressing regulatory and supervisory gaps that pose risks to 
financial stability, 
•    Monitoring the implementation of BCBS standards in member 
countries and beyond to encourage their timely, consistent and 
effective implementation, 
•    Consulting with central banks and bank supervisory authorities 
which are not members of the BCBS to benefit from their input into 
the BCBS policy formulation process and to promote the 
implementation of BCBS standards, guidelines and sound practices 
beyond BCBS member countries, 
•   Coordinating and cooperating with other financial sector 
standard setters and international bodies, particularly those 
involved in promoting financial stability.” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2016, I.2) 
 
In addition to these activities, in 2002, the Committee began to focus also 
on the issue of financing of terrorism and published a document called “Sharing 
of financial records between jurisdictions in connection with the fight against the 
financing of terrorism.” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2002)  
 
“The focus of the 14 December 2001 meeting was on banking 
activities and on the possibilities of preventing the global financial 
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system from being misused to support terrorist activities. The 
participants noted that this could not be achieved unless financial 
services providers have effective “know your customer” (KYC) 
and customer due diligence (CDD) procedures and that some of the 
methods that might be used by terrorists to move money, such as 
the postal giro network and private wire transfer systems, may not 
be within the jurisdiction of central banks or banking supervisors. 
This underscores the need to introduce or improve KYC and CDD 
standards for all categories of organizations that provide financial 
services.” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2002, p.1) 
 
The statement underlines that BCBS try to prevent the global financial 
system from being misused. Thus they are working on standards to restrict money 
transfers to banks by terrorist groups. Hence, they would like to draw attention to 
improve the know your customer (KYC) and customer due diligence (CDD) 
principles and standards. 
 
“3. Participants agreed that the size and geographical scope of the 
international financial system makes it imperative to significantly 
improve coordination and collaboration between all the parties 
involved, if measures to identify and prevent terrorist financing are 
to succeed. Central banks and bank supervisors are typically not in 
the front line of these efforts. Nevertheless, because terrorism is a 
threat to financial stability, the participants agreed that central 
banks and banking supervisors should lend their expertise and 
resources to those that are more directly involved, including 
treasuries, judicial authorities and law enforcement authorities such 
as financial intelligence units. The collaboration needs to operate 
both at a domestic level between all parties concerned and also, to 
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the extent possible, at an international level. This means that 
gateways need to exist for information to be transmitted within and 
across national borders.” (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2002, p.1) 
 
The statement draws attention to improve coordination and collaboration 
between all parties associated with the prevention of financing of terrorism. 
Terrorism is a threat to financial stability. Thus central banks and bank 
supervisory has a responsibility towards other actors such as financial intelligence 
units, treasuries, judicial and law enforcement authorities. Each party of struggle 
against terrorist financing process, need proper collaboration among themselves to 
succeeded on the domestic and international level. 
 
“The BCBS, in its Customer due diligence for banks (CDD) paper 
in October 2001 issued prudential guidance for CDD which are 
applicable to AML/CFT. This paper sets out standards and provides 
guidance for the development of appropriate practices by banks in 
this area. Adequate due diligence on new and existing customers is 
a key element. Banks must develop policies and procedures in key 
areas such as customer acceptance, customer identification, 
ongoing monitoring of high-risk accounts and risk management. 
The essential elements for these were presented in this paper, 
together with recommendations for more rigorous standards of due 
diligence for higher-risk areas.” (BCBS, IAIS, OISCO 2003, p.6) 
 
In June 2003, the Committee together with IOSCO and IAIS prepared a 
report assessing the efforts in banking, insurance and securities sectors for the 
prevention of the financing of terrorism and underlined the need for the efficient 
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implementation of customer due diligence procedures in each sector and  the 
importance of standards of AML/CFT to prevent financing of terrorism. Also, the 
report includes lots of references to FATF 40 recommendations and special 
recommendations on the financing of terrorism (BCBS, IAIS, OISCO 2003). 
In 2004, the IAIS published the “Guidance Paper on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism” as an updated version of 
the “Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Notes for Insurance Supervisors and 
Insurance Entities” in 2002  (Ustün 2008, p.34).  In this document, the steps that 
should be taken by insurance companies with respect to customer due diligence 
procedures, suspicious transaction reporting, risk management, keeping record 
and training of the staff are presented (IAIS 2004). 
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SECTION FOUR 
 
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF) 
 
4.1 GENERAL OUTLOOK OF FATF 
 
At the summit of the seven industrialized countries, called the G-7, held in 
Paris in July 1989, and eight other countries, It was accepted that preventing 
money laundering is not the responsibility of only one country, but of all. For this 
reason, it is necessary to determine the principles of multilateral struggle against 
the risk of laundering at the global level, in this regard, to organize these 
principles, to develop standards and to establish cooperation between the 
countries, as well as the countries participating in the summit and the other 
countries that are interested in this issue (FATF 2008, p.1). 
At the summit of the G-7, the focus was particularly on fighting drug 
trafficking and laundering from the narcotic funds, both nationally and 
internationally. For this reason, it has been proposed to establish bilateral or 
multilateral agreements between countries for freezing, seizing and confiscating 
the funds from narcotic (FATF 2008, p.1). 
The G7 Resolution included measures to strengthen international 
cooperation in the War on Drugs including ratification and implementation of the 
1988 ‘Vienna Convention’(UN 1988) on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances and the creation of a financial action task force from 
summit participants and other countries interested in these problems (Hayes 2012, 
p.16). The mandate of the Task Force was to assess the results of cooperation 
already undertaken in order to prevent the utilization of the banking system and 
financial organizations for the purpose of money laundering, and to consider 
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additional preventive efforts in this field, including the adaptation of the legal and 
regulatory systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance (G-7 1989). 
The FATF, consisting of experts from financial, legal, regulatory and 
operational sectors, meets regularly. It is a policy production center designed to 
assist the political will of countries to influence legal reforms. FATF’s basic 
mission is to help ensure that money laundering is effectively prevented and 
identified by all countries ensuring measures (Ergül 2001, p.15). 
The FATF is an organization established to prevent the use of the financial 
system by the criminals, to take measures against international criminals and to 
produce policies and standards in this respect. FATF is not set up for an unlimited 
period of time due to the fact that it is an 'action force.' The working period is 
based on a renewal mandate every eight years. The renewal of FATF Mandate 
until 2020 was adopted at the meeting of Ministers and representatives of the 
Financial Action Task Force in Washington on 20 April 2012. It reaffirmed the 
close co-operation between the FATF, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and the United Nations (FATF 2012, p.8). 
Secretariat of the FATF is in Paris, although the enforcement activity 
being under the OECD umbrella, it is not an organ of the OECD. It works as an 
independent organization and reports to the Finance Ministers and other relevant 
Ministers of member states and also reports to the OECD Council of Ministers 
(FATF 2008, p.2). 
The annual reports of FATF include revisions of recommendations, 
monitoring compliances, typologies of terrorist financing and the way how 
AML/CFT can be strengthened. The annual report of 2011-2012 underlines the 
objectives of the FATF as to set standards and to promote effective 
implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating 
money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of 
the international financial system. Moreover, it focuses on collaboration with 
other international stakeholders; the FATF works also to identify national-level 
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vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international financial system from 
abuse (FATF 2012, p.42). Furthermore, the FATF carries out the following tasks: 
 
“a) Identifying and analyzing money laundering, terrorist financing 
and other threats to the integrity of the financial system, including 
the methods and trends involved; examining the impact of 
measures designed to combat misuse of the international financial 
system; supporting national, regional and global threat and risk 
assessments; 
b) Developing and refining the international standards for 
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and 
proliferation (the FATF Recommendations); 
c) Assessing and monitoring its Members, through ‘peer reviews’ 
(‘mutual evaluations’) and follow-up processes, to determine the 
degree of technical compliance, implementation and effectiveness 
of systems to combat money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism and proliferation; refining the standard assessment 
methodology and common procedures for conducting mutual 
evaluations and evaluation follow-up; 
d) Identifying and engaging with high-risk, non co-operative 
jurisdictions and those with strategic deficiencies in their national 
regimes, and coordinating action to protect the integrity of the 
financial system against the threat posed by them; 
e) Promoting full and effective implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations by all countries through the global network of 
FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) and international 
organizations; ensuring a clear understanding of the FATF 
standards and consistent application of mutual evaluation and 
follow-up processes throughout the FATF global network and 
strengthening the capacity of the FSRBs to assess and monitor their 
member countries; 
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f) Responding as necessary to significant new threats to the 
integrity of the financial system consistent with the needs identified 
by the international community, including the United Nations 
Security Council, the G-20 and the FATF itself; preparing guidance 
as needed to facilitate implementation of relevant international 
obligations in a manner compatible with the FATF standards (e.g., 
continuing work on money laundering and other misuse of the 
financial system relating to corruption); 
g) Assisting jurisdictions in implementing financial provisions of 
the United Nations Security Council resolutions on non-
proliferation, assessing the degree of implementation and the 
effectiveness of these measures in accordance with the FATF 
mutual evaluation and follow-up process, and preparing guidance 
as needed to facilitate implementation of relevant international 
obligations in a manner compatible with the FATF standards; 
h) Engaging and consulting with the private sector and civil society 
on matters related to the overall work of the FATF, including 
regular consultation with the private sector and through the 
consultative forum; 
i) Undertaking any new tasks agreed by its Members in the course 
of its activities and within the framework of this Mandate; and 
taking on these new tasks only where it has a particular additional 
contribution to make while avoiding duplication of existing efforts 
elsewhere.” (FATF 2012, p.42, 43) 
 
The terrorism threat has been continuing to grow and has become the 
biggest concern worldwide. The FATF’s role as a standard-setting and assessment 
body is to encourage state’s efforts to take actions against terrorist financing by 
identifying and analyzing terrorist financing, developing and refining the 
international standards for combating the financing of terrorism, identifying and 
engaging with high-risks on integrity of financial system by terrorist financing, 
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assisting and supporting jurisdictions in implementing financial provisions of 
recommendations. Furthermore, the other tasks of FATF are engaging and 
consulting with the private sector and civil society on matters related to the 
overall work of the FATF (FATF 2017). 
 
4.2 COMPOSITION AND PARTICIPATION 
 
4.2.1 Members 
 
At the beginning of the FATF foundation, signing the Vienna Convention 
(UN 1988) was considered sufficient to become a member of the FATF, but today 
the FATF has set severe criteria for accepting new members. FATF is encouraged 
to create FATF-like regional organs instead of expanding under a single 
organizational framework. As a result of the FATF's policy, together members can 
acts a powerful force instead of a single unit in the struggle against TF/ML as 
seen from the global point of view, and this acts as a deterrent to terrorists. 
According to the 2012-2020 Final Mandate Report (FATF 2012) published 
by FATF, the conditions the group looks for membership are; 
“6. Member jurisdictions commit to: 
a) Endorse and implement the FATF Recommendations for 
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and 
proliferation, using where appropriate guidance and other policy 
endorsed by the FATF; and 
b) Undergo and actively participate in systematic ‘peer reviews’ 
(‘mutual evaluations’) and follow-up processes using the agreed 
assessment methodology and procedures; evaluations will be 
published by the FATF. 
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7. Member organizations commit to: 
a) Endorse and promote the efficient implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations among their member jurisdictions, and  
b) Support systematic ‘peer reviews’ (‘mutual evaluations’) and 
follow-up processes using the agreed assessment methodology and 
procedures. 
8. Member jurisdictions and organizations commit to: 
a) Pursue the development of the FATF standards, guidance and 
other policy for combating money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism and proliferation and other threats to the integrity of the 
international financial system through active participation in the 
work of the FATF (chairing meetings, drafting reports, etc.); and 
b) Work together to meet the objectives and carry out the tasks of 
this Mandate.” (FATF 2012, p.3, 4) 
 
The FATF currently comprises 35 member jurisdictions and two regional 
organizations, representing most major financial centers in all parts of the globe 
(FATF 2017). 
 
4.2.2 Associate Members 
 
FATF-like regional organizations (FSRB) are the common name given to 
organizations in different geographical regions of the world that come together to 
work within a program for the purpose of preventing laundering of criminal 
proceeds and struggle against terrorist financing. There are 9 FSRBs, which work 
with FATF and other international organizations. In addition to its thirty-seven 
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members, the FATF includes nine "associate members" that are FATF-like 
organizations in other regions (FSRBs) (FATF 2017). 
• Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) 
• Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) 
• Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-
Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL) 
• Eurasian Group (EAG) 
• Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG) 
• Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT) 
• Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa (GIABA) 
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
(MENAFATF) 
• Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC) (FATF 
2017, p.56) 
 
The FATF is a major standard-setting institution in the world fighting 
money laundering and terrorist financing and it covers from New Zealand to 
Iceland and from Africa to Canada, all the major developed countries of the 
world. FATF-like regional organizations (FSRB) are organizations that enable the 
cooperation of countries in close proximity in relation to their geographical 
position in the world. FATF-like organizations include countries with FATF 
membership, while the majority of members of these organizations are not FATF 
members (Ustün 2006). 
Associate Members of FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) can 
participate in the work of FATF and governed by a set of principles. These FSRBs 
promise to implement the FATF Standards in their jurisdictions through the 
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mutual evaluations and follow-up processes using the agreed assessment 
methodology and procedures (FATF 2017). Furthermore they participate in the 
development of the FATF standards, and guidance for struggling against terrorist 
financing, and endorse all FATF Recommendations (FATF 2017, p.4). 
 
4.2.2.1 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) 
 
The Asia Pacific Group was formed in February 1997 in Bangkok in order 
to fight regional crime against criminal incitement in line with the decision taken 
in the fourth Asia Pacific Launch of Crime Revenues Symposium. The APG 
meetings were held in August 1999 in Manila under the leadership of the 
Republic of the Philippines and the Asian Development Bank, and in May 2000 in 
Australia. At these meetings, issues related to structuring, 40 obligations for the 
implementation of Recommendations, self-evaluation of member states, mutual 
assessment, training, technical assistance and typology studies were discussed. 
The APG, in conjunction with the FATF and the other eight regional bodies, 
constitute a global network to combat money laundering, the financing of 
terrorism and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (APG 
2017). Based on the FATF 40 Recommendations in its work, the Group has also 
included combating terrorist financing in its activities. The APG also assists its 
members to establish national coordination mechanisms to better utilize resources 
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (Sedefoglu 2009, p.85). 
The APG, FATF and the other bodies have reciprocal rights of attendance 
at each other’s meetings as well as reciprocal sharing of documents and 
participation in working groups. The APG works jointly with these bodies in 
mutual evaluations, typologies, and other projects. The APG also works closely 
with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Group of International 
Finance Centre Supervisors on assessing and assisting APG members (APG 2016-
I, p.6). 
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APG has 41 member jurisdictions across the Asia/Pacific. (APG 2016-I, p. 
7) APG distribute these memberships into 5 sub-regions: North Asia, South East 
Asia, South Asia, Pacific, and Canzus for efficient management and 
representation. (APG 2016-I) APG believes in the benefits of the exchange of 
information from other international organizations. Thus, the APG has eight 
observer jurisdictions and 28 observer organizations (including FATF‐style 
regional bodies, or FSRBs) (APG 2016-II, p.5). 
 
4.2.2.2 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) 
 
 It is an organization formed by Caribbean countries and territories that 
have agreed to take counter-measures against the money laundering and terrorist 
financing. CFATF is the oldest regional institution established as FATF (Tasdelen 
2003, p.69). The task force was formed at the beginning of the 1990s as a result of 
meetings in Aruba and Jamaica. At a meeting in Aruba in June 1990, 19 regional 
recommendations were developed that address the concept and complement the 
FATF 40 Recommendations. 
There are twenty-seven states in the Caribbean Basin, Central and South 
America who have agreed to implement common measures to address the 
problem of money laundering, and terrorist financing. 
The members’ ministers held a meeting in Kingston in 1992 and agreed on 
Kingston Declaration (Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 1992). The 
ministers agreed to sign and ratify the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and further Agreed to Endorse 
and implement both the 40 FATF Recommendations and 19 Aruba 
Recommendations. 
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4.2.2.3 Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-
Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL) 
 
The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism- MONEYVAL is a permanent 
monitoring body of the Council of Europe entrusted with the task of assessing 
compliance with the principal international standards to counter money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism and the effectiveness of their implementation, as 
well as with the task of making recommendations to national authorities in respect 
of necessary improvements to their systems (Council of Europe 2014-I). Through 
a dynamic process of mutual evaluations, peer review and regular follow-up of its 
reports, MONEYVAL aims to improve the capacities of national authorities for 
struggle against terrorist financing and money laundering. 
 MONEYVAL has developed its activities in a step-by-step fashion, giving 
priority to achieving concrete results on struggle against terrorist financing and 
money laundering since its creation by the Committee of Ministers in 1997 as an 
expert committee subordinated to the European Committee on Crime Problems 
(CDPC) (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2013, p.1). MONEYVAL 
functioning was regulated by the general provisions of Resolution Res (2005)47 
on committees and subordinate bodies, their terms of reference and working 
methods (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2005). At their meeting on 
the 13th of October 2010, the Committee of Ministers adopted the Resolution 
CM/Res 12(2010) on the Statute of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL). The statute elevates MONEYVAL as from 1st of January 2011 to 
an independent monitoring mechanism within the Council of Europe answerable 
directly to the Committee of Ministers. MONEYVAL Statute was further 
amended in 2013 by the Resolution CM/Res 13(2013) (Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers 2013). 
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  The MONEYVAL underlines the significant role of the struggle against 
money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other forms of serious proceeds-
generating crimes for the purpose of which the Council of Europe has adopted a 
variety of instruments, in particular the 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Council of Europe 1990) 
and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism 
(Council of Europe 2005). 
Recalling the status of the Council of Europe/MONEYVAL since June 
2006 as an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and 
underlining the importance of MONEYVAL as a leading international partner in 
the global network of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT) assessment bodies (Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers 2013, p.1). 
In the process of evaluating the countries that are members should 
criminalize money laundering on the basis of the Vienna Convention of 1988, the 
FATF Recommendations, the Council of Europe Conventions and the EU 
Directives (FATF 2012). MONEYVAL expanded its field of activity after 
September 11, 2001, including the struggle against terrorist financing (Sedefoglu 
2009, p.90). The Resolution CM/Res (2013) underlines the deeply convincing 
need to fight the financing of terrorism (Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers 2013, p.1). 
MONEYVAL tries to raise awareness of major global policies on terrorist 
financing and contribute actively to the global struggle against terrorist financing 
by working closely with other significant international partners, including the 
FATF, the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations, the European Union and 
other FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in the global network of AML/CFT 
(Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2013, p.3). 
Member States of the Council of Europe that are not members of the 
FATF and Member States of the Council of Europe that become members of the 
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FATF and request to continue to be evaluated by MONEYVAL (Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers 2013, p.2). Currently it has 28 members: Albania, 
Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Council of Europe 2014-II). 
 
4.2.2.4 Eurasian Group (EAG) 
 
Kyrgyz Republic, People's Republic of China, Republic of Belarus, 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Tajikistan, Russian Federation, based on the 
historically developed relations of strategic partnership and cooperation among 
them. They realized danger related to money laundering and financing of 
terrorism, confirming their commitment to maintaining the economic safety in the 
region and preventing national financial systems from being used by criminal 
elements, recognizing the importance of broad international cooperation in the 
sphere of anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism, expressing 
interest in creation, on the basis of FATF Recommendations and with regard to 
the characteristics of the region, of the effective system of combating money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. According to the decision of the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CIS of March, 26, 2004, and consultations held 
among the above-mentioned countries of the region (Eurasian Group 2004, p.1). 
The main tasks of EAG are assisting member states in order to 
implementing 40 FATF Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations on 
CFT, analyzing trends on AML/CFT, and coordinating international cooperation 
and technical assistance programs with specialized international organizations 
(Eurasian Group 2011, Article 2). 
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EAG’s headquarters place in Moscow, Russia (Hayes 2012). There are 
nine EAG member states: Republic of Belarus, Republic of India, People’s 
Republic of China, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian 
Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Republic of Uzbekistan 
(EAG 2010). 
 
4.2.2.5 Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG) 
 
To fight against laundering proceeds of East and South Africa was 
established by the ministers and high-ranking representatives of fourteen states in 
Arusha (Tanzania) on 26-27 August 1999 with the aim of combating crime 
incidents and its headquarter is in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Hayes 2012, p.16). 
The scope of the Group's work also included the fight against terrorist financing 
(Sedefoglu 2009, p.88). Founding seven countries are Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, 
Seychelles, Mauritius, Mozambique and Namibia.  
Members of the group established in the regional character have agreed to 
comply with FATF's 40 Recommendations. This effort involves working with 
other international organizations involved in fighting crime incitement, trying to 
uncover regional typologies, fighting against problems such as institutional 
development and human resource capacities, and providing technical assistance 
wherever necessary. EGMONT, FATF, GIABA, IMF, Interpol – Harare, UK, 
UNODC, USA and mores are the cooperate partners and observers of ESAAMLG 
(ESAAMLG 2004). 
There are 17 member states which are Angola, Botswana, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
(ESAAMLG 2004). 
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4.2.2.6 Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT) 
 
The purpose of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, 
GAFILAT, (formerly known as Financial Action Task Force of South America 
(GAFISUD) is to work for developing and implementing a comprehensive global 
strategy to combat money laundering and terrorist financing as set out in the 
FATF Recommendations (FATF 2017). 
The origin of GAFILAT goes back to ongoing efforts to integrate anti-
money laundering efforts in South America and was encouraged by the creation of 
other anti money-laundering regional groups that were established following the 
FATF model (FATF 2017).  It was created as GAFISUD on the 8th of December 
2000 in Cartagena, Colombia by means of a memorandum of understanding by 
representatives of the governments of nine South American countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Three 
full members were also incorporated in the following years: México (2006), Costa 
Rica and Panamá (2010) (GAFISUD 2010, p.5). GAFILAT’s headquarters is at 
Buenos Aires in Argentina (Hayes 2012, p.16). 
Its work on public policies on money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism, carefully evaluating the implementation of international standards on 
the subject has not only consolidated it as a specialized organization but also 
expanded it, including Central and North America (GAFISUD 2010, p.24). 
The Inter-American Development Bank, The World Bank, The 
International Money Fund, Interpol, The Financial Action Task Force (FATF/ 
GAFI) is the in cooperation with GAFILAT (GAFISUD 2010, p.15). 
 
4.2.2.7 Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in 
West Africa (GIABA) 
 
The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa (GIABA) was established by the Economic Community of West African 
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States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government in the year 2000 
(GIABA 2012-I). Its headquarters is in Dakar in Senegal (Hayes 2012). 
GIABA is a specialized institution of ECOWAS, that is responsible for 
strengthening the capacity of member states towards the prevention and control 
terrorist financing and money laundering in the region (GIABA 2012-I). 
The Central Banks of Signatory States, regional Securities and Exchange 
Commissions, UEMOA, Banque Ouest Africaine pour le Développement 
(BOAD), the French Zone Anti-Money Laundering Liaison Committee (Conseil 
Régional de l'Epargne Public et des Marchés Financiers), the African 
Development Bank (ADB),the United Nations /UNCTED, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the FATF, Interpol, WCO, the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
and the European Union are the observers of GIABA(GIABA 2012-I). 
GAIBI has 16 member states which are Republic of Benin, Republic of 
Cape Verde, Republic of the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Liberia, 
Republic of Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, Republic of Sierra Leone, Burkina 
Faso, Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of Ghana, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Republic of Mali, Republic of Senegal, and Togolese Republic (GIABA 2012-II). 
 
4.2.2.8 Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
(MENAFATF) 
 
Middle East and North Africa Region have recognized the threats 
associated with terrorist financing and money laundering, and try to handle these 
problems through co-operation between states within MENA region 
(MENAFATF 2017-I).  The 40 Recommendations and 9 Special 
Recommendations on CFT/AML, UN Conventions and UN Security Council 
Resolutions and other worldwide-accepted standards are adopted the Arab states 
towards terrorist financing and money laundering in the region. The governments 
of 14 countries decided to establish MENAFATF, Bahrain on the 30th of 
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November 2004, as a FSRB in order to work jointly to adapt these standards and 
implement in line with cultural values, constitutional frameworks and legal 
systems (Hayes 2012). 
There are 19 member states: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, United Arab 
Emirates, Republic of Tunisia, People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic of Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of 
Iraq, Sultanate of Oman, State of Palestine, State of Qatar, State of Kuwait, 
Lebanese Republic, State of Libya, Arab Republic of Egypt, Kingdom of 
Morocco, The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, and Republic of Yemen 
(MENAFATF 2017-II).   
The International Money Fund, The World Bank, Financial Action Task 
Force, and United Nations are the some of the observers to support MENAFATF 
struggle against terrorist financing.  
The first meeting of the Operational Experts Forum on Terrorist Financing 
(OFTF) presided by the state of Qatar on 12th of November 2016 was held on the 
margins of the MENAFATF Plenary meeting which include the exchange of 
practical experiences among participants and stressed out the key roles of national 
cooperation among competent authorities for struggle against terrorist financing. 
It also stressed out the FIU’s role for detecting terrorist financing, and establishing 
developed databases on field of CFT (MENAFATF 2016, p.2). 
 
4.2.2.9 Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’Action 
Contre le Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale) (GABAC) 
 
GABAC is body of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa and established in 2000 with mandate to CFT/AML (GABAC 2015). 
GABAC became an observer organization of the FATF in February 2012, and 
since then worked with the FATF to meet the requirement of an FATF-Style 
Regional Body (FATF 2017). 
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Central and West Africa continue to experience the terrible impact of 
terrorism. Boko Haram (BH) in particular, has become one of the deadliest 
terrorist organizations in this region (Moore 2015). BH and related actors 
conducted hundreds of terrorist attacks, resulting in over 5000 casualties in 2014 
and 6000 casualties in 2015 (Uhramcher & Sheridan 2016) (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2015). 
 Terrorism not only threatens the lives of civilians in the region, but also 
contributes to political instability and undermines economic development. These 
reasons affect the states into cooperation among themselves to fight against 
terrorist financing and money laundering (FATF, GIABA, GABAC 2016). 
In the first half of 2015, BH was responsible for the deaths of 1059 people 
in northern Nigeria. The violence that originated in Nigeria has spilled into the 
neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger with a number of deadly 
terrorist attacks committed against government and civilian targets (United States 
Department of State 2016). 
In October 2015, the FATF recognized the Task Force on Money-
Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’Action contre le blanchiment d’Argent en 
Afrique Centrale (GABAC)) as an FATF-Style Regional Body and admitted it as 
an Associate Member (FATF 2017, p.51). 
 
4.2.3 International Financial Organizations (IFI) 
 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have a significant 
affect in developing, promoting and implementing measures for CFT/AML 
(FATF 2012) In particular, the IMF and the World Bank: 
 
“a) Contribute to the development of the FATF standards, guidance and 
other policy for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other 
related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. 
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b) Help to promote the effective implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations through country assessments conducted in the context 
of the Financial Sector Assessment. Program using the agreed assessment 
methodology and promoting publication of detailed assessment reports; 
and; 
c) Provide technical assistance and capacity building on combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats.” (FATF 2012, p.4, 
5) 
 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank try to help to 
promote the effective implementation of FATF Recommendations, to contribute 
to the development of the FATF standards, guidance and other policy for 
CFT/AML threats to the integrity of financial system, to provide technical 
assistance and capacity building on CFT/AML threats (FATF 2012). 
 
4.2.4 Observers 
 
Israel and Saudi Arabia are still observers; the remaining observers include 
twenty nine observer organizations, including the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units (FATF 2017). To become an observer: 
 
“i) The organization should be inter-governmental and 
international/regional in nature, and it should not work according to 
private sector mechanisms. 
ii) The organization should have a stated role relating to 
AML/CFT. 
iii) The organization should endorse the FATF standards. 
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iv) Admission of the organization as an observer should enhance 
the FATF’s global reach, geographically and/or sectorally. 
v) The organization should be able to make a contribution to the 
work of the FATF. 
vi) If the organization were to become an observer, reciprocity 
would exist between it and the FATF, including with respect to 
attendance at meetings and information sharing on AML/CFT 
issues.” (FATF 2008, p.31) 
 
The organizations having intention to become an FATF observer should 
write an interest letter to the FATF President and this letter should include 
information on the organization, its efforts on AML/CFT and its activities. 
Furthermore, the organization clearly defines the objectives, endorses the FATF 
Forty Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations and agrees to 
support implementation of these standards. FATF President submits the 
expression of interest to the plenary for assessment. If approved, FATF secretariat 
finalizes the process (FATF 2008, p.31). 
FATF has 30 observer organizations: African Development Bank, Anti-
Money Laundering Liaison Committee of the Franc Zone (CLAB), Asian 
Development Bank, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), European Central Bank (ECB), Eurojust, Europol, Group 
of International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Interpol, Interpol/Money Laundering, 
Organization of American States / Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism 
(OAS/CICTE), Organization of American States / Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission (OAS/CICAD), Organization for Economic Co-operation 
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and Development (OECD), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations 
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), The Analytical 
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to the Security Council Committee 
pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individuals and entities, The Expert Group to the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004),Panel of Experts to the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), Panel 
of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1929 (2010), The 
Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (1267 Committee), World Bank, and 
World Customs Organization (WCO) (FATF 2017, p.57).  
The observer organizations regularize, stabilize and quicken the struggle 
against terrorist financing and extend the implementation of FATF 
Recommendations. Je-yoon Shin, FATF President 2015-2016, pointed out that 
‘The greatest asset of the FATF is the expertise and integrity of its members, 
associate members and observers.’ (FATF 2017, p.4) It is a pertinent remark, so 
FATF is leading work globally to show the risks countries face from terrorist 
financing, and to develop policy responses to all aspects of it (FATF 2017, p.12). 
In sum, when the legal profession considers the impact of the FATF's work 
on the legal framework, it needs to realize that the FATF's reach is global. 
Furthermore, because there are a number of observer organizations that have 
endorsed the FATF's recommendations, the FATF's reach is much broader than its 
37 members (Terry 2010, p.9). 
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4.3 STRUCTURES OF FATF 
 
4.3.1 The Plenary 
 
The Plenary is the decision-making center of the FATF and all decisions 
are taken by consensus and it consists of member jurisdictions and organizations. 
The Plenary of FATF appoints the President, the Vice-President and the Steering 
Group, determines the manner in which it conducts its affairs and approves the 
program of work and budget. It decides on any other matter governing the 
business and affairs of the FATF and the membership, FSRB status and observer 
status for FTAF (FATF 2012, p.5). The plenary is chaired by a Presidency drawn 
from the FATF membership, supported by a vice-president, both of which rotate 
on an annual basis (Hayes 2012, p.18). 
The Plenary oversees the work of the four working groups which work on 
specific tasks that range from the identification of new threats to the evaluation of 
the implementation of AML/CFT systems at the national level. The working 
groups have the ability to set up project teams or sub-groups to examine relevant 
topics in more detail. In 2009-2010, the working groups focused on the issues 
indicated below (FATF 2010, p.12): 
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Figure 4.1 The Organization of FATF 
 
 
“Source: The organization of FATF”, (FATF 2010, p.12) 
 
There are at least three meetings each year, normally during February, 
June, and October. The President may appoint additional meetings. All members, 
observers and associate members can attend the plenary meetings and sub-group 
meetings. Each Plenary meeting is chaired by the president. The president may 
extend invitations to representatives of non-members to plenary meetings, in 
closed sessions of the Plenary and after consultation with members; the president 
may invite the representatives from IMF, World Bank observer bodies (FATF 
2012, p.6). 
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4.3.2 The President and Vice-President 
 
The FATF president is appointed by the Plenary from among its member 
states for one year and the term begins on 1th of July and ends on 30th of June of 
the following year. The president is the principal spokesperson for the FATF and 
represents the FATF (FATF 2012, p.6, 7). The plenary is chaired by a Presidency 
drawn from the FATF membership, supported by a vice president, both of which 
rotate on an annual basis (Hayes 2012, p.18). 
The FATF Vice President is appointed by the Plenary from among its 
members, works for a term of one year preceding the start of his/her Presidential 
term (FATF 2012, p.7). The vice president assists the Presidents’ responsibilities 
on FATF mandate (FATF 2012). 
 
4.3.3 The Steering Group 
 
The Steering Group, which is described as ‘an advisory body for the 
President’, includes the past, present and future presidencies (Hayes 2012, p.18).  
The FATF Steering Group is chaired by the President (FATF 2012, p.7). Apart 
from a commitment to take into account the ‘geography and size of the FATF’ 
there are no evident rules governing the election, mandate or structure of the 
Steering Group (Hayes 2012, p.18). The Steering Group is composed of the 
Presidency, Vice Presidency and Heads of Delegation appointed by the Plenary. 
Their role is to advice to the President on issues affecting the FATF (FATF 2010, 
p.12). 
The composition of Steering Group is decided by the Plenary at the 
proposal of the President with balanced representation in terms of geographic 
regions on annual basis (FATF 2012, p.7). The FATF Steering Group provides 
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advices and assists the president who convenes at least three Steering Group 
meetings every calendar (FATF 2012).  
The Steering Group monitors and guides the progress of the FATF’s 
ongoing work, ensure the coordination between working groups. Furthermore, the 
Steering Group establishes a network to transmit the information to members 
(FATF 2012, p.7). 
 
4.3.4 The Secretariat 
 
The FATF Secretariat was created in 1992. It is located at the headquarters 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
Paris, but remains independent from the OECD (FATF 2014). The FATF 
Secretariat is composed of an Executive Secretary, who is appointed by the 
Plenary at the proposal of the President, and the Secretariat staff (FATF 2012, 
p.7). The main responsibilities of the Secretariat include the following: 
 
“a) Supporting the activities of the FATF, including its working groups; 
 b) Facilitating co-operation between Members, Associate Members and 
observers; 
c) Ensuring efficient communication to Members and others; 
d) Managing the financial, material and human resources allocated to the 
FATF; 
e) Maintaining the records, administering internal and external websites 
and dealing with correspondence of the FATF; and 
f) Carrying out all other functions that are assigned to it by the President or 
the Plenary.” (FATF 2012, p.8) 
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Figure 4.2 FATF Executive Secretary Plan 
 
 
“Source: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/fatfsecretariat/”, (FATF 2017) 
 
There are five working groups for different area of works and 2 
administrative groups under the secretary. The Communications Management 
Advisor of FATF, Alexandra Wijmenga-Daniel, pointed out that the teams under 
the executive secretary are the teams that coordinate work of relevant working 
groups (Mrs. WD Alexandra 2017, pers.comm. 25 April). These teams are: Policy 
Development Group (PDG), Evaluations and Compliance Group (ECG), Risk, 
Trends and Methods Group (RTMG), International Cooperation and Review 
Group (ICRG), Global Network and Coordination Group (GNCG).Furthermore, 
the Final FATF Mandate (2012, p.8) declared that one of the main secretariat 
responsible is supporting its working groups.  
This study tries to explain the teams and groups responsibilities below on 
the topic of working groups of FATF.  
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4.4 WORKING GROUPS IN FATF MEETINGS AND ORGANIZATIONS  
 
4.4.1 Working Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(WGTM) 
 
The FATF is leading the work globally to understand the risks countries 
face from terrorist financing, and to develop policy responses to all aspects of it 
(FATF 2017, p.12). The FATF’s role as a standard-setting and assessment body is 
to support and encourage countries’ efforts to combat terrorist financing by 
understanding the risk, developing robust counter-terrorist financing (CFT) 
Standards and policy responses, and monitoring implementation (FATF 2017, 
p.12).  WGTM try to develop and refine the international standards for combating 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation (the FATF 
Recommendations) (FATF 2017).  
The Policy Development Group (PDG) develops and refines the FATF 
Recommendations on CFT/AML regime and these topics are determined under 
the Working Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (WGTM).  
 
4.4.2 Working Group on Evaluations and Implementation (WGEI) 
 
  The strength of the FATF lies in its ability to assess how well a country 
has implemented the FATF Recommendations, and how effective a country’s 
measures are in reaching their ultimate goal of detecting, preventing and 
punishing abuse of the financial system (FATF 2014, p.15). The Evaluation and 
Compliance Group (ECG) tries to assess and monitor members, through ‘peer 
reviews’ and follow-up processes to determine the effectiveness of a country’s 
measures to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism and 
proliferation and their technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations. 
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ECG tries to assess topics in Working Group on Evaluations and Implementation 
(WGEI). 
 
4.4.3 Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) 
 
The Risk, Trends and Methods Group (RTMG) tries to identify, analyze 
and understand money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the 
integrity of the financial system (FATF 2017). RTMG breeds the discussions over 
CFT/AML threats in the Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) (FATF 2013). 
The FATF has established a Working Group on Typology to develop 
typologies on the laundering of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism. 
This working group includes representatives from FATF member countries, 
certain international organizations, as well as other countries, and examines the 
laundering of crime proceeds and the financing of terrorism. The typologies 
developed by the typology study group are published annually as a report 
(Sedefoglu 2009, p.83). 
 
4.4.4 International Co-operation Review Group (ICRG) 
 
Identifying and engaging with high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions 
and those with strategic deficiencies in their national regimes. International 
Cooperation and Review Group (ICRG) has been established to closely monitor 
the countries and regions that are not members of the FATF or FSRBs and to 
prevent the risk of laundering and terrorist financing (Sedefoglu 2009, p.84). 
If the country continues to fail to strengthen its CFT/AML measures, the 
next step would be referral to the FATF’s International Co-operation Review 
Group that would look at the countries weakness in the context of its work on 
identifying high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions (FATF 2017, p.33). 
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As one of its key objectives, the FATF identifies countries with such 
serious shortcomings in their AML/CFT system and engages with them to 
establish an action plan. It works with them to strengthen their measures to protect 
the financial system from abuse. Through the work of the International Co-
operation Review Group (ICRG), the FATF publicly identifies these countries, 
which also serves to raise awareness about the risk they represent and help protect 
the integrity of the global financial system. Once identified, the FATF closely 
monitors the progress that each country makes to address the weaknesses in their 
AML/CFT system. Public identification has proved very successful at 
encouraging countries to take swift action; not least as it increases the costs of 
doing business with and in those countries and can deter direct foreign investment 
The ICRG process started in 2007; since then, the FATF has reviewed over 80 
countries, and publicly identified 59 of them. Forty-eight have since taken the 
necessary steps to strengthen their AML/CFT framework, of which seven between 
July 2015 and June 2016: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Myanmar, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea and Sudan (FATF 2017, p.37). 
 
4.5 40 RECOMMENDATION OF FATF: A GENERAL OUTLOOK  
 
The FATF’s Recommendations are at the core of FATF’s work. The first 
set of Recommendations was issued in 1990 and aimed at providing measures that 
would help detect, prevent and punish the abuse of the international financial 
system for money laundering (FATF 2012, p.7). Since then, the FATF has 
periodically refined and updated the FATF Recommendations to respond to new 
threats to the international financial system. For example, in 2001, the FATF 
established Special Recommendations to combat terrorist financing. In 2003, the 
FATF introduced stronger standards for money laundering predicate offences and 
stronger customer due diligence requirements. And in 2005 it addressed the threat 
posed by cash couriers by introducing measures to detect physical cross border 
transportation of cash and bearer monetary instruments (FATF 2014, p.12). 
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By 2005, FATF was globally recognized as the standard-setter to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing. This was confirmed by United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1617(2005), which strongly urges all Member States 
to implement the comprehensive, international standards embodied in the FATF 
Forty Recommendations on money laundering and the Nine Special 
Recommendations on terrorist financing.  
Following the conclusion of the third round of mutual evaluations of its 
members, the FATF has reviewed and updated the FATF Recommendations, in 
close co-operation with the FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) and the 
observer organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the United Nations(FATF 2012,p.8). 
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Figure 4.3 FATF Recommendations I 
 
 
“Source: The FATF 40 Recommendations”, (FATF 2012, p.4) 
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Figure 4.4 FATF Recommendations II 
 
 
“Source: The FATF 40 Recommendations”, (FATF 2012, p.5) 
 
The AML/CFT efforts try to strengthen the criminal law with a particular 
emphasis on the development of legislative and enforcement techniques, such as 
the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, designed to undermine the financial 
power of trafficking networks and organized crime groups (Gilmore 2004, p.93). 
After that, it is to understand that the criminal law is not enough and the system 
needs a broad range of measures (Gilmore 2004). These needs affect the FATF 
Recommendations process in order to create effective standards to reach the 
gatekeeper. 
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The 1990 FATF report identifies three measures which were unanimously 
regarded as constituting the overall general framework for its many specific 
proposals. All of them were intended to cure major difficulties and inefficiencies 
in international cooperation. The first groups of decisions focus on the full 
implementation of Vienne Convention (UN 1999), the financial organizations 
secrecy laws should be conceived and an effective money laundering enforcement 
program should include multilateral cooperation (Gilmore 2004, p.95).  
The second group of decisions includes measures to be taken by financial 
and non-financial organizations and business and professional owners. Under this 
group there are 22 recommendations from Recommendation 4 to 
Recommendation 25. 5-12 recommends that the customer be recognized and the 
necessary records kept; Recommendation 13-16 contains notifications of 
suspicious actions and regulations on compliance with recommendations. 
Recommendations 17-20, laundering proceeds of crime and other measures to 
prevent terrorist financing, Recommendations 21-22, measures to be taken in 
respect of countries that do not comply with the recommendations of the FATF. 
Measures 23-25 are related to regulation and denial (Sedefoglu 2009, p.95). 
The third group of recommendations, numbered 26-34, requires 
institutional and other measures necessary for the prosecution of crime incidents 
and the prevention of terrorist financing comprising. Recommendations No. 26-32 
include the competent authorities, the authority of these authorities and the 
arrangements for the sources of authority. Recommendations 33-34 relate to the 
transparency of legal entities and agreements (Sedefoglu 2009, p.95). 
The recommendations in the last group are related to the international 
business union. Recommendations 36-39 relate to mutual legal assistance and the 
recall of the criminals. The last recommendation number 40 includes the 
development of the business union (Sedefoglu 2009, p.96). 
Gilmore (2004, p.42) defines the FATF as a gatekeeper to the international 
financial system. Thus, FATF Recommendations try to cover not only criminal 
side but also cover the other financial instruments in order to protect the 
international financial system.  
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4.5.1 The Link between Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing  
 
Baker&Joly (2009) have revealed important links that exist between ML 
and insecurity. In their study, they expose some of the connections that have been 
unveiled in the past between illicit money flows and destabilizing activities 
(Baker&Joly 2009). For instance, well before the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda used 
phoney foundations, bogus corporations and dubious bankers all based in tax 
havens to wire about 50 million US dollars a year. Also, elements of groups such 
as Hezbollah have been found to be engaged in illegal trade in cigarettes in the 
West as well as in illicit diamonds in Western parts of Africa (Kingah& Zwartjes 
2015, p.342). Hamas’ dubiety and ML extend as far as to Latin America. The 
Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran has been accused in the past of illegal trades 
amounting to about 12 billion US dollars a year. Globalization has been 
accompanied by an increase in the internationalization of crime (Vander 2003, p. 
2). For Baker and Nordin the issue of ML forms part of a broader whole: the 
challenge of dirty money. They define dirty money as one that is illegally earned, 
illegally used or illegally transferred, and has three main facets: criminal proceeds 
from drug trafficking and racketeering; commercial proceeds from transfer pricing 
and shady business transactions, often hidden in tax havens; and corrupt proceeds 
from greedy government officials (Baker & Nordin 2004). 
Chasing dirty money is a complex matter given that the main private 
bodies that aspire for change tend to be resistant to the same. Ramasastry (1998) 
argues that in the past foreign banks have been regarded as agents of dictators 
given that tyrants from poor countries have used banks in developed countries to 
launder money. 
The link between ML and TF is that money obtained through terrorist 
means such as hostage taking can be laundered into the formal and legal system 
and this is usable in turn to further fund terrorist acts (Madzima 2009, p.1). 
Another link between the two is succinctly made by Jean François Thony who 
notes in his ‘geography of terrorism’ that criminal organizations gain from the 
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propensity and ability of terrorists and guerrillas to wreak damage, while terrorists 
avail themselves of the financing that the criminal activities gain for them. This 
has been the case for Colombia, countries afflicted by endless imbroglios in 
Africa (Eastern Congo) and Afghanistan that have all been marked by the illicit 
flows of coca, diamonds and opium (Thony 2000, p.4). The most recent manifest 
linkage between ML and TF has been brought into sharper relief through the 
financing operations led by ISIS to fund its terrorist activities in Iraq, Syria and 
beyond. Dealing with ML is an important way to address all these ills including 
TF without any need for physical engagement (Thony 2000, p.5). 
Freeman (2011, p.472) suggests that terrorist financing and money 
laundering are conceptual opposites even though they are often linked in the same 
legislation and regulation. Mugira (2010) describes money laundering as the 
process where cash raised from criminal activities was made to look legitimate for 
re-integration into the financial system, whereas terrorist financing cared little 
about the source of the funds. However, he also contended that the use of funds 
will define its scope. Similar to Mugira (2010), Sinha (2013) suggest that terrorist 
financing can involve legal and illegal activities. It is not a sub-set of money 
laundering. Crime and money laundering are two such distinct activities. 
However, Sinha (2013) notes that there were some common elements in terms of 
the transfer of funds and the types of transactions. Power (2014) contends that 
money laundering is confined to legitimizing the proceeds of crime and without 
crime, there is no money laundering. However, Goede (2012) argues that it is an 
exercise of futility in combining money laundering and terrorist financing under 
the same law. 
There are seven differences between the crime of money laundering and 
terrorist financing (Mohamed 2013). First, the objective of money laundering is 
for profit, while the latter is based on the ideology (Wheeler 2010). Second, 
although the sources of fund are internally from within the criminal organizations, 
such sources for terrorist financing are internally from self-funding cells 
(increasingly centering into criminal activities) (FATF 2008). Third, transactions 
in money laundering are usually through the formal financial system, whereas the 
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latter would usually favor cash or informal financial system such as the hawala 
and currency exchange firm (Patrick&Sandhu 2003). The fourth point is the 
detection of the transaction such as deposits which are uncharacteristic of an 
individual’s wealth or the expected activity which could lead to relational links 
(Mohamed 2013). On the other hand, Mohamed (2013) suggests that terrorist 
financing has involved suspicious relationship such as wire transfers between 
unrelated parties that could lead to transactional links. 
The fifth aspect of the distinction is that the amount involved in the 
transaction for money laundering is normally in large amounts and often 
structured to avoid the financial system requirements. However, for terrorist 
financing, such amounts would usually involve small amounts below reporting 
thresholds. Sixth, the financial transactions in money laundering could involve 
shares, front companies, bearer shares and offshore secrecy havens. However, 
according to the US 9/11 Commission (2004) for terrorist financing, there is no 
workable financial profile of professional terrorist. Last, the money trail for 
money laundering is found to be circular, and money eventually ends up with the 
persons who generated it. However, for the latter, such flow is linear, as the 
money being generated has been used to propagate terrorist groups and activities. 
In this context, Sinha (2013) contends that the solution for the ineffective and 
burdensome force marriage of AML/CTF was, in the first place, to recognize the 
differences between money laundering and terrorist financing. 
 
4.6 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF FATF ON TERRORIST 
FINANCING  
 
4.6.1 Framework of Special Recommendations of FATF on Terrorist 
Financing 
 
The term 'terrorist finance' came into existence within the context of 
money laundering due to the September 11, 2001, hijacking events in the United 
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States (Kalyani 2010, p.17). Before this date terms such as 'financing of 
terrorism', 'terrorist financing', or 'counter-terrorist financing' were not a part of 
the anti-money laundering crime control vocabulary. The term, or the concept, did 
not arise in the Task Force's 1990 or 1996 Forty Anti-Money Laundering 
Recommendations, and neither was it referred to by the United States in the 2001 
Money Laundering Assessment Strategy (Gilmore 2004, p.119).  Prior to 2001 
terrorist finance was considered a completely different crime, and the Financial 
Action Task Force debated whether or not to include it within the ambit of the 
anti-money laundering regime (Beare 2003). 
But the September 11, 2001, events renewed and intensified attention on 
the financial underpinnings of all serious crime, leading, in turn, to an 
amalgamation of the two processes (Beare&Schneider 2007, p.248). Specifically, 
the Financial Action Task Force on Anti-Money Laundering first used the term 
subsequent to the special plenary meeting in Washington in October 2001, while 
issuing the first eight of the Nine Special Recommendations regarding Terrorist 
Financing (the ninth Recommendation was issued in 2004) (FATF 2010). 
The SR, without defining the term 'terrorist finance'; state a process to be 
undertaken for the detection and prevention of the financing of terrorism (Kalyani 
2010, p.17). Essentially a preventive strategy, the Special Recommendations 
consist of the following obligations (for which an equal commitment by all states 
- FATF members, members of the several FATF-like bodies, and observers - is 
urged by the Task Force):  
 
“I. Ratification and implementation of U.N. instruments; 
II. Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated 
money laundering; 
III. Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets; 
IV. Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism; 
V. International co-operation (providing the widest possible 
range of assistance to other countries' law enforcement and 
regulatory authorities for terrorist financing investigations); 
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VI. Alternative remittance (imposing anti-money laundering 
requirements on alternative remittance systems); 
VII. Wire transfers (strengthening customer identification 
measures in international and domestic wire transfers); 
VIII. Non-profit organizations (ensuring that entities, in 
particular non-profit organizations, cannot be misused to 
finance terrorism); 
IX. Cash couriers (impose measures to detect the physical 
cross-border transportation of currency and bearer 
negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or 
other disclosure obligation) “(FATF 2010, p.2, 3) 
 
FATF explains concept, suggesting that operationally terrorist finance 
means the "undertaking or other entity that provides or collects, by any means, 
directly or indirectly, funds or other assets that may be used, in full or in part, to 
facilitate the commission of terrorist acts" (FATF 2010, p.10). The Task Force 
does not offer any further explanation; therefore, the nuance of this process should 
be clarified. 
The methods used by terrorists and drug traffickers to “transfer funds” are 
similar, but they do not necessarily involve “laundering” in the normal sense of 
the word (Berry et al., 2003). As Kersten (2002) observed, money laundering and 
financing of terrorism are completely different concepts. Terrorists may well 
resort to the same methods used by criminals to conceal the source of the funds 
they wish to use. However, where financing of terrorism occurs there often is no 
criminal offence that precedes the attempts to hide the movement of funds from 
official scrutiny (Kersten 2002, supra not.6). The financing of terrorism often does 
not involve the washing of the proceeds of crime and, as Lilley (2003) noted “in 
fact the funds may be completely clean and the laundering is to conceal their 
ultimate use rather than initial origins” (Lilley 2003, p.188). 
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The events of September 11, 2001, led to a convergence between the two 
concepts money laundering and terrorist finance, under the leadership of the 
Financial Action Task Force. At that time recognizing a 'symbiotic relationship' or 
'close connection' between the two concepts, FATF focused on the similarities of 
the methods used in money laundering and terrorist financing (FATF 2005). In 
particular, it states that the convergence was due to the similar needs of money 
laundering and terrorist financing to mask financial resources and activities from 
the scrutiny of state authorities and occasional use of similar techniques (FATF 
2008). 
More precisely, the conceptual merger was due to the fact that the Task 
Force saw minimal regulatory difference between the two concepts, and the 
rudimentary material used for creating the terrorist finance Nine Special 
Recommendations was the generic anti-money laundering material (Kalyani 2010, 
p.21).  The Task Force clarified: 
 
“the basic sources creating the Nine Special 
Recommendations were the previous already existing money 
laundering typologies material (including annual typologies reports 
and written submissions provided by countries during the yearly 
typologies exercises), finished typologies reports prepared by 
national and international authorities, [and] national indicator lists 
developed to aid financial organizations detecting and reporting 
money laundering/terrorist finance activities.”(FATF 2005, supra 
not.46) 
 
Furthermore, it assured financial organizations that the Nine Special 
Recommendations regarding terrorist finance do not constitute an additional rule 
or regulation - but are intended to clarify, complement and/or reinforce already 
existing requirements imposed by the money laundering regime (FATF 2002).  
Thus, the 'new' Nine Recommendations were derived from an existing policy 
paradigm (Wolosky&Heifetz 2002). 
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Subsequent to several years of forceful action to address the consolidated 
threat, recently, the FATF dramatically and significantly changed its view, 
conceding that profound differences exist between the two concepts (Kalyani 
2010, p.21). It stated: 
 
“Since 2001, experience and study within the FATF and the 
intelligence community have demonstrated that money laundering and 
terrorist financing are distinct activities and that the measures which have 
been successfully applied in the identification and prevention of money 
laundering are by themselves less effective in the prevention of terrorist 
financing.”(FATF 2008, p.34) 
 
The FATF Standards have also been revised to strengthen the requirements 
for higher risk situations, and to allow countries to take a more focused approach 
in areas where high risks remain or implementation could be enhanced. Countries 
should first identify, assess and understand the risks of money laundering and 
terrorist finance that they face, and then adopt appropriate measures to mitigate 
the risk. The risk-based approach allows countries, within the framework of the 
FATF requirements, to adopt a more flexible set of measures, in order to target 
their resources more effectively and apply preventive measures that are 
commensurate to the nature of risks, in order to focus their efforts in the most 
effective way (FATF 2012, p.8). 
Combating terrorist financing is a very significant challenge for FATF. An 
effective AML/CFT system, in general, is important for addressing terrorist 
financing, and most measures previously focused on terrorist financing are now 
integrated throughout the Recommendations, therefore obviating the need for the 
Special Recommendations. However, there are some Recommendations that are 
unique to terrorist financing. These are: Recommendation 5 (the criminalization 
of terrorist financing); Recommendation 6 (targeted financial sanctions related to 
terrorism & terrorist financing); and Recommendation 8 (measures to prevent the 
misuse of non-profit organizations) (FATF 2012, p.8). 
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FATF progressed nine special recommendations to prevent the 
international financial system from abuse. The FATF methodology tries to put the 
differences and similarities of money laundering and terrorist financing and to put 
the international standards of CFT/AML to prevent financial system as a soft law 
process. Today, FATF's work focuses on the following areas, set out in detail in 
a FATF Consolidated Strategy on Combating Terrorist Financing (FATF 2016, 
p.4, 5): 
 
• Improve and update the understanding of terrorist financing risks, in 
particular the financing of ISIL/Daesh. 
• Ensure that the FATF Standards provide up-to-date and effective 
tools to identify and disrupt terrorist financing activity. 
• Ensure countries are appropriately and effectively applying the tools, 
including UN Targeted Financial Sanctions, to identify and disrupt 
terrorist financing activity. 
• Identify and take measures in relation to any countries with strategic 
deficiencies for terrorist financing. 
• Promote more effective domestic coordination and international 
cooperation to combat the financing of terrorism.  
 
Combating terrorist financing has been a priority for the FATF since 2001. 
However, in 2015, the scope and nature of terrorist threats globally intensified 
considerably, with terrorist attacks in many cities across the world, and the 
terrorist threat posed by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL/Daesh), and by Al-Qaeda and their affiliated terrorist organizations, and by 
other terrorist organizations also becoming more significant (FATF Terrorist 
Financing 2017).   
FATF is in search of new terrorist financing trends in order to raise the 
awareness of member countries, FRSBs, observers, financial organizations and 
moreover non-member countries and international organizations. Thus, 
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understanding the terrorist financing risk is the first step for FATF Terrorist 
Financing Strategy. 
The FATF Recommendations, interpretive notes and guidance, provide 
countries with comprehensive tools to detect and disrupt terrorist financing 
activity (FATF Terrorist Financing 2017).  FTAF tries to strengthen and updated 
its methodology for assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations to 
reflect the increased focus on terrorist financing activity (FATF Terrorist 
Financing 2017). The strong CFT/AML regime, if supported with strong measures 
and progress is a fully preventive financial system for countries. Thus, FATF has 
continued the mutual evaluation process to identify weakness points of countries 
and progress a monitor program to address these weaknesses. The basic term for 
terrorist financing is financial intelligence on terrorist financing and these are 
usually available in different locations for governments. Promote effective 
domestic coordination and international cooperation are key instruments to 
prevent the international financial system to abuse (FATF Terrorist Financing 
2017). 
 
4.6.2 FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 
 
4.6.2.1 Ratification and Implementation of UN Instruments 
 
Resolution 1373 as a global legislation, and the UNSC as a global 
legislator that demands member states to implement particular legal provisions to 
counter terrorist financing (Guillaume 2004). And while the resolution speaks of 
terrorist financing, it also calls upon states to implement the terms of an existing 
treaty, the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing 
(UN 2001, p.3).  
Each country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully 
the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (FATF 2010, p.2). 
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Countries should also immediately implement the United Nations 
resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist 
acts, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373(2001). 
Stressing on international duty to combat terrorism, SR-I calls for the 
universal adoption of the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terror and implementation of all UN resolutions 
relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorist act (FATF 2010). By 
recalling that convention, which was unanimously adopted by the UN General 
Assembly, SR-I rejects bank secrecy as a valid excuse for refusing to cooperate 
and pressures nations to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of 
terrorists, whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, 
social or cultural goals or which also engage in illicit activities such as drug 
trafficking or gun running (UN 2001). 
Such steps include not only imposing criminal, civil, or administrative 
liability on those who fund terrorism but also identifying, freezing, and seizing 
funds that are allocated for terrorist activities (UN 2001). By calling for the 
immediate implementation of all UN resolutions dealing with the funding of 
terrorism, and in particular Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which was 
passed in response to 9/11 and promotes international cooperation through the 
sharing of intelligence and lending of legal assistance to prosecute offenders, SR-I 
applies further pressure on nations to seek to combat terrorist financing 
(Martuscello 2011, p.375). 
 
4.6.2.2 Criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism and Associated Money 
Laundering 
 
Each country should criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts 
and terrorist organizations. Countries should ensure that such offences are 
designated as money laundering predicate offences (FATF 2010, p.2). 
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SR-II was developed with the objective of ensuring that countries have the 
legal capacity to prosecute and apply criminal sanctions on persons that finance 
terrorism (FATF 2010, p.4). Given the close connection between international 
terrorism and inter alia Money laundering, another objective of SR II is to 
emphasize this link by obligating countries to include terrorist financing offences 
as predicate offences for money laundering. The basis for criminalizing terrorist 
financing should be the United Nations International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). 
In addition, according to the provisions of the Special Recommendation; it 
is necessary to make arrangements by countries to ensure that terrorism; terrorist 
acts and the financing of terrorist organizations are among the leading crimes of 
money laundering (IMF 2003, p.49). 
SR-II (FATF 2010, supra not.31) seeks to provide countries with the legal 
capacity to prosecute and apply criminal sanctions on persons that finance 
terrorism, by obligating states both to criminalize the financing of terrorism, 
terrorist acts and terrorist organizations and to designate terror-related offenses as 
money laundering predicate offences (FATF 2010). The broad definitions that the 
FATF supplies in its interpretive guidance for SR-II makes clear that the objective 
of this recommendation is to provide countries with great flexibility to prosecute 
any person who is somehow connected to terrorism. Moreover, by calling for any 
act that furthers terrorism to be a predicate offense for money laundering, the 
FATF pressures nations to designate terrorist-related activities as severe crime and 
increases the risk for terrorist financiers, who could also be prosecuted and 
penalized as money launderers, as well as terrorists. SR-II is important because 
without terrorist financing being illegal in all countries, those who fund terrorism 
could utilize safe havens to avoid arrest and prosecution (Bowers 2009, p.392, 
393). 
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4.6.2.3 Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets 
 
Each country should implement measures to freeze without delay, funds or 
other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism and terrorist organizations in 
accordance with the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and 
suppression of the financing of terrorist acts (FATF 2010, p.2). 
 Each country should also adopt and implement measures, including 
legislative ones, which would enable the competent authorities to seize and 
confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for 
use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations (FATF 
2010, p.2). 
SR-III calls not only for the freezing and confiscation of terrorist assets, it 
targets the proceeds and assets purchased with the proceeds of such activities as 
well, no matter how far removed. If applied in broad strokes, the incentive for 
legitimate companies (e.g. ethnic grocers) to allow illicit remittance operations to 
piggyback on their infrastructure, for example, is substantively decreased. Grocers 
who might receive a few hundred dollars in ‘hush-money’ each month now have 
to contemplate losing their entire business, their home, their cars, their accounts, 
anything that that money was either spent on or comingled with (Bowers 2009, 
p.393). 
SR-III consists of two obligations. The first requires jurisdictions to 
implement measures that will freeze or, if appropriate, seize terrorist-related funds 
or other assets without delay in accordance with relevant United Nations 
resolutions. The second obligation of SR-III is to have measures in place that 
permit a jurisdiction to seize or confiscate terrorist funds or other assets on the 
basis of an order or mechanism issued by a competent authority or a court (FATF 
2010, p.7). 
In the UNSC Resolutions, it goes one step further and obliged to freeze the 
assets of the persons and organizations whose names are registered in the lists 
published by the "1267 Committee" (UN 1999). In UNSC resolutions, it is only 
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anticipated that the assets of individuals and organizations related to terrorism and 
terrorism financing will be frozen, and countries are not expected to take an 
attempt to confiscate or confiscate such property. 
The FATF (2010) IX Special Recommendations Report emphasizes that 
country should have effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or 
other assets of persons designated in the context of S/RES/1373(2001). Such 
freezing should take place without delay and without prior notice to the 
designated persons involved (FATF 2004, p.49). 
It should have effective laws and procedures to examine and give effect to, 
if appropriate, the actions initiated under the freezing mechanisms of other 
jurisdictions. Such procedures should ensure the prompt determination, according 
to applicable national legal principles, whether reasonable grounds or a reasonable 
basis exists to initiate a freezing action and the subsequent freezing of funds or 
other assets without delay (FATF 2004, p.49). 
In all cases, the frozen property, equipment, instrumentalities, funds or 
other assets remain the property of the natural or legal persons that held an interest 
in them at the time of the freezing and may continue to be administered by third 
parties, or through other arrangements established by such natural or legal persons 
prior to the initiation of an action under a freezing mechanism, or in accordance 
with other national provisions. As part of the implementation of a freeze, 
countries may decide to take control of the property, equipment, instrumentalities, 
or funds or other assets as a means to protect against flight (FATF 2017 
Methodology, p.156). 
The term confiscation, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means 
the permanent deprivation of funds or other assets by order of a competent 
authority or a court. Confiscation or forfeiture takes place through a judicial or 
administrative procedure that transfers the ownership of specified funds or other 
assets to be transferred to the State. In this case, the persons or entities that held an 
interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time of the confiscation or 
forfeiture loses all rights, in principle, to the confiscated or forfeited funds or 
other assets. Confiscation or forfeiture orders are usually linked to a criminal 
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conviction or a court decision whereby the confiscated or forfeited property is 
determined to have been derived from or intended for use in a violation of the law 
(FATF 2013, p.150). 
 
4.6.2.4 Reporting Suspicious Transactions Related to Terrorism 
 
Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism. SR-IV calls for 
financial organizations, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-money 
laundering obligations to report suspect transactions (Schott 2006, supra not.73). 
Suspicion alone is apparently the standard of proof which sets into motion this 
reporting requirement (Bowers 2009, p.393). 
Financial information which is gathered from suspicious transaction 
reporting (STR) has a central role in identifying terrorist financing and the 
movement of terrorist funds through the financial system (FATF 2008, p.29). 
Efforts are ongoing to examine the operational experience of counter-
terrorism agencies and establish general “alerts” or “indicators” that suggests a 
particular transaction presents a risk of terrorist finance. The diversity and 
multifaceted nature of terrorist’s financial activity makes this challenging (FATF 
2008, p.29). 
If financial organizations, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-
money laundering obligations, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that 
funds are linked or related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by 
terrorist organizations, they should be required to report promptly their suspicions 
to the competent authorities (FATF 2010, p.2). 
This special recommendation extends the obligation to report suspicious 
transactions under the fight against money laundering to include terror financing. 
For this reason, it is necessary to revise the legislation of countries against 
laundering in this scope (Aykın & Sözmen 2008, p.81). 
Furthermore, effective information exchange between the public and 
private sector has been identified by the FATF as one of the five high-level 
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principles for creating a risk-based approach to money laundering and terrorist 
financing (FATF 2007). 
SR-IV makes the detection of terrorist funds more probable by imposing 
new reporting requirements on the businesses that terrorist organizations are most 
likely to exploit to conceal the true intentions beyond their numerous financial 
transactions. SR-IV mandates that states should require financial organizations 
and other entities that already have AML reporting obligations to report any 
reasonable suspicions that funds are linked or related to, or are to be used for 
terrorism to competent authorities (Bowers 2009, p.393). These new reporting 
requirements complement SR-III because alerting authorities to such suspicious 
activities will allow them to take appropriate preventive action to freeze 
suspicious funds and if necessary, punitive action to seize them. Moreover, SR-IV 
helps to suppress terror by getting the gatekeepers to the financial system involved 
in fighting terrorism. This is important because gatekeepers control the points of 
entry that terrorists and money launderers use to put money through transaction 
after transaction. Collectively, SR-III and SR-IV allows nations to take action 
when there is a reasonable suspicion that funds are for a terrorist purpose 
(Martuscello 2011, p.377). 
 
4.6.2.5 International Co-operation 
 
Each country should afford another country, on the basis of a treaty, 
arrangement or other mechanism for mutual legal assistance or information 
exchange, the greatest possible measure of assistance in connection with criminal, 
civil enforcement, and administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings 
relating to the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations 
(FATF 2010, p.2). 
Countries should also take all possible measures to ensure that they do not 
provide safe havens for individuals charged with the financing of terrorism, 
terrorist acts or terrorist organizations, and should have procedures in place to 
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extradite, where possible, such individuals (FATF 2010, p.2). Countries shall 
ensure territorial integrity with regard to terrorists, terrorist organizations, and 
terrorist financiers. That is to say, countries shall not provide, nor acquiesce in 
being used as, a terrorist safe haven (Bowers 2009, p.393). 
The FATF will as a priority, review all issues that may inhibit or create 
barriers to effective information sharing, whether internationally, domestically 
between government agencies, and with/within the private sector, including 
implementation of current tools and authorities to share information (FATF 2016, 
p.7). 
SR-V aims to make it easier to prosecute suspected terrorists and their 
benefactors by requiring countries to provide each other the greatest possible 
measure of assistance in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and 
administrative investigations, inquiries, and proceedings relating to the financing 
of terrorism (FATF 2010). By calling for mutual legal assistance and the sharing 
of information, SR-V ensures that countries will work together and cooperate in 
order to eradicate the mutual threat of terrorist financing. Moreover, SR-V also 
prevents terrorists from fleeing to a jurisdiction with more relaxed CTF laws in an 
attempt to evade prosecution by prohibiting countries from acting as safe havens 
and requiring them to implement procedures for the extradition of terrorists 
(FATF 2010). Under SR-V countries must cooperate with each other to combat 
terrorist financing (Martuscello 2011, p.378). 
 
4.6.2.6 Alternative Remittance 
 
Alternative remittance systems (ARS) are used by terrorist organizations 
for convenience and access. ARS have the additional attraction of weaker and/or 
less opaque record-keeping and in many locations may be subject to generally less 
stringent regulatory oversight. Although FATF standards call for significantly 
strengthened controls over such service providers, the level of anonymity and the 
rapidity that such systems offer have served to make them a favored mechanism 
for terrorists (FATF 2008, p.24). 
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According to FATF (2001) IX Special Recommendations Report 
emphasizes that each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal 
entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or 
value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system 
or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF 
Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial organizations. It 
should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally are 
subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions (FATF 2010, p.2). 
The objective of SR-VI is to increase the transparency of payment flows 
by ensuring that jurisdictions impose consistent anti money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing measures on all forms of money/value transfer systems, 
particularly those traditionally operating outside the conventional financial sector 
and not currently subject to the FATF Recommendations (FATF 2010, p.13). 
All countries should require either the licensing or registration of all 
formal and informal money/value transfer services. In addition, both formal and 
informal money/value transfer services should be subject to the FATF (2016) 40 
Recommendations. Lastly, failure to comply should result in appropriate sanction 
(Bowers 2009, p.393). 
After providing the infrastructure for criminalizing, prosecuting, and 
punishing those who fund terrorism, the FATF addresses four specific things, 
which terrorist financiers exploit in order to avoid detection while moving funds, 
in its final four recommendations (Martuscello 2011,p.378). SR-VI goes after the 
unregulated businesses that terrorist often use to transfer funds around the world 
by requiring states to implement measures to ensure that those who provide a 
service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an 
informal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed and 
registered and subject to all the FATF recommendations that apply to bank and 
non-bank financial organizations (FATF 2010, p.3). SR-VI also recommends that 
countries impose penalties on those who carry out such services without a license. 
The aim of these requirements is to increase the transparency of payment flows by 
ensuring that jurisdictions impose consistent anti-money laundering and counter-
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terrorist financing measures on all forms of money/value transfer systems (FATF 
2010, p.13). 
 
4.6.2.7 Wire Transfers 
 
The FATF (2010) IX Special Recommendations Report emphases that 
countries should take measures to require financial organizations, including 
money remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator information 
(name, address and account number) on funds transfers and related messages that 
are sent, and the information should remain with the transfer or related message 
through the payment chain (FATF 2010, p.3). 
Financial organizations of all stripes are required to supply meaningful 
originator information (name, address, and account number). Further, they are 
either to refuse or to scrutinize transfers that contain incomplete originator 
information (Bowers 2009, p.393). 
SR-VII increases both surveillance over and transparency of wire transfers. 
Representing one of most potentially potent of all  the Special Recommendations, 
SR-VII requires countries to force all electronic money transferors to include 
accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address and account 
number) on fund transfers and related messages that are sent, which will remain 
with the transfer or related message through the payment chain (FATF 2010, p.3). 
SR-VII also obliges financial organizations, including money remitters, to 
conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspicious activity funds transfers 
which do not contain complete originator information (Martuscello 2011, p.379). 
Recognizing the potential terrorist financing threat posed by small wire transfers, 
the guidance maintains that countries should try to trace all wire transfers and to 
minimize thresholds taking into account the risk of driving transactions 
underground (FATF 2010). 
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4.6.2.8 Non-profit Organizations 
 
The G7 first asserted that NPOs were involved in terrorist financing in 
1996, calling for measures to combat those organizations which falsely claim to 
have charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also engaged in unlawful 
activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing, and racketeering (G8 
Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, 1996). 
Post-9/11, counter-terrorism policies have since accused some NPOs of 
supporting terrorism in two ways: either as ‘fronts’ for terrorist organizations that 
raise funds, transfer money and provide logistical support, or as legitimate 
enterprises that indirectly or directly support the aims of terrorist organizations 
(Hayes 2012, p.27). 
According to the FATF’s 2008 Terrorist Financing Typologies Report:  
 
“Terror networks often use compromised or complicit 
charities and businesses to support their objectives. For example, 
some groups have links to charity branches in high-risk areas 
and/or under-developed parts of the world where the welfare 
provision available from the state is limited or non-existent. 
 In this context, groups that use terrorism as a primary means to 
pursue their objectives can also utilize affiliated charities as a 
source of financing that may be diverted to fund terrorist attacks 
and terrorist recruitment by providing a veil of legitimacy over an 
organization based on terrorism.” (FATF 2008, p.8) (Kohlmann 
2006) 
 
This idea has been accepted and embraced by many national governments. 
For example, as Gordon Brown (then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer) said in a 
speech at Chatham House in October 2006, ‘We know that many charities and 
donors have been and are being exploited by terrorists’ (cited Howell 2010, p.22).  
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The actual extent of the problem is, however, strongly contested. A study 
commissioned by the European Commission, published in 2008, found ‘limited 
abuse of foundations’; (Matrix Insight 2008) the UK Charities Commission has 
reported that “actual instances of abuse have proved very rare”; (UK Charity 
Commission 2008) and the U.S. Treasury has acknowledged that the vast majority 
of the 1.8 million U.S. charities face little or no terrorist financing risk (Council 
on Foundations Press Release 2010). 
 The FATF’s own “mutual evaluation” reports also often acknowledge that 
terrorist financing in the NPO sector is an insignificant or non-existent problem 
for the country concerned, yet somewhat preposterously proceed to propose 
binding remedies that those states must implement in order to comply with SR-
VIII (Hayes 2012, p.27). 
The FATF (2010) IX Special Recommendations Report emphasizes that 
countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities 
that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organizations are 
particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused: 
 
(i) by terrorist organizations posing as legitimate entities; 
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, 
including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and 
(iii)to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds 
intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organizations   (FATF 
2010, p.3). 
 
For the purposes of SR-VIII, refers to a legal person or arrangement or 
organization that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes 
such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or 
for the carrying out of other types of “good works” ( FATF 2013, p.158). 
It is the important topic for FATF mutual evaluation process to assess non-
profit organizations, thus FATF carefully examines the legal regulations relevant 
to non-profit organizations. At the end of these examinations, countries warn of 
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weaknesses of system which may turn to be a threat international financial 
system. In recognition of the particular ease by which criminal elements can 
masquerade as non-profits, countries are called on to strengthen applicable 
transparency laws (e.g. auditing requirements, governance, etc.). In addition, 
countries are called on to prevent the exploitation of legitimate entities by 
nefarious organizations (Bowers 2009, p.393). 
Showing the FATF going after an entity that terrorists commonly exploit 
in order to raise and move money, SR-VIII requires countries to review the 
adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the 
financing of terrorism (FATF 2010). 
Since non-profit organizations are particularly vulnerable, the FATF 
mandates that countries ensure that they cannot be misused to allow terrorist 
groups to appear as law-abiding entities, exploit legitimate entities as conduits for 
terrorist financing, or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for 
legitimate purposes (FATF 2010). The guidance to SR-VIII provides a multi-tier 
approach for preventing the abuse of these easily manipulated entities, which 
includes sector outreach, supervision, and monitoring requirements as well as 
information gathering and international cooperation responsibilities (Martuscello 
2011, p.380). 
 
4.6.2.9 Cash Couriers 
 
The FATF (2010) IX Special Recommendations Report emphases that 
countries should have measures in place to detect the physical cross-border 
transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a 
declaration system or other disclosure obligation (FATF 2010, p.3). 
Countries also should ensure that their competent authorities have the legal 
authority to stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are 
suspected to be related to terrorist financing or money laundering, or that are 
falsely declared or disclosed (FATF 2010, p.3). 
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SR- IX was developed with the objective of ensuring that terrorists and 
other criminals cannot evade financial market controls through the physical cross-
border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments. Specifically, 
it aims to ensure that countries have measures to:  
 
“(1) detect the physical cross-border transportation of 
currency and bearer negotiable instruments,  
(2) stop or restrain currency and bearer negotiable 
instruments that are suspected to be related to terrorist financing or 
money laundering,  
(3) stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable 
instruments that are falsely declared or disclosed,  
(4) apply appropriate sanctions for making a false 
declaration or disclosure and  
(5) to enable confiscation of currency or bearer negotiable 
instruments that are related to terrorist financing or money 
laundering consistent with FATF Recommendation 3 and Special 
Recommendation III “(FATF 2008, p.29). 
 
Fighting the most basic method of moving funds, SR-IX requires countries 
to put measures in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of 
currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or 
disclosure requirement (FATF 2010).  Moreover, SR-IX obliges nations to have 
penalties and sanctions in place for those that make false declarations, including 
the freezing and seizure of their funds. This special recommendation endows 
nations with investigation and penalization processes that directly aim to detect 
suspicious activity and to deter attempts by terrorists to move money manually 
rather than electronically through the formal financial system (Martuscello 2011, 
p.380). 
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4.6.3 Assessing Implementation of the FATF Recommendations 
 
The preventive measures involve the establishment of a regulatory regime 
for financial organizations that are intended to reduce the scope for using the 
financing system to collect and transfer funds for terrorism purposes. As these 
measures must be integrated in the local regulatory framework of each country, 
they have been contained in more informal arrangements, such as the FATF 
recommendations (Raphaeli 2003). 
Allies are important in the physical struggle against terrorist financing 
(Myers, 2002). If one country strengthens its regulations and other countries 
remain the same, money launderers or terrorists may move their funds to one of 
the other countries with comparatively looser regulations. Therefore, concerted 
international cooperation is indispensable in the fight against money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism (Kishima 2004). 
According to Jurith (2004), governments throughout the globe are 
realizing that one of the most effective ways of attacking crime is by pursuing 
illegal money and confiscating it. Many nations and independent law enforcement 
jurisdictions have made changes in their laws, regulations, and practices in order 
to suppress terrorism financing more effectively. Sound laws and regulations are 
important, but it is more important that they are used effectively (FATF 2017, 
p.30). 
The impact of terrorist financing legislation at both the national and the 
international levels has been felt in particular by private financial organizations 
(Lopez 2006, p.41). Private organizations have been burdened by disclosure 
duties, the lifting of bank secrecy privileges, and the freezing of client accounts, 
all of which require extra resources. Moreover, monitoring the various lists, which 
are often updated, may be within the capability of large investment banks 
equipped with the requisite legal personnel and know-how to develop information 
technology software to check lists against customer information, but such tracking 
is very difficult for small and medium-sized firms (Bantekas 2003). As a result of 
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the September 11, 2001, events, the group met again in January 2002 to discuss 
terrorist financing and updated the principles to make reference to the role of 
financial organizations in preventing the global flow of such funds. The preamble 
to the new document, Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism, acknowledges that terrorist funds “do not necessarily derive from 
criminal activity,” and that terrorist financing can be defeated only by global 
cooperation between state entities and banks (Bantekas 2003, p.315). 
The financing of terrorism is a complex financial network governed by 
secrecy, deception, and criminal endeavors, but also requires good measure of 
sophistication and an understanding of the global financial system (Lopez 2006, 
p.45). 
In order to assess the international CFT initiatives, some indicators should 
be taken into account: legal compliance, the number of states that have signed the 
UN convention, financial intelligence units (FIUs) created, increased reporting, or 
international bodies joined, the amount of national and global asset freezes, 
technical assistance programs run and more importantly the degree to which states 
have changed domestic policies to be in compliance with the new international 
standards (Clunan 2006, p.578). 
A methodology document based on the recommendations by derived from 
the experience gained in the mutual evaluations of organizations such as FATF 
and FSRB; moreover, the information gained from the IMF and World Bank 
Financial Sector Assessment was prepared (Ustün 2006, p.51). 
The FATF recommendations include measures that require countries to 
assess and understand where their financial system is most at risk, so that they 
focus their resources on areas where risks are the highest (FATF 2014, p.14). The 
FATF’s recommendations are seen as “extremely persuasive soft law” with affect 
not only for its member states, but also non-member states (Bantekas 2003, 
p.319). 
In 1991, the FATF introduced the mutual evaluation procedures. France, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Australia were the first countries to undergo a 
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peer review of their level of implementation of the FATF Recommendations 
(FATF 2014, p.15).  
The mutual assistance program achieved to comply with the FATF 
standards, especially after integration of terrorist financing in the FATF’s 
mandate; it expedited the collaboration with international organizations associated 
with terrorist financing. By 2004, the IMF and the World Bank as well as the 
FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) had all agreed to use the same 
methodology in conducting their assessment of compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations (FATF 2014, p.16). The peer review also assesses how 
effective a country’s AML/CFT measures, such as financial intelligence, law 
enforcement and legislation work together to achieving the ultimate objective of 
protecting the financial system from abuse (FATF 2014, p.16). 
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Figure 4.5 FATF Mutual Evaluation Process 
 
 
“Source: The Mutual Evaluation Process”, (FATF 2017, p.34) 
 
The FATF has started to make Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations 
(2017) for protect the financial systems and broader economy from threats of 
terrorist financing, money laundering and proliferations (FATF 2017, p.31). The 
FATF/FSRB mutual evaluation assessments firstly focus on the country’s 
framework of CFT/AML. Each assessment try to reach the weakness and 
173 
 
strengths points of countries, then through the FATF follow-up process, the 
countries regulate their weak points which are included in the mutual evaluation 
report (FATF 2017).  The mutual evaluation report emphasizes the weak points 
and encourages the countries the implementation of FATF 40+9 
Recommendations. After that FATF monitors the progress for the countries 
process over the weak points, if the mutual evaluation identifies serious problems 
in CFT/AML regime, or if the country is not making meaningful progress in 
addressing them, the assessing body may publicly identify these shortcomings.  If 
the country continue to fail the strengthen its CFT/AML measures, the next step 
would be referral to the FATF’s International Co-operation Review Group that 
would look at the countries weakness in the context of its work on identifying 
high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions (FATF 2017, p.33).The FATF 
republished these public statements, as they contain relevant information that 
countries and the private sector should be aware of as part of their implementation 
of the risk-based approach (FATF 2017, p.34).  
FATF has regularized the mutual evaluation process. FATF monitors the 
third round evaluation process failures. Brazil is the latest example that FATF 
expressed its concern regarding continuous failure to address the serious 
weaknesses that its third round mutual evaluation report from 2010 June had 
identified (FATF 2017, p.34). Especially on criminalizing terrorist financing, 
Brazil had failed since 2004 and for FATF it is the key requirements to fully 
implementing FATF 40+9 Recommendations (FATF 2017). 
FATF warned Brazil to fulfill its commitments by enacting CFT 
legislation before the June 2016 Plenary, since then Brazil made significant 
progress and has enacted the law on the criminalization of terrorist financing, 
while some shortcomings still remain, the FATF Plenary recognized the progress 
but highlighted that Brazil must continue to address the remaining deficiencies in 
its AML/CFT framework and report to the FATF on the progress it has made 
identified (FATF 2017, p.35). 
Any country with weak measures to combat money laundering or the 
financing of terrorism or proliferation poses a risk to the entire global financial 
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system (FATF 2017, p.36). FATF ascertains the weaknesses of countries in their 
CFT/AML system and engages with them to establish an action plan in order to 
strengthen their measures to protect the financial system from abuse. Public 
identification has proved very successful at encouraging countries to take swift 
action; not least as it increases the costs of doing business with and in those 
countries and can deter direct foreign investment (FATF 2017, p.36). 
The FATF publicly identifies countries and jurisdictions with serious 
weaknesses and potential loopholes in their AML/CFT framework. This process 
of ‘naming and shaming’ is a powerful tool to make important and necessary 
reforms happen (FATF 2017, p.38). Being labeled as a country with the 
weaknesses on CFT/AML framework directly affects the international trading 
partners that will face higher costs and no longer be able to do business at all. 
Unless the country takes urgent action to strengthen its AML/CFT measures in 
order to remove itself from FATF’s enhanced scrutiny, it could see a negative 
impact on its position in the global economy (FATF 2017, p.38). Thus, the public 
identification puts pressure on the governments to implement the measures. This 
public identification identifies (FATF 2017, p.38): 
 
• The countries or jurisdictions with the most serious strategic 
deficiencies. The risk that these countries pose is so significant that 
the FATF calls on its members and non-members apply counter-
measures. 
• Countries and jurisdictions with serious strategic deficiencies that 
should be subject to enhance due diligence measures proportionate 
to the risks to the financial system that these countries represent. 
The statement ‘Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-
going process’ lists countries that have weaknesses in their 
measures to combat money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism and proliferation. These countries have developed an 
action plan with the FATF to address these weaknesses and have 
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provided a high-level political commitment to carry out the reforms 
called for in the action plan. 
 
The FATF identifies strategic deficiencies and called the member or non-
member countries to implement counter-measures on CFT/AML regime. 
Furthermore, the weaknesses of countries represent by ‘Improving Global 
AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process’ lists. FATF address the weakness 
points of countries and give a timely manner for progress, if it fails to progress, 
FATF can decide to increase pressure on country (FATF 2017, p.39). 
 
Table 4.1 Technical Compliance Ratings 
 
Technical compliance ratings 
Compliant C There are no shortcomings 
Largely compliant LC There are only minor shortcomings. 
Partially compliant PC There are moderate shortcomings. 
Non-compliant NC There are major shortcomings. 
Not applicable NA A requirement does not apply, due to the 
structural, legal or institutional features of a 
country. 
“Source: Technical Compliance Ratings”, (FATF 2013, p.13) 
 
For each Recommendation, assessors should reach a conclusion about the 
extent to which a country complies or not with the standard. There are four 
possible levels of compliance: compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant, 
and non-compliant. In exceptional circumstances, a Recommendation may also be 
rated as not applicable (FATF 2013, p.13). 
FATF monitors the progress process of countries which have strategic 
CFT/AML deficiencies linked with an action plan. The FATF and the FATF-style 
regional bodies (FSRBs) will continue to work with the jurisdictions and to report 
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on the progress made in addressing the identified deficiencies. The FATF calls on 
these jurisdictions to complete the implementation of action plans expeditiously 
and within the proposed timeframes. On 24 February 2017 FATF ‘s Public 
Statement included the Iran and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
and urges them to immediately and meaningfully address their AML/CFT 
deficiencies. Further, FATF has serious concerns regarding the threat posed by 
DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) and it’s financing. There are 9 countries which have strategic 
deficiencies Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzeggovina, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, 
Syria, Uganda, Vanuatu and Yemen (FATF 2017).  
FATF uses soft law to protect the international financial system that means 
it has a soft power on financial markets. If a country continues to fail to comply 
with FATF recommendations or to comply adequately, the regions should face the 
appropriate additional measures from FATF. In this context, no other is available 
to any country which does not apply the mentioned recommendations when 
considering the current economic structure and financial markets. This situation 
means that the country could be isolating itself from the  world by non 
compliance, which no country can afford to do (Sedefoglu 2009, p.108). 
 
4.6.4 Limitations of FATF Special Recommendations and Possibilities of 
Implementation 
 
In the years prior to 9/11, several states pursued terrorist’s finances with 
less significant efforts at coordination and cooperation (Drezner 2008). Although 
the SC financial sanctions were issued three times for reasons related to terrorism, 
these measures were not robustly implemented by states in the pre-9/11 period 
(Cortright & Lopez 2000, p.115). Similarly, Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism attracted limited support and only four states took the 
opportunity to join it before 9/11. But the US began to show an interest in 
cooperation and introduced the topic of terrorist financing into the FATF in 2000 
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(FATF 2010). Also in that year, the Commission on Terrorism report 
recommended increasing counter-terrorist financing measures and the National 
Money Laundering Strategy signaled training foreign officials (National 
Commission on Terrorism 2000).  
Only after 9/11 did counter- terrorist financing initiatives become 
institutionalized, on the back of the anti-money laundering initiatives of the 1980s 
and 1990s.  The rise of the FATF and the anti-money laundering regime is 
described in a greater depth elsewhere (Gilmore 2004). However, four of its pre-
9/11 features are relevant here. FATF is a limited-membership body comprising 
mostly industrialized countries. FATF had been initiated in 1989 by the G7 and 
initially included 15 states. For this reason, Drezner (2008, p.142) characterizes 
the FATF as a 'club', enabling it to that reflect consensus among strong states but 
involve high adjustment for weak states. Although membership of the FATF grew 
over time, 29 governments and two regional organizations in mid-2001 (FATF 
2001). Pre-9/11 accounts of the emergence of the anti-money laundering regime 
emphasize the role of powerful states (Helleiner 2000). 
Second, the FATF member states exercised hegemony (Romaniuk 2010, 
p.601). Moreover, despite the limited membership of FATF, it established an 
active external relations effort and the recommendations urge banks to exercise 
special caution regarding transactions involving countries that do not conform to 
the standard. They call upon members to ensure subsidiaries of home financial 
organizations registered aboard adhere to the recommendations. Subsequently, the 
G7 invited non-members to implement the recommendations (Gilmore 2004, 
p.141). In doing so, the FATF extended to itself a global mandate.  
Third, the FATF disseminated its standards through a growing network 
that include member states, the observers, and FATF-Style Regional Bodies 
(FSRBs), including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the 
United Nations (FATF 2012, p.8). As each body endorsed the '40 
Recommendations', rules authored by the FATF 'club' gained authority 
(Romaniuk 2010, p.603). 
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Fourth, the FATF utilized several mechanisms to enforce the 
recommendations, including a graduated series of self-assessments and peer 
review evaluations, with the possibility of sanctions for non-compliance against 
both members and non-members. Name and shame regime works to enforce the 
implementation. While considered discriminatory and overtly political by some, 
succeeded in inducing compliance (Levi 2002) (Drezner 2008).  
The FATF Nine Special Recommendations have several implications and 
limitations. This analysis starts with a summary of special recommendations since 
9/11. Counter terrorist financing measures which began since 9/11 and still in a 
progress today in order to prevent international system from abuse and prevent 
terrorism. The special recommendations have its origin from FATF 40 
Recommendations associated generally with AML regime (Loader 2007, p.245).  
Enforcement of the Special Recommendations entails extraordinary costs, 
since they are mandatory and all encompassing (Kalyani 2009, p.68). That is to 
say, the scope is inclusive (a) of a wide range of offences, and (b) in terms of 
entities subject to the Recommendations, which extend to and include all 
economic actors -from financial organizations to non-bank financial organizations 
to several classes of professionals. The reason for the wide range, the FATF 
(2008, p.21) Report suggests, is that experience suggests that all of the 
mechanisms that exist to move money around the globe are to some extent at risk 
of being used to finance terrorism. However, some suggest the reality is that the 
financial reporting obligations "serve only a repressive purpose that is to supply 
law-enforcement authorities with information of the widest possible 
range"(Stessens 2000, p.98). 
The point is that the range of entities subject to reporting regulation is 
extraordinarily wide. Naylor (2006, supra not.3) observes that anyone with a cash 
register is subject to reporting that means extraordinary expenditure undertaken by 
all economic actors. 
The cost incurred to enforce the mandatory Nine Recommendation is 
tremendous. Two KPMG (2007) surveys note the extraordinary cost incurred by 
financial organizations since 2001. The survey KPMG (2014, p.16) also 
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underlined that there are 3 top areas that the AML/CFT budget invested: 
Transaction Monitoring Systems, Know Your Customer Systems and 
Recruitment. The KPMG (2014) also analyze the survey results that: 
 
“In an environment that has continued to be impacted by the 
financial crisis senior management need to be asking some pressing 
questions when it comes to AML/CFT investment. Large sums of money 
continue to be spent on improving transaction monitoring but is this 
yielding the expected return? Why is there a continued need to fund large 
scale KYC remediation exercises? Is this purely the result of regulatory 
change or is the periodic review process not picking up key gaps in KYC? 
We believe that senior management will continue to underestimate AML 
expenditure unless lessons are learnt from past mistakes.” (KPMG 2014, 
p.16) 
 
There is a huge amount of money spent and time on study on CFT/AML 
regime for countries related with the surveys, but still there is a question that it is 
effective or not. Similarly, Beare and Schneider note that the huge compliance 
costs, quoting an estimate, concerning financial organizations as $10 billion 
(Beare & Schneider 2007, supra not.4). Quite simply, the data suggest that 
compliance costs for enforcing the mandatory regime are immense and increasing. 
On January 30, 2014, the Center on Law and Globalization issued its paper 
"Global Surveillance of Dirty Money: Assessing Assessments of Regions to 
Control Money-Laundering and Combat the Financing of Terrorism (KPMG 
2014). This study concludes that there has been no serious effort to assess the 
costs versus the benefits of the FATF system, and the entire effectiveness of the 
FATF work is called into question (Levi et al. 2014, p.52). On February 6, 2014, 
Gregory J. Millman of the Wall Street Journal stated (Millman 2014):  
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“Anti-money laundering efforts by the International 
Monetary Fund and the Financial Action Task Force have built a 
Potemkin village and a "paper reality" based on a plausible fold 
theory" rather than data and evidence of what works, co-authors of 
a new, independent report said in interviews with Risk & 
Compliance Journal. The report had been compiled with the 
cooperation of IMF and FATF officials and examined the third 
round of country assessments for anti-money laundering, conducted 
in the 2003-2012 period. "We find that the current system is 
pervasive and highly intrusive but without any evidence as to 
tangible effect," said Terence C. Halliday, co-director of the Center 
on Law and Globalization.”  
 
The second point to be noted is that the Special Recommendations terrorist 
finance reporting regime covers the widest possible spectrum of predicate crimes 
that is, proceeds from all types of predicate criminal activity, including tax 
offences (Kalyani 2009, p.70). Special Recommendation IV includes by reference 
Recommendations 4 to 20, specifically, Recommendations 13, 14, 15 and 
Recommendation 16. Recommendation 13 enlarges the scope of the predicate 
crime to include proceeds of all criminal activity, while specifically including 
funds related to terrorist financing (FATF 2010). Recommendation 13 
Interpretative Note specifies that all criminal acts that would constitute a predicate 
offence for money laundering" and suspicious transactions should be reported by 
financial organizations regardless of whether they are also thought to involve tax 
matters (FATF 2011, interpretative not.13). 
The Recommendations are virtually unlimited in scope and mandatory in 
nature. The narrative views them as essential to combat financing of terrorism 
(U.S. Department of Treasury 2004). And official testimony by members of the 
intelligence community suggests that the obligations enforcing the 
Recommendations effectively build financial institution ability to perform the 
entrusted gatekeepers tasks (U.S Department of the Treasury 2005). Perhaps, the 
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perspective deserves the consideration because a purely economic or negative 
economic impact argument cannot outweigh the expected benefits of deterring, 
detecting, and disrupting terrorist financing. In addition,, another fact cannot be 
overlooked that they are imposed on an international or at least supranational 
level, which ensures a minimum leveling of the playing field. 
At the core of the reporting regime created by the Recommendations are 
the Suspicious Activity Reporting obligations, which, according to the FATF, 
play a central role in identifying terrorist financing and the movement of terrorist 
funds through the financial system (FATF 2008, p.29). The claim naturally gives 
rise to the question, which transactions qualify as suspicious? Unfortunately, 
FATF, without providing any indicators of terrorists finance, has left it to 
financial organizations to determine the basis of suspicion, but encourages them to 
rely on due diligence and anti-money laundering policies and procedures to 
designate transactions as suspicious (FATF 2002, p.2).  Moreover, definition or 
meaning of a suspicious (and therefore, a reportable) transaction is not provided 
by any national, international, or supranational authority or instrument (Ping 
2005, p.252). Plus, terms such as suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect 
also lack clarity and definition (i.e., in SR. IV). The view has been taken that it 
would be better to leave the matter open than come up with a list, because the 
criteria of suspicious transactions vary from country to country (Ping 2005). 
In suspicious transaction reporting, a client or a client's transaction exhibits 
certain characteristics that trigger a response, which in principle is deemed 
'suspicious' by an institution and is therefore reportable (Naylor 2002, p.272). This 
subjective and proactive form of reporting is built on several assumptions that 
Professor Beare (2003) summarizes: 
 
“The complete system of reporting is based on assumptions and all 
suspicious reporting rest on two essential principles: the "Know 
Your Customer" policies, and the belief in an ability to profile 
"suspicious" transactions. There is the assumption that front-line 
tellers, or business persons, untrained in wider law-enforcement 
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techniques, will be able to identify these "suspicious" transactions. 
Further, there is the assumption that they will be motivated to do so 
carefully in a matter that does not ignore "suspicious" cases or over 
identifies cases that are unlikely to prove to be worthy of police 
investigations. This of course is built on a third assumption that the 
suspicious transactions can be "profiled" and that it is possible to 
teach employees what characteristics ought to alert the employee to 
a potential criminal operation that can then be passed immediately 
to law enforcement” 
 
The absences of guidance, together with assumptions that substitute for 
guidance, are perhaps the most profound limitation of the mandatory reporting 
regime, because they result in making the Suspicious Transaction Reports a 
subjective and proactive exercise. Naylor (2002) observes that:  
 
"Despite efforts by law enforcement to draw up a list of objective 
characteristics of suspicious transactions, the bank's decision is really 
based on subjective hunches. It is no longer passive or even reactive, but 
proactive... Nor is it clear where the financial organizations responsibilities 
stop. To really know of client's business, it is necessary to know the 
client's clients, and perhaps it will be more.” (Naylor 2002, p.272) 
 
Some observe that these proactive and subjective measures have resulted 
in a privatization of law enforcement wherein financial organizations are cajoled 
into carrying out police like functions (Stessens 2000, p.179). Still others say that 
by the virtue of the reporting system, banks start behaving like the FBI and CIA 
(Economist 2005). Though innumerable issues arise with regard to civil liberties 
and privacy (that are beyond the scope of this research) a financial institution role 
while making suspicious activity reports changes from benchmark or blind 
reporting to proactive and/or reactive reporting in most cases. In others the 
reporting system becomes a default mechanism. Noting the widespread reporting 
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and the diluted value of such reports, authorities complain that such defensive 
filing results in our database becoming populated with reports that should not 
have been filed, diluting the value of information (U.S. Department of Treasury 
2005). And, the Statement J. Fox (U.S. Department of Treasury 2005) explain that 
they have seen a significant increase in suspicious activity reports filed 
defensively that is, filed not to document truly suspicious activity but to prevent 
some perceived regulatory or reputation risk posed to the institution. And aware 
that the same phenomenon is occurring here in Europe (U.S. Department of 
Treasury 2005). 
Given all these issues, it is reasonable to question what the Special 
Recommendations accomplish since it is infeasible to adapt the regulatory 
structure built to interdict proceeds of crime to terrorist financing (Kalyani 2009, 
p.75). Boiled down to their essence, technically, the Special Recommendations 
are incapable of differentiating terrorist finance transactions from other legal or 
illegal activities. Lastly, the aforementioned admission by the FATF is clearly a 
tremendous concession. But since the by themselves less effective regulations are 
widely enforced by most jurisdictions, their application has two enormously 
significant ramifications. 
The first ramification is that enforcement of the Special Recommendations 
results in profiling (Kalyani 2009, p.76). Recall that there is an absence of 
regulatory guidance for what constitutes 'suspicious' individuals or transactions, 
and additionally, there is an absence of indices and profiles for transactions 
constituting terrorist financing The absence of regulatory guidance, the FATF 
suggests, is due to the challenge in developing generic indicators of terrorist 
financing activity (FATF 2008, p.29). Furthermore, all attempts to provide 
guidance or to create a terrorist finance profile have proved futile. The New York 
Clearinghouse, a private consortium of the largest money-center banks, attempted 
to create a terrorist finance profile in partnership with government investigators; 
however, after two years it was concluded that the attempt was unsuccessful 
(Roth, Greenburg &Wille 2004, p.56). Other attempts (such as by the United 
Nations) have also proved unsuccessful at creating a terrorist finance profile. The 
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absence of such core guidance is problematic, creating, on one hand, a regulatory 
black hole; whereas, on the other hand, the absence results in a subjective 
substitute. The preeminent U.N. counterterrorism experts encourage the 192 U.N. 
member states to allow experienced bankers to rely on their knowledge and their 
instinct for what appears odd and, therefore, subject to reporting as a terrorist 
finance transaction (United Nations Security Council 2008, para.58). 
As a result, in practice, due to the subjective nature, amounts to the 
unfortunate exercise of religious, regional, or racial profiling, which is not only 
unfair, but also an ineffective method to address issues of terrorist finance 
(Kalyani 2009, p.76). As the 9/11 Commission notes, the absence of a profile 
creates a risk that financial organizations could rely primarily on religious, 
geographic, or ethnic profiling in an attempt to find some criteria helpful for 
identifying terrorist financing (Beare & Schneider 2007, p.56). 
The second equally dire consequence is that the reporting regime is 
reduced to an over-reliance on national- or supranational-issued lists that 
proscribe individuals or entities as terrorists (Byrne2004). What that means is that 
the sole surviving option for complying with the Special Recommendations 
regime is for reporting entities to match names in their databases against names 
proscribed on several lists a process, which as a U.N. Consolidated List study 
shows, is fraught with severe limitation (Kalyani 2009,supra not.8). 
In any case, the Nine Special Recommendations fall severely short of their 
stated goal of deterring terrorism, detecting terrorism and disrupting terrorism, 
,because technically it is infeasible to differentiate terrorist finance transactions 
from other transactions using, this preventive, strategy (FATF 2008, supra 
not.58). Some even critically suggest that, what the preventive strategy really 
means when one talks about "following the money trail"! to "starve the terrorist of 
financing," is that is that "we will freeze the accounts of people whom we suspect 
are involved in terrorist financing, if we are lucky enough to know their names 
(Cuellar 2003,supra not.51). 
There are many reasons for the limited effectiveness of the CTF program 
of the FATF, but the most significant one is a design that too closely resembles 
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the taskforce‘s AML program and does not adequately address the unique nuances 
of terrorist financing (Martuscello 2011, p.365).What are the reasons of these 
weaknesses for FATF special recommendations to struggle against terrorist 
financing?  
Specific criticisms have included that: SR-I incorporates UN instruments, 
which contain broad definitions and thus can be gamed to the point of being 
rendered ineffectual; (Bowers 2009) SR-II endows law enforcement agencies with 
expanding responsibilities without commensurate increases in enforcement 
budgets; SR-III and SR-IV suffer from qualitative enforcement issues respectively 
because frozen assets ―are too often allowed to thaw and assets are all too often 
returned when a prosecution fails to occur and because different entities often 
have diverse reporting requirements depending on a state‘s definition of a 
financial institution SR-V has not prevented the existence of safe-havens, such as 
Somalia or the tribal areas of Pakistan;(Bowers 2009,p.364,365) SR-VI and SR-
VII suffer from a simple lack of follow-through so that many money remitters 
remain unregulated and many wire transfers continue to occur without complete 
originator information;(Bowers 2009) SR-VIII may never be complied with in the 
Middle East and in parts of Asia;(Bowers 2009, p.396) and SR-IX has remained 
ineffective because currency declaration thresholds are relatively high and 
terrorists can circumvent these by converting cash to more compact, and less 
overt, forms of value (e.g. jewelry)(Bowers 2009). 
Regardless of the validity of these criticisms, the 2010 Global Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Threat Assessment (GTA) (FATF 2010-II) by the FATF 
reveals that the CTF program has done little if anything to prevent terrorists from 
funding their operations. This report is key player that include the criticism over 
CFT program of FATF and describe the cases and try to solve the problems with a 
transparency in decision making process. Identifying recent trends and methods in 
money laundering and terrorist financing, the GTA has reported that those who 
finance terrorism continue to exploit at least one of five features of the 
international financial system: cash and bearer-negotiable instruments; transfer of 
value; assets and stores of value; gatekeepers; and jurisdictional/environmental 
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aspects (FATF 2010-II, p.11). Considering that the 40+9 Recommendations have 
addressed all of these features in one way or another, this revelation illustrates that 
the effectiveness of the FATF in addressing the funding of terrorism has been 
inadequate (Martuscello 2011, p.382). 
The threat of terrorist financing remains great. In spite of SR-IX, terrorist 
groups still heavily resort to physically moving cash because as more AML/CTF 
controls are placed on the financial sector, criminals look at alternative means to 
move their illicit cash (FATF 2010-II, p.16). They continue to exploit cash-
intensive businesses to direct funds to terrorist organizations/activities when the 
relationship between sales reported and actual sales is difficult to verify (FATF 
2010-II, p.21). Terrorist groups also still take the advantage of transfer of value 
systems through banks, money transfer/alternative-remittance businesses, the 
international trade system, complex legal entities, and retail payment systems, 
including the ATM network. (FATF 2010-II, p.24). To avoid cash-reporting 
requirements, they have progressively taken to using  money mules, which are 
third parties recruited to receive and then send wire transfers from deposit 
accounts to individuals overseas, minus a certain commission payment (perhaps 
5-10%)(FATF 2010-II, p.26). They have also increasingly utilized false or stolen 
identities to avoid being identified through application of CDD (customer due 
diligence) requirements or to gain access to accounts (FATF 2010-II, p.25) or to 
register businesses which can later be used to obscure the true beneficial owners 
of funds (FATF 2010-II, p.22). 
Recognizing that free-trade zones often have more relaxed AML/CTF 
programs than other jurisdictions, terrorist organizations have come to find these 
helpful when transferring funds through non-existent and fraudulent trading 
activities (Martuscello 2011, p.383).The increasing role of non-banks in offering 
prepaid cards, electronic purses, mobile payments, internet payment services and 
digital precious metals, especially when they are offshore providers of such, has 
further made it easy for terrorists to move funds despite the attempt by SR-VII to 
increase the transparency and monitoring of electronic payments (FATF 2010-II, 
p.34). 
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Although the incidents of money launderers using stores of value and 
exploiting gatekeepers far outweigh (FATF 2010-II, p.37) those of terrorists, the 
GTA still recognizes such features as vulnerable to being used for terrorist 
financing because stores of assets can enable terrorists to discretely hold funds 
and third-parties, such as professionals, insiders, and politically exposed persons, 
can allow terrorists to access the formal financial system discretely (Martuscello 
2011, p.383). 
Lastly, the GTA reveals that terrorist organizations continue to abuse 
environmental/jurisdictional elements in order to carry out their operations, move 
funds, and evade police detection or prosecution. Since CTF standards are 
variable across borders, terrorists continue to take advantage of those jurisdictions 
with weaker regulatory and enforcement systems, such as tax havens, offshore 
banking centers, conflict zones, high-corruption areas, and safe havens (FATF 
2010-II, p.51,52). By doing so, terrorist groups have been able to evade the 
increased transparency, customer due diligence, and suspicious activity 
requirements that more regulated jurisdictions have and that make them most 
vulnerable to being caught. 
Based on the findings of the GTA, it seems apparent that terrorist 
organizations can still fund their operations with relative ease and that although 
the 9 Special Recommendation represent a commendable effort, their effect has 
been quite limited, illustrated by the fact that most countries have been reluctant 
to accept the Special Recommendations in full questioning whether transparency 
and accountability are desirable (Nelson 2007, p.734). 
The inability of the FATF to compel full implementation of 
recommendations across all jurisdictions is in great measure to blame for this lack 
of effectiveness because terrorists seek out and conduct their illegal operations in 
countries with weak regimes (Bachus 2004, p.847).  Nonetheless, given the soft 
strategy of this CTF program, such jurisdictional variances can only be expected. 
Surely, mutual evaluations and a shame list cannot force countries to adopt best 
practices. Therefore, some areas will be easier targets for terrorist financing abuse 
than others that are more regulated, secure, and transparent. 
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However, it is equally, and perhaps more, appropriate to blame the limited 
effectiveness of the 9 Special Recommendations on a failure by the FATF to 
maintain enough of a distinction between money laundering and terrorist 
financing. By following an approach to CTF that very much resembled its 
approach to AML, the FATF failed to take fully into account that terrorists and 
criminal launderers do actually behave differently in important ways (Martuscello 
2011, p.384). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
SECTION FIVE 
 
EVALUATION 
 
Terrorism has continued to be a global problem until now. Studies on 
causes and consequences of terrorism have been carried out for many years. Many 
ideas have emerged to end terrorism, which have tried to determine its cause and 
consequences. The legal system continuously tries to curb down terrorist acts. 
Many academic studies on terrorism have shown that terrorism needs 
funds to survive and conduct its operations. In order to meet the need for funds, 
terrorist groups tend to have close ties with other criminal organizations. This 
study demonstrates that substantial amount of funds are required to feed terrorist 
groups in the financial system. States and international organizations try to 
combat terrorist financing in order to prevent terrorism and to deter would be 
terrorist financiers. 
Efforts to prevent terrorism after the 9/11 attack have been accelerated 
with events of 9/11. Terrorism however, has been a major problem for the world 
even before. By encouragement of the US, the response to terrorism and terrorist 
financing has grown globally, and cause-effect analysis has been published in 
academic studies with different perspectives. In this case, especially after the 9/11 
attacks, US has applied pressure on international organizations and other states. 
According to Nicholas Ridley and Dean C. Alexander (2012, p.40), before 9/11 
attacks some international organizations also had studies on terrorism and terrorist 
financing. The US just only accelerated this process due to 9/11. Ruwantissa 
Abeyretne (2011, p.58) stated in Suppression of the financing of terrorism that 
pre-9/11 studies aim to establish international cooperation among states in 
devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of 
terrorism. 
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United Nations has been playing a major role in counter-terrorist financing 
since the 1960s. After the massacres at Lod Airport in Israel and at the Olympic 
Games in Munich; the Resolution 3034 was decided by the General Assembly 
(Sederberg 1989). It established an ad-hoc Committee on terrorism for submitting 
recommendations on international terrorism (Koh 2006). Since 1960s the UN has 
studied the international terrorism, so 9/11 is not the starting point of studies and 
reports on terrorism.  
After 1963, decisions were made by the United Nations Secretary-General 
on terrorist financing. The first decision associated with terrorist financing is 
"Covenants on Crimes and Certain Other Actions on Airplanes" (Kiser 2005, p. 
123). The actions specified in similar UN conventions and protocols have been 
accepted as the premise of terrorist financing. 
The financing of terrorism was not considered as a major issue in the fight 
against terrorism until the mid-1990s. In 1996, United Nations General Assembly 
prepared a resolution and mentioned both legitimate and illegitimate financial 
resources of terrorist organizations. It mentioned that the involvement of terrorist 
groups in organized crime and the abuse of charitable organizations. For the first 
time, it mentioned terrorist financing and needs for measures to prevent terrorist 
fund’s international movements. 
In this term, the introduction of international conventions were heavily 
influenced by the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam on August 13, 1998, which resulted in the death of 234 people 
(Mair 2003). Indeed, Clunan (2006, p.574) took the view that prior to the terrorist 
bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the issue of terrorist 
financing was handled almost entirely as a problem of state sponsors of terrorism, 
or money laundering and criminal finance by non-state actors. 
In response to these terrorist attacks on the US embassies, President Bill 
Clinton instigated ‘Operation Infinite Reach’ 2(Kittrich 2009), which authorized a 
                                                          
2  The United States has executed military strikes against terrorist facilities 
in Afghanistan and Sudan. President Clinton says the attacks were ordered because “We 
have compelling information they were planning additional terrorist acts”. 
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series of cruise missile attacks in the Sudan and Afghanistan in August 1998 
(McIntyre 1998). Supplementary, the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 
1189 that strongly condemned the terrorist attacks (United Nations Security 
Council 1998). 
In 1998, the Resolution 53/108 of the General Assembly formed an ad-hoc 
committee to prepare a draft convention for the suppression of terrorist financing. 
The need for a convention to be prepared by the UN to deal specifically with 
terrorism, in particular on the possibility of terrorist financing, on the inability and 
ineffectiveness of fighting terrorism financing, has been achieved and the 
International Convention on the Prevention of Terrorist Financing has been 
prepared by the UN. 
The contract was drawn up in support of the initiative initiated by France 
in the G-8 countries (Clifton 2000). In May 1998, the Foreign Ministers of the G-
8 countries considered combating terrorism funding as a priority issue (G-8 1998, 
paragraph 28). 
In the last quarter of 1998, France initiated the negotiations of the 
Convention and proposed a text to the UN. The text of convention was evaluated 
by an ad hoc committee and adopted by the General Assembly on 9th of December 
1999.  
In 1999, the Resolution 1267 of Security Council demanded that Taliban 
should give up providing a safe haven for terrorists and turn over Osama Bin 
Laden (Utük 2009, p.35). In accordance with UNSC Resolution 1267 dated on 
15th of October 1999 on combating terrorist financing, measures such as freezing 
of Taliban and Al-Qaeda assets, travel ban and arms embargo are required. 
According to this Resolution, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee was 
established. The committee has a duty on monitoring the measures taken by 
member states against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden (United Nations Security 
Council 1999).  
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Since the 1960s, United Nations has studied terrorism and terrorist 
financing. It tries to establish the legal ground necessary for the development of 
cooperation between states in the context of the detection and prevention of 
terrorism and terrorist financing. Clive Walker quoted in “Financial War on 
Terrorism” that explanation of increasing attention on terrorism and terrorist 
financing in world political system (ed. Ryder 2015). He believed that this 
attention has 2 reasons since the attacks on September 11, 2001: 
 
“First, international terrorism outruns local neighborhoods both for 
recruits and targets and so garners its resources through dispersed and 
sophisticated channels. The second reason is that the impact of jihadi 
terrorism on 9/11 and thereafter has energized international condemnation 
and the universal demand for action, in contrast to earlier times when 
international endorsement of counter-terrorism measures was often 
lukewarm and hobbled by political support for national liberationist and 
anti-imperialist movements.” (ed. Ryder 2015, p.38) 
 
It is important that prior to the terrorist attacks in September 2001, only 
four states had acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (O’Neill 2004, p.34). However, at the time of writing the 
International Convention has been implemented by 188 nation states (UN 1999).  
International organizations have still continued until today to urge states to 
implement terrorist financing standards, despite US priorities has changed in time. 
According to Mathew Levitt(2003, p.59) that the synchronized suicide 
attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the critical role financial and logistical 
support networks play in the operations of international terrorist organizations. 
The challenge in tackling these networks, however, is that they are well-
entrenched, sophisticated, and often shrouded   in a veil of legitimacy (Levitt 
2003, p.59). 
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U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Enforcement Jimmy Gurule explained in 
U.S. Congress, the War on Terrorism at 31May 2002 (Barnett 2002). He tried to 
explain why international organizations are crucial in struggle against terrorist 
financing. Jimmy Gurule said that: 
 
“The fight against terrorist financing is a complex problem that will 
involve years of careful diplomacy and innovative thinking. The reasons 
why the fight is international in nature are obvious.  
• First, terrorism is a global problem.  
• Second, money is a fluid commodity that can be wired 
around the world in seconds.  
• Third, because of the strict federal bank reporting 
requirements and aggressive forfeiture laws, terrorist funds 
are not likely to be held in U.S. banks. ” (Barnett 2002 P.9) 
 
Gurule noted that development of an international strategy to deplete 
terrorist funding poses enormous challenges not only because foreign 
governments have different legal regimes, but also because some countries have 
not enacted anti-terrorist financing, money laundering, or asset forfeiture laws 
(Barnett 2002). He explained the reason why struggle against terrorist financing 
have to work both domestically and internationally. He also proved that 
international organizations are crucial actors in struggle against terrorist financing 
and he called this fight as a marathon and not a sprint (Barnett 2002).  
It is a question that state have to get support from international 
organizations in struggle against terrorism, Jimmy Gurule also supported this idea 
and noted that terrorism is a global threat and money is fluid commodity, if we 
talked about a struggle against terrorist financing, it is not possible without a 
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common mind, sustainability, continuity and collaboration (Gurule 2009). 
However, all these needs direct world political system to the international 
organizations, such as FATF. 
US efforts directed UN, FATF and European Union attention on terrorist 
financing, because US try to establish a common mind and collaboration in 
struggle against terrorism. In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, FATF adopted 
Nine Special Recommendations on terrorist financing, including a provision on 
terrorist asset freezing (Gurule 2009, p.22).  
9/11 attacks activated a global war on terrorism and prompted a new burst 
of rule-making and interaction on terrorist financing. FATF which is the global 
standard setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism is the first vehicle to enact this policy change at global level to struggle 
against terrorist financing. Prior to 9/11, FATF has had forty recommendations 
against money laundering, but the policy change affected the mandate of FATF 
with the elaboration of nine special recommendations against terrorist financing. 
As a case of CFT regime emergence and consolidation, CFT regime provides 
unique recommendations to reach all members and non-members of FATF with 
mutual evaluation processes. 
FATF Special Recommendations are recognized as the international 
standard for combating terrorist financing, as it is involved with many 
international organizations, such as the UN, Egmont Group, the IMF, the World 
Bank and more.  The FATF’s formation of institutional partnerships with FSRBs, 
the IFIs, UN, and other international organizations has provided the FATF with 
significant functional advantages in advancing the implementation of a global 
CFT system.  
FATF’s CFT regime is approved by members, FSRBs, observers and 
financial organizations. These partnerships cover a significant part of the world 
and international financial system. FATF also takes advantage of its huge 
partnerships networks to subject the non-compliant countries which have strategic 
deficiencies in the CFT regime. The mutual evaluation process aims to fully 
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implement the recommendations that identified the deficiencies to prevent 
international financial system from abusing. The mutual evaluation reports are 
made public, the presentation and discussion of a country’s fulfillment of the 
FATF recommendations could be considered persuasive enough to increase 
compliance. The public shame method is used for countries that do not want to 
comply with the FATF recommendations, despite being warned earlier about 
identified deficiencies. The aim is to single out countries that cause the misuse of 
the international financial system by not applying the international terrorist 
financing standards.  
 Jimmy Gurule clearly noted why we need international organizations in 
struggle against terrorist financing (Barnett 2002). He noted that terrorism is a 
global problem and fighting needs global solutions, so we need international 
organizations to prepare global resolutions, conventions and more. He stated that 
money is a fluid commodity that can be wired around the world in seconds, hence 
states have to be in collaboration in the struggle against terrorist financing. Lastly, 
he called this struggle as a marathon and not a sprint. He located critical points of 
this fight, because states are like human bodies. It may reflect suddenly and 
directly, however this reflection may not be continued for a long time. So, 
struggle against terrorist financing is a long process which needs common mind, 
continuity, sustainability, and collaboration (Gurule 2009). Thus, international 
organizations are major players to reach common mind, continuity, sustainability, 
and collaboration in struggling against terrorism and terrorist financing.  
In 2003, the Resolution 1456 of Security Council calls upon member states 
to take steps to prevent and suppress the support the terrorism and adopt the 
Resolutions 1373 and 1455. Besides, the resolution persists that member states 
shall become a part of all international conventions and protocols on terrorism, 
especially to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. It draws attention to cooperate for struggle against 
terrorism and imposed sanctions on Al-Qaeda. It proposes to take measures to 
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prevent Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s access to the financial resources (United Nations 
Security Council 2003). 
UN refers to the Resolutions 1373 and 1455 which were decided in 1999 
and pointed out the cooperation for the struggle against terrorism. Although neo-
institutional liberalism and neo-realism thoughts agree that international 
cooperation is possible, they differ as to the ease and likelihood of its occurrence. 
According to Grieco (1993), in neorealist’s view international cooperation is 
harder to achieve, harder to maintain, and more dependent on state power than do 
the neo-institutional liberalism. The system faced with common problems which 
state could not solve, such as terrorist financing. 
United Nations try to increase cooperation in the struggle against terrorist 
financing and refers to another international body, FATF and urges member states 
to implement FATF’s Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and  9 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Utük 2009). When we look at 
the core features of neo-institutional liberalism, first of all, the analysis of peace 
and cooperation emerges (Arı 2013). Neo-institutional liberalism thought that 
cooperation between liberal democratic states is possible. There are, however, 
some factors that will favor mutual co-operation of the states (Arı 2013).  At the 
forefront of the reasons leading to the cooperation of the states are international 
organizations, international law, rational behavior of states.  
In 2005, the Resolution 1617 of Security Council stresses out again, Neo-
institutional liberalism’s key assumptions on international relations that 
cooperation and international organizations power over member states to 
implement recommendations of financing of terrorism and money laundering. In 
2006, the Resolutions 1730 and 1735 of the Security Council emphasize the 
importance of cooperation and exchange of information between member states. 
Thus, for United Nations, we can find more resolutions to stress out the terrorist 
financing before, and after the 9/11 attacks, UN tries to establish the legal ground 
necessary for the development of cooperation between states in the context of the 
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terrorist financing. The UN urged member states to implement FATF’s 
Recommendations on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. 
UN’s efforts have increased the awareness of international community on 
the struggle against the financing of terrorism. The member states have begun to 
take measures in the struggle against the financing of terrorism. In conclusion, the 
UN has been a critical component of struggle against the financing of terrorism, 
otherwise, mentions on international cooperation and a leader to other 
international efforts on the financing of terrorism (Utük 2009). 
 In April 2001, the World Bank and the IMF's Executive Directors pointed 
out that terrorist financing was a significant threat to the development of countries 
and the financial stability of their economy, and they began to work within this 
scope. The boards determined that the fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing as an area of operational work, and in November 2002 they put into 
practice a 12-months pilot program which uses a comprehensive assessment 
methodology internationally. Within the scope of the pilot program, The IMF and 
the World Bank have been doing country assessments and have decided to 
continue their work in this area after March 2004, when they received the pilot 
program results. It also stated that during these studies, cooperation with regional 
organizations like FSRB and FATF should be continued (IMF  n.d.). 
IMF and World Bank have used country assessment method to control the 
level of implementation of terrorist financing recommendations. Moreover, they 
try to increase the cooperation with regional organizations like FSRB and FATF. 
It means that IMF and World Bank try to use the advantage of international 
organizations to reach more states and use the power of organizations to 
implement standards against terrorist financing.  
In 2002, the World Bank and the IMF worked together with the FATF, 
FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRB), the Egmont Group, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, International Association of Securities Commissioners 
(IOSCO) and International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) on single 
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comprehensive anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing 
assessment methodology. This method was revised in 2004, and 200 criteria were 
determined to assess countries’ efforts to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing (Schott 2006, p. X-6). 
In 2011, the Executive Board of IMF discussed the evolution of the IMF’s 
AML/CFT programs and established guidance as for the way of improving in this 
topic. In 2012, the guidance on the AML/CFT in surveillance and financial 
stability assessments (FSA) was issued. It mentions that the money laundering 
(ML), terrorist financing (FT) threaten stability, the balance of payments stability, 
the effective operation of the international monetary system. In 2014, The Board 
of IMF reviewed the AML/CFT strategy. Firstly, it approved the revised FATF 
AML/CFT standard and assessment methodology. It also approved the continuity 
of AML/CFT issues (IMF 2016, p.2). 
IMF and World Bank reports mention that the money laundering (ML), 
and terrorist financing (FT) threaten stability, the balance of payments stability, 
the effective operation of the international monetary system. This statement is the 
essential reason why other states cannot insist on not to implement standards of 
terrorist financing anymore because the state may turn as a threat for the 
international monetary system and none of the states can totally isolate itself from 
international monetary system.  
Terrorism and terrorist financing are global threats for the world political 
system. These issues could not be directed by only a state’s interests because, in 
today's economy, the international financial system directly affects all of them. 
Thus, international organizations, such as IMF and World Bank have had an 
essential regulatory position on the struggle against terrorism and terrorist 
financing. Each country must enforce these measures, and ensure that the 
operational, law enforcement and legal components of an AML/CFT system work 
together effectively to protect financial system in the world (FATF 2017). 
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EU adopted a framework decision on combating terrorism (Brent 2008, 
p.114). In December 2001, the European Council adopted the Common Position 
on combating terrorism, which was the legal instrument that implemented UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373(Council of European Union 2001). 
Furthermore, Council Resolution 2580/2001 required members of the EU to 
freeze the funds, financial assets and resources of people and for groups included 
in the UN list (Council of European Union 2001).  Additionally, Council 
Resolution 881/2002 included a ‘black list’ of names that were identical to the list 
determined by the UN Sanctions Committee (Council of European Union 2002).   
In 2005 the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism was signed in 
Warsaw among 29 member states (out of 47) of the Council of Europe, but only 7 
of them ratified it (Council of Europe 2005). The Council of Europe Convention 
defines financing of terrorism in Article 1; it has been amended to the 
International Convention on the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism of the 
United Nations. It has been stated that the provisions of the Convention 
"International Convention on the Prevention of Terrorist Financing" should be 
taken into account in this context (Council of Europe 2005, p.2). 
The convention states that countries should benefit from the FATF Special 
Recommendations when regulating the struggle against the financing of terrorism 
(Council of Europe 2005). 
The European Council is another international institution in struggle 
against terrorist financing. Their studies started in 2005 and prepared a convention 
on terrorist financing in Warsaw, but only seven member states of them had 
ratified it until 2006. This shows us that we cannot ignore the state’s behavior. In 
the long term, most of states that were faced with terrorism in their territories.  
The European Union draws attention to combat money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism to prevent the market from being misused. EU rules in this 
area largely based on international standards adopted by the Financial Action 
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Task Force’s (FATF), Special Recommendations and the Commission 
Communication on the Prevention of and Fight against Terrorist Financing of 
October 2004 (Commission of European Communities 2004). They are tailored to 
the EU’s needs and complemented by national rules.  
The European Union points out to prevent the market being misused. It is 
an acceptable reason for all the members of European Union in struggle against 
terrorist financing. Neo-institutional liberalism claims that, contrary to realism 
and by traditional liberal views, organizations can help states work together 
(Keohane 1984, p.9).  
The European Union’s strategy underlines the cooperation with 
international actors with full implementation of the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, UN Security Council Resolution 
1373 and other relevant international conventions and Security Council 
Resolutions. Moreover, cooperation with FATF and FATF-style Regional Bodies 
should be developed (Council of European Union 2004). 
In 2005, the European Commission underlined the importance of 
cooperation and exchange of information between competent authorities in 
horizontal structures. The cooperation is between Finance, Justice, Interior and 
Foreign Ministries, financial intelligence unit, law enforcement authorities, 
intelligence agency and public prosecutor offices in policy formation and 
operational issues (Commission of the European Communities 2005, p.3). Lipson 
(1984) argues that international cooperation is more likely in areas of economic 
issues than in those concerning military security. Since neorealists tend to study 
security issues and neo-institutional liberalism tends to study political economy, 
their differing estimates of the ease of cooperation may be related to the issues 
they enquire. 
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the EU had largely concentrated its white-collar 
crime efforts on money laundering and not terrorist financing. This is illustrated in 
the scope of first two EU Money Laundering Directives. In 2004, the European 
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Commission determined that it was necessary to introduce a Third Money 
Laundering Directive (Alexander 2006, p.373). Proposals contained number of 
predicate offences and provide more guidance to improve customer identification 
procedures. Thus, it was not until the EU introduced Third Money Laundering 
Directive that terrorist financing was criminalized. 
Egmont Group works as an international intelligence forum and mobilizes 
its member FIUs. It works for simplifying the exchange of secure information 
between its member FIUs, stakeholders, and international organizations. It 
strengthens the cooperation in the struggle against terrorist financing. It is a 
crucial attempt to provide solutions to the international and domestic problem of 
terrorist financing.  
In January 2002, the Wolfsberg Group published “the Statement on the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.” (Wolfsberg Group 2002) It 
underlines the role of financial organizations in the fight against the financing of 
terrorism, which may assist states and their agencies, to strengthen struggle 
against terrorist groups from accessing their financial funds. 
The Wolfsberg Group stands behind the FATF Special Recommendations 
on Terrorist Financing as a measure for the struggle against terrorist financing. 
The Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
proves that the financial institution's interests in the issue and put forward reasons 
to be a part of the fight against the financing of terrorism which needs significant 
cooperation on efforts.  
International organizations, Wolfsberg and Egmont Group stress out the 
cooperation among member states and other international organizations in 
struggle against terrorist financing.  Neo-institutional liberalism underlines that 
international relations is anarchic, and cooperation is possible between states. 
In 2002, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision began to focus also on 
the issue of financing of terrorism and published a document called “Sharing of 
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financial records between jurisdictions in connection with the fight against the 
financing of terrorism.” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2002) 
BCBS tries to prevent the global financial system from being misused. 
Thus, they are working on standards to restrict money transfers to banks by 
terrorist groups. It is the BCBS’s reason in struggle against terrorist financing that 
prevents the global financial system from being misused.  It stresses out the 
cooperation to prevent the global financial system from being misused in struggle 
against terrorist financing.  
Non-state organizations and multinational companies which are also actors 
that affect the world political system depend on states’ interests. However, these 
new actors cannot establish new arguments and interests without states.  Keohane 
& Nye (1977) criticized the realist school of thought that; states are not the only 
players in world political system. They are necessarily unitary actors as they are 
composed of competing bureaucracies, force itself may now be an ineffective 
instrument of policy. 
This study mentioned that terrorism is originated in an anarchic 
environment, these anarchic problems direct states in a collaboration process. 
Keohane and Nye (2001) points out international organizations are established for 
the need to collaborate on complex issues and struggle against terrorist financing 
is one of them. Neo-institutional liberalism emphasizes that international 
organizations can overcome these anarchic problems with setting rules and 
procedures, such as terrorism.  
Neo-institutional liberalism points out international laws and standards.  
FATF and its recommendations on terrorist financing are the best examples that 
each international organization refer these standards to their member states. 
Moreover, study covered that all these FATF 9 special recommendations raised 
the awareness of other states on terrorist financing issue. Other international 
organization's reports refer to the FATF 9 Special Recommendations. These 
references raised the efficiency of FATF‘s efforts on terrorist financing, reached 
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and urged more states to implement these standards. More international 
organizations in struggle against terrorist financing mean more states which 
implement the international standards on terrorist financing. It is a big chance to 
reduce the size of an area for terrorist financing in the global world.  
United Nations, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units, European Union (EU), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and 
Wolfsberg Group of Banks, all of them have unique reasons in struggle against 
terrorist financing. Despite the existence of all of these efforts, it may be possible 
to examine the adequacy of actions to struggle terrorist financing. In the face of all 
these efforts, states are ruled by politicians and they need quick and successful 
feedback to their voters. Thus, state’s war on financing of terrorism seems as a 
sprint. However, Jimmy Gurule (2009) noted that struggle against terrorist 
financing is not a sprint, it is a long marathon.  
This study analyzes two terrorist groups as a case, Al-Qaeda and Islamic 
State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and to look financial war and strategies on these 
terrorist groups since 2001. First case is Al-Qaeda because it is a more important 
reason in financial war against terrorism associated event of 9/11. Second case is 
ISIL, however it became known for extreme violence and terror tactics as one of 
the major actors in the Syrian civil war in 2013 and with its rapid expansion into 
Syria and then Iraq in 2014. 
 In Report of Congress on Terrorist Financing: The US and International 
Response mentioned that: 
 
“The United Nations Security Council (UNSCR), pursuant to UNSCR 
Resolution 1390 (January 16, 2002) and related preceding resolutions, 
maintains a consolidated freeze list of some 300 individuals and entities 
linked to al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban. The European 
Union and a number of individual states maintain their own terrorism lists 
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and blocking orders. As a result of these various activities, approximately 
$85 million of terrorist bank funds reportedly has been frozen outside the 
United States in the post-September 11 period. Of the total $121 million 
blocked worldwide, more than 75% reportedly has been linked to the 
Taliban and al Qaeda and the rest to other terrorist entities. The bulk of the 
activity has occurred in a few countries. Although almost 170 nations have 
blocking orders in force, only 4 countries, including the United States, 
account for about two-thirds of the blocked $121 million, according to 
U.S. financial data.” (Report of Congress 2002, p.5) 
 
How effective campaign to limit terrorist finance has been a matter of 
controversy. Thus, U.S. officials regard the effort as a vital adjunct to the overall 
fight against terrorism. They asserted that asset seizures to date have constricted 
the funds of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. A Treasury Department fact 
sheet of September 2002 noted: “Our war on terror is working both here in the 
United States and overseas. “(US Treasury Department 2002, p.5) Al-Qaeda and 
other terrorist organizations are suffering financially as a result of sanctions. 
However, others have expressed skepticism about the campaign. As a recent 
report by a U.N. Security Council monitoring group observes that: 
 
 “Al Qaeda continues to have access to considerable financial and 
other resources. As noted above, reports indicate that less than 20 percent 
of the reported $121 million totals in blocked terrorist assets have been 
frozen since mid-January 2002, which suggests that the campaign is 
yielding sharply diminishing returns. Government officials have indicated 
that it has proved extremely difficult to identify these additional funds and 
resources,” (UN Monitoring Group 2005, p. 3) 
 
205 
 
There is clear evidence linking Al-Qaeda with the counter-terrorist 
financing measures that were initially introduced by President Bill Clinton 
following the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 (Ehrenfeld 
2011). These measures were soon matched by the United Nations who introduced 
the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing in 1999 
(UN 1999). However, it was not until 9/11 that the international community was 
sparked into unprecedented efforts to tackle the financing of terrorism, with 
particular focus on personal wealth of Osama bin Laden. The Institute for 
Economics and Peace concluded that Al-Qaeda was:  
 
“..funded by bin Ladin’s personal wealth and fundraising as well as 
through the opium trade. Recently, ransoms for hostages a New York 
Times report, Al-Qa’ida has raised $125m from ransoms since 2008, with 
$66m from 2013 alone. The source of the majority of ransom payments is 
reportedly European governments and companies.”(Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2014, p.54) 
 
It has been very difficult for the financial war on terrorism to have any 
meaningful impact on the finances of Al-Qaeda and its funding operations. For 
example, it has been suggested that its methods of raising and moving money 
have bedeviled the world’s intelligence agencies for good reason (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004). The 
ineffectiveness of the financial war on terrorism is also highlighted by the 
argument that it is impossible to accurately identify how much funding Al-Qaeda 
have received and from what sources or donors. For example, Clive Walker stated 
that while the worldwide outlay of Al-Qaeda has been estimated to cost up to 
£30m per annum, individual operations may entail modest costs derived from 
lawful sources (Walker 2011, p.388). This is a view supported by the Financial 
Action Task Force, who is citing the national high level officials, and sporadically 
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contributing to related terrorist organizations (FATF 2008). The British Treasury 
suggested that Osama bin Laden paid over $100m to the Taliban during the five 
years he was in Afghanistan. Tracking, intercepting and strangling the flow of 
funds is a vital element in the widening global effort against terrorism (UK HM 
Treasury 2002, p.11). 
Other reason that occurred limitation in war on financing of terrorism to 
Al-Qaeda is vast array of sources of finance that Al-Qaeda have utilized to fund 
their operations. This view is also supported by FATF: 
 
“During the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, it was widely 
reported that … members of al-Qaeda smuggled their money out of the 
country via Pakistan using couriers that handled bars of gold. In Karachi, 
couriers and hawala dealers transferred the money to the Gulf Region, 
where once again it was converted to gold bullion. It has been estimated 
that during one three-week period in late November to early December 
2001, al-Qaeda transferred £10m in cash and gold out of Afghanistan. An 
al-Qaeda manual found by British forces in Afghanistan in December 2001 
included … [not only information] on how to build explosives and clean 
weapons, but on how to smuggle gold on small boats or conceal it on the 
body. ” (FATF 2008, p.24) 
 
The association between hawala brokers and gold was identified by the 
FATF, who noted that hawala brokers used gold to balance their books and that 
terrorists may store their assets in gold because its value is easy to determine and 
remains relatively consistent over time. There is always a market for gold given 
its cultural significance in many areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia, South 
and Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa (FATF 2008). This is a 
view supported by the US Government Accountability Office who stated that 
terrorists can also convert their assets into internationally traded commodities that 
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serve as forms of currency, such as gold, but are not subject to standard financial 
reporting requirements (US Government Accountability Office 2003, p.14). Thus, 
alternative or non-remittance underground banking systems as part of the struggle 
against terrorist financing. The relationship between Al-Qaeda and the hawala 
system existed before the terrorist attacks in September 2001 when Al-Qaeda was 
forced to abandon the Afghanistan banking system because it was antiquated and 
undependable (UN Monitoring Group 2005, p.25). Therefore, it has been 
suggested that hawala became important to Al-Qaeda after the embassy bombings 
in Kenya and Nairobi in 1998 when:  
 
“Bin Ladin turned to an established hawala network operating in 
Pakistan, in Dubai, and throughout the Middle East to transfer funds 
efficiently. Hawalas were attractive to al Qaeda because they, unlike 
formal financial institutions, were not subject to potential government 
oversight and did not keep detailed records in standard form. Although 
hawaladars do keep ledgers, their records are often written in idiosyncratic 
shorthand and maintained only briefly. Al Qaeda used about a dozen 
trusted hawaladars, who almost certainly knew of the source and purpose 
of the money. Al-Qaeda also used both unwitting hawaladars and 
hawaladars who probably strongly suspected that they were dealing with al 
Qaeda but were nevertheless willing to deal with anyone. ” (UN 
Monitoring Group 2005, p.25) 
 
Illegal drug trade is one of the major funds to support its operations. This 
connection was identified by the UN and indicated that while it is difficult to 
establish how widely terrorist groups are involved in the illicit drug trade, or the 
breadth and nature of cooperation between these two criminal groups, the 
magnitude of the numbers involved make the relationship worrisome (UNODC 
n.d). Moreover, UN added that in some cases drugs have even been currency used 
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in the commission of terrorist attacks, as was the case in the Madrid bombings 
(UNODC n.d). It has been suggested that since 2003 certain Al-Qaeda cells were 
maintained by revenues from drug trafficking (Ehrenfeld 2011). The FATF, citing 
the United Nations Al-Qaeda & Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team, took the 
view that:  
 
“out of the total 2011–2012 budget of the Taliban of $400m – one 
third was raised from the poppy trade. To raise money, the Taliban runs a 
sophisticated protection racket for poppy farmers and drug traffickers, 
collecting taxes from the farmers and pay-offs from the traffickers for 
transporting the drugs through insurgent-controlled areas. ” (FATF 2014, 
p.43) 
 
Ransselaer Lee (2002) noted that despite the efforts of law enforcement 
agencies, there was an increasing amount of evidence that Al-Qaeda was able to 
adopt its funding mechanisms to avoid detection that that these terrorists had 
transferred a portion of its exposed assets into untraceable precious commodities 
(Lee 2002, p.19). 
An investigation by US News and World Reported noted that over the past 
25 years, the desert kingdom has been the single greatest force in spreading 
Islamic fundamentalism, while its huge, unregulated charities funneled hundreds 
of millions of dollars to jihad groups and Al-Qaeda cells around the world 
(Kaplan 2003). 
It has proved extremely difficult if not impossible to limit Al-Qaeda’s 
access to funds because many of their cells are self-financing. Indeed, Donohue 
stated that Al-Qaeda comprises loosely affiliated groups that are more closely 
resemble a movement than an organized entity. Most of its operations are self-
financed: the group carrying out the attack raises its own funds through a variety 
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of legal and illegal sources (Donohue 2008, p.153). This is a view supported by 
the Central Intelligence Agency who stated:  
 
“Usama Bin Ladin’s financial assets are difficult to track because 
he uses a wide variety of mechanisms to move and raise money[;] … he 
capitalizes on a large, difficult-to-identify network with few long-lasting 
nodes for penetration. It is difficult to determine with any degree of 
accuracy what percentage of each node contributes to his overall financial 
position. Gaps in our understanding contribute to the difficulty we have in 
pursuing the Bin Ladin financial target. We presently do not have the 
reporting to determine how much of Bin Ladin’s personal wealth he has 
used or continues to use in financing his organization; we are unable to 
estimate with confidence the value of his assets and net worth; and we do 
not know the level of financial support he draws from his family and other 
donors sympathetic to his cause. ” (UN Monitoring Group 2005, p.56) 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the impact of the financial war on 
terrorism on Al-Qaeda has resulted in a missed set of results. It has been reported 
that the arrests and deaths of several important facilitators have decreased the 
amount of money Al-Qaeda has raised and have made it more expensive and 
difficult to raise and move that money (UN Monitoring Group 2005, p.21). 
However, the ineffectiveness of the financial war on terrorism on Al-Qaeda is 
illustrated by the evidence that related groups, they have inspired attacked over 25 
countries and killed thousands of people (UN Monitoring Group 2005, p.56). 
The financing of this activity is equally international with funds very often 
being raised in one country, used for training in a second, for procurement in a 
third and for terrorist acts in a fourth (UK HM Treasury 2007, p.9). Therefore, it 
is clear that CFT regime is so young for struggle against Al-Qaeda; we must admit 
that this war is first and most important test of the CFT regime. Al-Qaeda case 
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showed that CFT regime should be improved by states and international 
organizations. International organizations should establish a ground in struggle 
against terrorist financing which should involve more states, in order to provide 
integration where terrorist groups cannot find gaps.  
Second case is ISIL which has emerged as one of the wealthiest terrorist 
organizations. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has emerged as the 
largest Sunni terrorist organization active in the Middle East. The group was 
originally Al-Qa’ida in Iraq. However following the death of the head of AQI, 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and disagreements over tactics, a group split from AQI 
and formed the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). ISIL became to adopt extreme violence 
and terror tactics as one of the major actors in the Syrian civil war in 2013 and 
with its rapid deployment into Syria and then Iraq in 2014. In February 2014 Al-
Qa’ida formally broke ties with ISIL, with leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stating ISIL 
disobeyed directions from Al-Qa’ida to kill fewer innocent people (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2014, p.51).  It is described as the largest threats to the 
effectiveness of the financial war on terrorism.  ISIL’s funding opportunities was 
recognized in UN Security Council Resolution 2170 that: 
 
“..identified ISIL-related funding streams, including revenues 
generated from control of oil fields and related infrastructure, kidnapping 
for ransom, trade with UN-designated entities, donations from individuals 
and entities, and possible sanctions evasion through aircraft or other 
transport to transfer gold or other valuable items and economic resources 
for sale on international markets. ” (FATF 2014) 
 
ISIL has three main funding streams, thus it is hard to limit funding of  it. 
First one is selling what they have captured, which include oil sales to local 
consumers, the Syrian regime and black marketers as well as exporting crude oil 
to Turkey. (Lander 2014) There is a sophisticated smuggling empire with illegal 
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exports going to Turkey, Jordan and Iran (Hawramy 2014). The Institute for 
Economics and Peace reported that ISIL controls a dozen oil fields and refineries 
in Iraq and Syria, generating revenues between $1m to $3m  per day  (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2014, p.51).  
The second funding source for ISIL is through foreign investors and 
private benefactors from several countries, such as Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and Syria (Laub 2014). However, it has been suggested that amount of funding 
provided by private sponsors has diminished by the international organizations 
pressure to the states, but it is only tiny percentage of total income that flows into 
ISIL (BBC News 2014).  
Third funding source is kidnapping and extortion (Institute for Economics 
and Peace 2014, p.51). Tens of millions of dollars paid by some European 
governments and wealthy relatives of the kidnap victims (Windrem 2014). It has 
also reported that ISIL has $36m from kidnapping foreign aid workers and 
journalists (Jonnson 2014, p.11). Therefore, it can be argued that in 2014 Islamic 
State is the best equipped and funded terrorist group with more financial wealth 
than Al-Qaeda ever had (Carey 2014). 
The most important question must be considered that which measures able 
to limit the relationship between ISIL and its funding opportunities. US President 
Barack Obama called the world to join efforts to starve it of financial resources 
and halt the flow of foreign recruits to its ranks (Lander 2014).  This has involved 
adopting various aspects of the financial war on terrorism have as imposing 
economic and financial sanctions. However, it is important to be conscious of the 
fact that ISIL, unlike other terrorist groups around the world, has been able to 
obtain a large proportion of its funding from within Iraq and Syria. Therefore, the 
likely impact of sanctions on ISIL members and financiers in both of these 
countries is likely to be negligible at best. Furthermore, the position has been 
made even more complicated because ISIL has largely gained a financial foothold 
in Iraq and Syria by effectively taking over the local economy. It’s taken control 
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of resources like oil installations and refineries, as well as food granaries, and the 
group is also extorting and taxing individuals operating businesses in the region 
(Johnston & Bahney 2014). 
It has been suggested that for to limit ISIL’s funding resources that 
required cutting the access to local Syrian and Iraqi income sources (Boghardt 
2014).  A number of unique and diverse case studies have been provided by 
countries which describe how ISIL obtains funding and economic support as well 
as describing mechanisms to utilize these funds. All these case studies has 
collected by international organizations, such as the United Nations, FATF, EU, 
IMF and more, then try to reach trimly analyses on terrorist organizations, such as 
ISIL. FATF Report on Financing of Terrorist Organization Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant(ISIL) defined need of struggle against terrorist financing to ISIL 
that : 
 
“The need for vast funds to meet organizational and governance 
requirements represents a vulnerability to ISIL’s infrastructure. In order to 
maintain its financial management and expenditures in areas where it 
operates, ISIL must be able to seize additional territory in order to exploit 
resources. It is unclear if ISIL’s revenue collection through the illicit 
proceeds it earns from occupation of territory, including extortion and 
theft, will be sustainable over time. Cutting off these vast revenue streams 
is both a challenge and opportunity for the global community to defeat this 
terrorist organization. ” (FATF 2015, p.5) 
 
Cutting off this vast revenue is primary purpose of international 
organizations. There are number of legislative options to the international 
community to tackle the threat posed by ISIL. It has been subjected to sanctions 
under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and 2161(UN Security Council 
2014-II). Furthermore, UN Security Council Resolution 2178 stated that:  
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“Member States shall, consistent with international human rights 
law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, prevent 
and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of 
individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or 
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, 
or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist 
training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities. ”(UN 
Security Council 2014-I) 
 
In addition to these UN Security Council Resolutions the FATF took the 
view that several of its recommendations could be an effective mechanism to 
limiting the funding opportunities for ISIL. For example, the FATF stated that 
countries should:  
 
“..criminalize terrorist financing on the basis of the Terrorist 
Financing Convention, and should criminalize not only the financing of 
terrorist acts but also the financing of terrorist organizations and individual 
terrorists even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act or acts. 
Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as money 
laundering predicate offences.” (FATF 2014, p.13) 
 
FATF Recommendation 6 provides that countries should implement 
targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with United Nations Security 
Council resolutions associated with prevention and suppression of terrorism and 
terrorist financing (FATF 2013). Moreover, the FATF stated that countries should 
review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be 
abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organizations are particularly 
vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused (FATF 
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2013). Importantly, the FATF took the view that countries should implement 
appropriate preventive measures to prevent ISIL from accessing the international 
financial system, including related to customer due diligence, correspondent 
banking, and wire transfers (FATF 2014). The FATF also provided that countries 
should ensure that individuals providing money or value transfer services are 
licensed, monitored, and sanctioned for lack of compliance (FATF 2014). It added 
that:  
 
“Countries should implement cash declaration/disclosure systems 
for both incoming and outgoing transportation of currency and bearer 
negotiable instruments … designated competent authorities should have 
the authority to request and obtain further information from the carrier 
with regard to the origin of the currency or [bearer negotiable instruments 
and their intended use.”(FATF 2014) 
 
Finally, the FATF stated that:  
 
“Each country should ensure that it has adequate means to and does 
in fact provide prompt and useful international cooperation, including 
inter-agency cooperation, mutual legal assistance and extradition, to other 
countries seeking to detect terrorist financing activity and to investigate or 
prosecute individuals or entities connected to such activity.”(FATF 2014) 
 
Juan C. Zarate noted that ‘you can’t lob in Treasury paratroopers or push 
some magic button in New York and stop all their financing when you’ve got a 
group [ISIL] like this’ (Condon 2014). Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
financial war on terrorism model that was used to attack the finances of Al-Qaeda 
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and Osama bin Laden would not work against ISIL because it is a new reality. The 
metastasized, Qaeda-inspired terrorist movements have learned to raise millions 
of dollars locally, while the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have resurrected the 
terrorist funding networks of old. Terrorist funding is now both local and global 
(Zarate&Sanderson 2014). However, FATF thought that there is an improvement 
in the technical compliance with many of the FATF recommendations resulting in 
stronger legal and regulatory frameworks. Despite these improvements, many 
jurisdictions continue to struggle with meeting the technical requirements 
associated with criminalizing terrorist financing, with abuse of the NPO sector, 
implementing targeted financial sanctions to freeze terrorist assets without delay 
and creating legal and operational frameworks to stop, restrain and enable 
confiscation of cash related to terrorist financing (FATF 2015). Taking into 
consideration that the 2013 FATF Methodology addresses the effectiveness of 
AML/CFT systems, jurisdictions should ensure that these TF-related 
recommendations, which have an important role in the disruption of ISIL funding, 
are being fully implemented. 
FATF Report on Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State in 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (2015) declared member states cases after 
implementation of FATF Recommendations. The report indicated  that there have 
been efforts to suppress the sale of ISIL oil and oil products on regional markets, 
such as enhanced counter smuggling efforts of the Turkish authorities in the past 
two years, as well as recent steps taken by the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) and Iraqi Government authorities to seize suspected ISIL-related 
shipments of oil and oil products. One of the case study in Turkey declared that: 
 
“Turkey provided statistics on counter oil smuggling, demonstrating that 
the amount of seizures of smuggled petroleum has shown a steady increase 
since 2012, when the government introduced enhanced measures with an 
Action Plan upon finding an increase in attempted oil smuggling along the 
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Syrian border. Following capture of oil fields by ISIL by summer 2014, 
the seizures of smuggled oil increased sharply, reaching 20 million liters at 
the seven Turkish provinces bordering Iraq and Syria. The amount of 
seizures of smuggled petroleum products and oil by Turkish authorities 
was raised to 79,238,759 liters in 2014 from over 73,000,000 liters in 2013 
and the number of intercepted smuggling incidents since 2012 has 
increased from around 4,000 to 10,000. ” (FATF 2015, p.34) 
 
In FATF Report on Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (2015), there are lots of cases of member countries 
in financial war against ISIL. However, there is doubt that economic sanctions 
and CFT efforts on ISIL has been sufficient or not. Statistics showed that the 
effectiveness of the financial war on terrorism on Islamic State will be limited 
because the terrorists have established a war economy which has spawned a for-
profit militant model that breathes life into insurgencies around the world 
(Zarate&Sanderson 2014). Therefore, ISIL has the resources (as well as the 
territory) to establish itself as the hub of a global terrorist movement in the heart 
of the Middle East. There are no Treasury paratroopers to send in to seize the 
cash, or bank regulations to issue to stop ISIS from spending it 
(Zarate&Sanderson 2014). 
The aim of this analysis has been to highlight the likely impact of the 
international organizations in struggle against terrorist financing associated with 
two carefully selected Islamic terrorist organizations Al-Qaeda and ISIL. Global 
Terrorism Index 2015 declared that  ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was 
in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014 (Institute for Economics and 
Peace 2015, p.39). Al-Qaeda also has been major indicator to improve CFT 
regime in the world since 2001. 
It is well-known that international organizations in struggle against 
terrorist financing, such as United Nations, FATF and more put some measures 
217 
 
for member states in this war on terrorism.  These measures were extended 
following the events of 9/11. It can be concluded that a large number of the Al-
Qaeda financiers have either been arrested or killed as part of the wider war on 
terrorism. It has even been suggested by some commentators that the measures 
introduced by the CFT regime has limited the ability of Al-Qaeda to support its 
operations in several countries. Global Terrorism Index 2014 Report mentioned 
that: 
 
“Prior to the death of bin Ladin the group were responsible for a 
number of high profile attacks within western countries such as September 
11, the London and Madrid bombings, as well as a string of smaller 
attacks. However, recently it hasn’t committed large scale acts of terror. 
This may be because of the much reduced organizational capacity. Other 
attacks such as suicide bombings, armed attacks, IEDs, kidnapping and 
hijackings have also been employed by the organization. The number of 
terrorist attacks attributed to Al-Qa’ida dropped significantly in 2013 to 
166 from 405 in 2012, while the organization was still responsible for the 
death of 559 people and injury of 1, 245 others. ” (Institute for Economics 
and Peace 2014, p.54) 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2016 Report mentioned that Al-Qa’ida had a 17 
percent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 1,1620 
deaths in the year (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016, p.49). 
Therefore it can be argued that the struggle against terrorist financing has 
been able to prevent Al-Qaeda from launching large-scale terrorist attacks in 
certain countries. However, what is clear from this monograph is that Al-Qaeda 
still poses a significant threat to the national security of many nation states and the 
safety of its citizens. This point was clearly illustrated by the conclusion of the 
Global Terrorism Index 2014 which noted that the majority of claimed deaths 
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from terrorist attacks, 66 percent in 2013, are claimed by only four terrorist 
organizations; ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates 
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2014). 
The second terrorist group is ISIL, who like Al-Qaeda has been able to get 
access to wide range of sources. In many ways, ISIL has become a self-sufficient 
terrorist organization that has thrived on the political uncertainty and insecurity in 
both Iraq and Syria. It has developed in a sophisticated modern terrorist 
organization, a point graphically illustrated by the following quote from the 
Global Terrorism Index 2014 Report:  
 
“The military and intelligence wings remain significant as ISIL attempt to 
gain and maintain control over land. Military operations include training 
camps as well as military incursions and terrorist activity. Terrorist activity 
takes the form of bombings targeting private citizens, police and 
businesses. In 2013 there were 350 terrorist attacks by ISIL which killed 
1,400 people and injured 3,600. ISIL conducted over 50 suicide bombings 
which killed an average of nine and injured 17 people. ”(Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2014,p.52) 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2016 Report mentioned that:  
 
“ISIL was the deadliest terrorist group in 2015 with one percent 
increase in deaths from the previous year, responsible for the deaths of 
6,141 people. Despite a reduction in attacks in Iraq, there was a 50% 
increase in attacks in Syria. In 2015 ISIL also expanded the number of 
countries in which they conduct an attack to 11, up from six in the 
previous year. If ISIL affiliated groups were to be included, the number of 
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countries where attacks occurred would jump to 28. ” (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2016, p.50) 
 
ISIL has been continuing lost massive amount on territory (Szoldra 2017). 
It means that ISIL will be in trouble funding of their needs, because Global 
Terrorism Index 2016 emphasized that ISIL’s economic activities were believed 
to generate roughly US$2 billion in revenue in 2015 and half of ISIL’s revenue 
comes from oil. If territory loses will continue, it would directly affect ISIL. 
Moreover, taxation is second major revenue for ISIL and it depends on size of 
area. According to new analysis: 
 
“The jihadi group has not only lost more than 60 percent of the 
territory it held straddling the Iraqi-Syrian border, but it has lost 80 percent 
of its revenue, according to London-based defense consultancy IHS 
Markit. It says that the group controlled 90,800 square kilometers (35,000 
square miles) of land as of January 2015, but two-and-a-half years 
later, the group now only holds 36,200 square kilometers (14,000 square 
miles), still about twice the size of New Jersey. Similarly, its revenue 
stream shrunk from a monthly average of $81 million in the second quarter 
of 2015, to $16 million in the second quarter of 2017” (Moore 2017) 
 
On war on ISIL financing, CFT measures just have limited affect, 
however military conventions do not lead only to loss of territories for 
ISIL and prevent ISIL to benefit significant sources of revenue, such as oil.  
Therefore, two terrorist groups Al-Qaeda and ISIL are best 
examples to understand effectiveness of CFT measures. Despite 
similarities of terrorist organizations, the techniques of financial war 
showed differences. Moreover, these two terrorist organizations show us 
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that CFT regime should be improved in struggle against terrorist financing 
associated with needs in war on terrorism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Terrorism is the starting point for this study, and this study tries to define 
terrorism with reference to academic articles, reports, journal articles, and books. 
An essential part of this study explains characteristics, history, components, 
methods and purposes of terrorism. These are the key issues to understand all 
aspects of terrorism.  
Studies conducted in the framework of issues related to terrorism in 
Turkey have been limited to terrorist groups at national level in the field. Those 
efforts are currently insufficient to explain the supranational nature of terrorism. 
These inadequate explanations and definitions in addition to the examples directly 
affect the international struggle against terrorism. For these reasons, this study is 
realized in the framework of terrorism from international academician’s articles 
and reports of international organizations on terrorism and terrorist financing. 
Thus, it tries to achieve supranational explanations and clarifications about 
terrorism.   
One state’s definition of terrorism can be in full contradiction with the 
other states’ definition. For example, one's states’ terrorist can be a freedom 
fighter from another state’s standpoint. This situation causes great damage to 
international relations, and it hampers common understanding and definition of 
terrorism at the international level.  This study stresses out that states could only 
be rational, when international organizations establish a definition, common 
standards or similar procedures. States’ behavior has been gathered around 
common interests on ground rules. The problem of different definitions of 
terrorism can only be solved through international decision-making processes in 
which all states are represented under common rules, methods, procedures and 
terms of reference.  
Academic studies made within the context of the international fight against 
terrorism have only been shaped by the role and the equitability of the United 
Nations (UN) and not sufficiently focused on the work of other international 
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organizations which fight against terrorism, such as FATF, EU, IMF and more. 
Thus, this study took the reference from primarily multidimensional sources, such 
as reports, resolutions, agreements, articles, and studies of international 
organizations.  
Terrorism has been and still confronts all nations with the means of a 
structure filled with complexities flowing over and beyond the borders that cannot 
be solved by a single state. This substantial threat, which transcends borders, 
makes cooperation between states compulsory. Within the scope of those 
cooperation efforts, this study analyzed war on terrorism with its financial side 
from international organizations’ reports, resolutions, articles and studies. 
International organizations try to establish a common ground, joint rules, 
and similar procedures for complex problems faced by the world political 
systems. Terrorism is one of the essential threats in today’s world, which occurred 
by anarchy created in the above-mentioned systems. International law, 
procedures, and rules presented by international organizations establish 
cooperation between states to solve problems of those systems. This study has 
defined funding of terrorism, CFT regime and war on financial war on terrorism 
with neo-institutional liberalism tools. 
This study defined terrorist financing as a significant threat, which 
transcends borders and needs cooperation between states. It focused on the 
primary reports, articles and studies of international organizations in struggle 
against terrorist financing.  Moreover, study examined international academic 
articles, to understand international organizations’ efforts on terrorist financing in 
the framework of neo-institutional liberalism. Eventually, study proved that 
international organizations’ efforts have limited effect on fighting with terrorism 
and terrorist financing threat. However, it has noted in this study that terrorism is 
a global threat and need global solutions. International organizations have 
essential role to achieve common mind, sustainability, continuity and 
collaboration.    
FATF and other international organizations have huge partnerships with 
networks to reach non-compliant countries which have strategic deficiency in 
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CFT regimes. These huge partnerships have to turn an advantage in struggle 
against terrorism and terrorist financing. Both Al-Qaeda and ISIL cases showed 
that a very limited number of international organizations follow trends on terrorist 
financing, such as FATF and United Nations. However, we need more 
information in order to identify problems to achieve reasonable, sustainable and 
realistic solutions in the fight against terrorist financing. 
The primary examination of sources on reports, articles and studies of 
international organizations which struggle against terrorist financing, find out a 
significant amount of FATF and FATF’s special recommendations..  
9/11 attacks activated, a global war on terrorism and prompted a new burst 
of rule-making and interaction on terrorist financing. FATF, the United Nations 
and the European Union enacted this policy change at a global level in order to 
struggle against terrorist financing. Then, IMF, the World Bank, Council of 
Europe, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the Wolfsberg Group of 
Banks and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision enacted CFT regime. Study 
indicates that all international organizations have unique reasons in struggle 
against terrorist financing and these unique reasons diversify and enrich struggle. 
Moreover, terrorist financing is global threat and this threat needs collaboration, 
persistence and global solutions. However, study has mentioned that international 
organizations efforts have been limited effects in struggle against terrorist 
financing, so they have to take more responsibility on this threat. 
Both terrorist organizations of Al-Qaeda and ISIL are best examples to 
understand the effectiveness of CFT measures. Despite similarities of terrorist 
organizations, the techniques of financing war on terrorism showed differences. 
Moreover, these two terrorist organizations have showed us that CFT regime 
should be improved in struggle against terrorist financing associated with needs in 
struggle against terrorist financing.   
The struggle against terrorist financing as previously defined in this study, 
is dependent on a number of mechanisms including the criminalization of terrorist 
financing, freezing or forfeiting the assets of terrorists, the use of financial 
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intelligence and the enforcement of sanctions. This study has also assessed CFT 
measures being able to limit the funding activities of terrorist financing.  
International organizations should take more responsibility and follow the 
behavior of terrorist organizations. Otherwise, CFT measures will have little or 
limited effect on these terrorist organizations. Both cases have proved that 
struggle against terrorist financing is the key issue in fighting against terrorism. 
However, CFT measures have limited effects in this fight. International 
organizations and states should establish prompt decision-making processes to 
find proper solutions so as to prevent humanity from the danger of this global 
threat. 
Both cases have proved that we need a soft law in CFT regime to enhance 
the implementation of measures. International organizations also have capacity to 
enlarge CFT regime. There are limited international organizations which are in the 
struggle against terrorist financing and FATF is one of them. As a case of CFT 
regime emergence and consolidation, CFT regime has unique recommendations to 
affect all the members and non-members of FATF with mutual evaluation 
processes. 
FATF Special Recommendations are recognized as the international 
standards for combating terrorist financing, as many international organizations, 
such as UN, Egmont Group, IMF, the World Bank and more are involved in it.  
The FATF’s formation of institutional partnerships with FSRBs, the IFIs, UN, and 
other international organizations has provided the FATF with significant 
functional advantages in advancing the implementation of a global CFT system.  
FATF’s CFT regime is approved by members, FSRBs, observers and 
financial organizations. These partnerships cover a significant part of the world 
and international financial system. FATF also takes advantage of its huge 
partnerships networks to subject the non-compliant countries which have strategic 
deficiencies in CFT regime. The mutual evaluation process aims to fully 
implement the recommendations that identified the deficiencies to prevent 
international financial system from abusing and more. The mutual evaluation 
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reports are made public, the presentation and discussion of a country’s fulfillment 
of the FATF recommendations could be considered persuasive enough to increase 
compliance. The public shame method has been used for countries that do not 
want to comply with the FATF recommendations, despite being warned earlier 
about identified deficiencies. The aim is to single out the countries that cause the 
misuse of the international financial system by not applying the international 
terrorist financing standards.  
Publication of the evaluations, countries have even more incentive to go 
further in compliance, because the evaluations are often used by banks and other 
entities in assessing the risk of doing business with entities in a particular country. 
Thus, a single country cannot take a stand in the international financial system. 
Also, name and shame system is more soft, persuasive and effective way to 
subject a country which resist compliance against FATF Recommendations, 
because no country can isolate itself from the whole world, or international 
financial system.  
International organizations in struggle against terrorist financing has had 
limited effect to prevent countries from terrorism threat. However, CFT regime is 
too new to achieve certain results, so CFT measures have to be developed by 
states and international organizations in order to have the countries protected from 
this global threat. International organizations should diversify and enrich their 
studies on terrorist financing, and they should establish more platforms to discuss 
and cooperate on issues that affect the world political systems, such as terrorist 
financing. Moreover, ISIL case has showed that terrorist organizations have an 
agenda and they can rapidly develop and change trends of terrorist financing. 
Therefore, international organizations should reduce bureaucracy and ensure rapid 
decision-making process in order to catch the trends. 
FATF Recommendations are soft law and non-binding, thus some people 
think FATF does not apply the CFT regime adequately because it uses soft touch. 
However, I believe that soft law and informality provide flexibility. This 
flexibility allows for a faster decision-making process for changing types and 
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methods of crime and be up to date. Terrorist financing issue needs the latest 
solutions, so the policy makers should have enough flexibility in decision-making 
processes, such as FATF. 
The 9 Special Recommendations on terrorist financing, which are meant to 
complement and be implemented along with the 40 Recommendations on money 
laundering, appear to have been limited because the FATF has not maintained 
sufficient separation between the two criminal practices. It is clear that FATF’s 
CFT regime comes from the 40 recommendations, the 9/11 prompted a new burst 
of rule making and interaction on terrorist financing and FATF designed special 
recommendations to fight against terrorist financing. Thus, FATF’s CFT strategy 
is associated with its AML strategy. Despite the similarities between money 
laundering and terrorist financing, it is important to recognize that the two 
activities remain distinct. Indeed, despite the need of both money launderers and 
terrorists to maintain discretion and their use of similar methods to do so, funding 
a terrorist organization does not necessarily involve laundering dirty revenue and 
instead often relies on collecting non-criminal funds through charities, legitimate 
businesses, or other seemingly clean sources. 
The CFT program of the FATF closely follows its AML program by 
imposing due diligence, monitoring and reporting requirements on banks and 
other gatekeepers to the financial system. These measures make it harder for 
terrorists to move large amounts of funds through financial system. However, this 
study has showed us that the terrorists transfer small amounts through other 
methods. Terrorist acts also needs small amount of funds that terrorist can easily 
get, so some part of the CFT program also are ineffective against terrorist 
financing for similar reasons. These measures may deter and detect criminals who 
illicitly get funds and transport it to another place; they may do nothing to prevent 
terrorists from transferring a small amount of funds that does not have to be 
declared but still enough to carry out a terrorist act. Accordingly, the FATF must 
address these specific weaknesses if its CFT efforts are to be more effective at 
preventing the funding of terrorism. 
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FATF declared its priority on terrorist financing in their up-to-date reports, 
so they are aware that their 40 Recommendations strategy is effective on anti-
money laundering, unlike the special recommendations which are limited in 
financial war on terrorism. These limitations and weaknesses may affect 
efficiency of special recommendations.  
This study tried to analyze the FATF anti-terrorist financing strategy, 
particularly the special recommendations. It distinctly established the limitations 
and weaknesses, moreover, this study put forward the strong points of FATF 
terrorist financing, these strong and weak points proved that FATF is major player 
in the struggle against terrorist financing, moreover it is the international policy 
maker on CFT. However, I believe that FATF’s intensive studies on terrorist 
financing may change the FATF’s CFT strategy. Limitations and weaknesses of 
special recommendations may affect this possible change and I expect a clear 
separation between FATF’s special recommendations and FATF’s forty 
recommendations. In this way, FATF may focus to develop CFT standards which 
involve diversified and enlarge solutions to prevent members and non-members 
countries from terrorism.  
This study has showed that FATF has an authority on international 
standards to prevent terrorist financing. In this way, FATF may continue to 
arrange partnerships in order to reach more states which has adequate 
implementation of terrorist financing standards.. In the near future, the AML and 
CFT standards will be a clear separation by FATF. This separation will directly 
affect all other organizations which refer to the FATF Recommendations. This 
will be a chance again to prevent this threat to the financial system. 
This study has reached that international organizations have an essential 
role in the struggle against terrorist financing. It is clear that they have raised 
awareness on threat; moreover they all have found different reasons in struggle 
against terrorist financing. This variety feeds the back ground of terrorist 
financing studies to raise awareness. 
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International organizations efforts encourage more academicians to study 
on terrorist financing issue, thus in near future we will have more resources on 
terrorist financing. These studies feed the variety of resources for the terrorist 
financing threat. Moreover, these studies on terrorist financing raise the awareness 
of other states which are non-compliant at implementation of international 
standards. In the near future, I believe that this awareness will turn out to be a 
great soft power for international organizations in struggle against terrorist 
financing.   
In conclusion, this study describes how the international organizations 
specifically FATF are adaptive, facilitating transnational effectiveness in the fight 
to counter terrorist financing and to ensure compliance with globally recognized 
standards. It is important to note that FATF cannot hope to eliminate completely 
the threat of terrorist financing. The incentive to carry out the crime cannot be 
fully eliminated from terrorist financing because such crime is very frequently 
driven by ideology and not profit. Meanwhile, there are lots of deficiencies on 
CFT strategy of FATF; they do not demand a change in its leadership level in the 
international community to establish standards against terrorist financing. The 
FATF must be praised for its attempts against terrorist financing. And other 
international organizations joined and followed CFT measures to become 
prevalent. Moreover, they should monitor terrorist financing trends which are 
used by terrorist organizations so as to be a part of the solution to this global 
threat.   
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ANNEXES 
     
   WEBSITES FOR KEY ORGANIZATIONS, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND INITIATIVES 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—Bank for International 
Settlements 
➢ http://www.bis.org/ (BIS Home Page) 
➢ http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) 
➢ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30.pdf (Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision) 
➢ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs61.pdf (Core Principles Methodology) 
➢ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.htm#pgtop (Customer Due Diligence 
for Banks) 
➢ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf (Prevention of Criminal Use of 
the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering December 
1988) 
 
Council of Europe 
➢ http://www.coe.int/portalT.asp (Main page) 
➢ http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/141.htm 
(Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime—The Strasbourg Convention, 8.XI.1990) 
 
Egmont Group for Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) 
➢ http://www.egmontgroup.org/ (Main page) 
➢ http://www.egmontgroup.org/list_of_fius_062304.pdf (Countries with 
operational Financial Intelligence Units) 
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➢ http://www.egmontgroup.org/statement_of_purpose.pdf (Statement of 
Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, 
Guernsey, 2004) 
➢ http://www.egmontgroup.org/info_paper_final_092003.pdf 
(Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont 
Group) 
➢ http://www.egmontgroup.org/procedure_for_being_recognised.pdf 
(Procedure for being recognized as member country) 
➢ http://www.fincen.gov/fiuinaction.pdf (List of AML cases) 
 
European Union 
➢ http://europa.eu.int/ (Main page) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/eudireng.htm (Council Directive on Prevention 
of use of Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering 
(91/308/EC)) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/EUdir01e.htm (Directive 2001/97/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 
amending Council Directive 91/308/EC on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering.) 
 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) 
➢ http://www.fatf-gafi.org (Welcome page) 
➢ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/MLaundering_en.htm (Money Laundering) 
➢ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/40Recs-2003_en.pdf (The Forty 
Recommendations 2003) 
➢ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/SRecTF_en.pdf (The Special 
Recommendations 2001) 
➢ http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/TerFinance_en.htm (Terrorist Financing) 
➢ http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/GuidFITF01_en.pdf (Guidance for 
financial organizations in Detecting Terrorist Financing) 
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➢ http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/Initiatives_en.htm (Other International Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing Initiatives) 
➢ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/SR8-NPO_en.pdf (Combating the Abuse 
of Non-Profit Organizations: International Best Practices (11 October 
2002) 
➢ http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/NCCT_en.htm (Non-Cooperative Countries 
and Territories) 
 
FATF-Style Regional Bodies 
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
➢ http://www.apgml.org (Main site) 
➢ http://www.apgml.org/content/member_jurisdiction.jsp (Member 
Jurisdictions) 
➢ http://www.apgml.org/content/observer_jurisdiction.jsp (Observer 
Jurisdictions) 
➢ http://www.apgml.org/content/organisations.jsp (Observer 
Organizations)  
 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 
➢ http://www.cfatf.org (Main site) 
➢ http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-orgpages/org-cfatf_en.htm (Co-
operating and Supporting Nations and Observers) 
➢ http://www.cfatf.org/about/about.asp?PageNumber=1 (Membership) 
➢ http://www.cfatf.org/eng/recommendations/cfatf/ (Caribbean Financial 
Action Task Force—CFATF 19 Recommendations, 1990) 
➢ https://cfatf-gafic.org/index.php/documents/cfatf-resources/24-
kingston-declaration-on-money-laundering?format=html (Kingston 
Declaration on Money Laundering—November 5–6, 1992) 
 
MONEYVAL (Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation 
of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV Committee) 
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➢ http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_cooperation/Combating_e
conomic crime/Money_laundering/ (Main site) 
➢ http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-orgpages/org-pcrev_en.htm (Members 
and Observers) 
 
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) 
➢ http://www.esaamlg.org (Main site) 
➢ http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-orgpages/org-esaamlg_en.htm 
(Members and Observers) 
 
Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, GAFILAT (Formerly known 
Financial Action Task Force of South America, GAFISUD)  
➢ http://www.gafilat.org/ (Main site) 
➢ http://www.gafilat.org/content/observadores/ (See members and 
observers 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
➢ http://www.iaisweb.org/ (Main page) 
➢ http://www.iaisweb.org/framesets/pas.html (Overview of IAIS 
principles, standards and guidance papers) 
➢ http://www.iaisweb.org/132_176_ENU_HTML.asp (Member countries 
and jurisdictions) 
 
International Monetary Fund 
➢ http://www.imf.org/ (Main page) 
➢ http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/092502.htm 
(Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) (September 2002) 
➢ http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/am/2002/eng/092523.htm 
(Comprehensive Methodology on AML/CFT) 
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United Nations 
➢ http://www.un.org 
➢ http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (List of Member States) 
➢ http://www.incb.org/e/conv/1988/ (United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) 
(Vienna Convention)) 
➢ http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/palermo/convmain.html (United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) (The 
Palermo Convention)) 
➢ http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm (United Nations International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)) 
➢ http://www.untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/Status/Chapter_xviii/treaty11.as
p (Status–Convention of the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism) 
➢ http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html (UN Charter) 
➢ http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp (United Nations Treaty 
Collection Conventions on Terrorism) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/ml99eng.htm (United Nations Model 
Legislation on Laundering, Confiscation and International Cooperation 
in Relation to the Proceeds of Crime (1999)) 
➢ http://www.un.org/terrorism/ (UN Action against Terrorism) 
➢ http://www.un.org/sc/ctc (Counter-Terrorism Committee) 
➢ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaty_adherence.html (List of member 
countries) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/imolin/en/pocf03.html (United Nations Model 
Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing Bill 
2003) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/imolin/en/tfbill03.html (United Nations Model 
Terrorist Financing Bill 2003) 
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United Nations–International Money Laundering Information Network 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/ (Main page) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/imolin/gpml.html(United Nations Global 
Program Against Money Laundering) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/conventi.htm (Standards, Conventions and 
Legal Instruments) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/model.htm (Model Laws/Regulation) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/map.htm (National legislation relating to money 
laundering) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/reference.htm (Reference) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/current.htm (Current Events in the Anti-Money 
Laundering Arena) 
➢ http://www.imolin.org/calendar.htm (Calendar of Events) 
 
United Nations–Security Council Resolutions 
➢ http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm 
 
Wolfsberg Group of Banks 
➢ http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/index.html (The Wolfsberg 
Group of Banks) 
➢ http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/wolfsberg_statement.html (The 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism) 
➢ http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/corresp-banking.html (The 
Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent 
Banking) 
 
The World Bank Group 
➢ http://www.worldbank.org/ 
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➢ http://www.amlcft.org (Financial Market Integrity website on anti-
money laundering and terrorist financing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
